


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POWER, PRIMACY, AND PERSPECTIVE: AMERICA AS NO. 1 NATION. VOLUM--ETC(U)  
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POWER, PRIMACY, AND PERSPECTIVE  
AMERICA AS NUMBER 1 NATION  
VOLUME I. IDENTIFYING THE TOOLS OF MEASUREMENT

ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

15 DECEMBER 1976



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and others. Chance and environment play roles in national status, but so also do national character and achievement.

The United States has ranked as No. 1 in power since the 1930's and as No. 1 in development since 1913; yet widespread affluence has emerged only over the most recent two generations. In military and nuclear power, the United States probably shares primacy with the USSR; in most other elements of power and status, the United States stands at the apex alone: GNP, GNP per capita, industrial production, food production, low tax burden, diplomatic representation, Nobel Prizes, computers, energy, free press, radio and TV, personal citizen freedom, and many others. In addition, the "America idea" (not only material power) continues to inspire foreign admirations. Foreigners see the United States as No. 1 nation and as likely to remain so. Americans perceive less approval for America abroad than actually exists.

American relative eminence will decline; nevertheless, despite all the complex accelerating changes in progress, American primacy will probably extend to 1990 and possibly to 2000 and after. It is of importance to much of the rest of the world that American power remain at a very high level.

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

# POWER, PRIMACY, AND PERSPECTIVE: AMERICA AS NO. 1 NATION

Volume I

IDENTIFYING THE TOOLS OF MEASUREMENT

by

Anthony L. Wermuth

15 December 1976

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
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## FOREWORD

This volume is the first of a three-volume work which explores the domestic and international significance of America's being the world's number one nation. Volume I explores some theoretical and empirical concepts as tools and as contexts relevant to power, influence, authority, leadership, primacy, and other perspectives towards being Number One. Volume II compares numerous specific appraisals of US power and status and Volume III considers potential impacts from a changing world upon American primacy in the future. Volume III also contains an extensive bibliography. A summary of all three volumes has also been published.

In publishing such works, the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical studies on subjects of current importance. This three-volume work was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not necessarily reflect the official view of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.

  
JOSEPH E. PIZZI  
Colonel, Infantry  
Director

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Dr. ANTHONY L. WERMUTH joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1974. He holds masters degrees from Columbia University in English and from George Washington University in international affairs and a doctorate from Boston University in political science. A West Point graduate, Dr. Wermuth's military assignments included brigade command; Assistant for Central Europe (OASD, ISA); and Military Assistant (Public Affairs) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He spent seven years on the West Point and US Army War College faculties. Following retirement, he served for seven years as Director, Social Science Studies, Center for Advanced Studies and Analyses, Westinghouse Electric Corporation. He has written many articles on civil-military affairs in professional journals, and is a member of numerous professional associations.



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Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret:  
Though you drive out nature with a pitchfork,  
it will always hurry back.

- Horace

Man is astonishingly good at dealing with the physical world, but he is just as astonishingly bad at dealing with human nature; therefore, an inch gained in the understanding of and command over human nature is worth a mile gained in the understanding of and command over physical nature.

- Arnold J. Toynbee,  
The Prospects of Western  
Civilization

A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors.

- Old European saying  
(K. Deutsch, Nationalism  
and Its Alternatives)

Equality begins in the grave.

- French proverb

## INTRODUCTION

In anthologies of apt quotations, someone named Lacordaire is credited with this line: "It is the true cry of nature; wherever we are, we wish to be first." Is this true; do we? Every one of us? Wherever we are? Is the evidence conclusive? Does no one second the contradictory conclusion of Samuel Johnson: "Subordination tends greatly to human happiness"?

In recent decades, the United States has been frequently referred to as "the Number One Nation," as "the most powerful nation in the world," and as a "superpower" without peer. Again, we ask, are these appraisals accurate, partly true, exaggerated, bombastic, or what? Either way, is it important; should we care? If the appraisals are inaccurate, what is faulty about them?

In further narrowing of one particular context, we may also note allegations by some foreigners and some Americans that the United States vigorously seeks to be Number One, to increase its status of primacy, to exploit Number One status in the grip of an obsession that is uniquely American. Again, one asks, is there anything to this allegation? Are most or many Americans obsessed with being Number One? If they are, does that make them in some way unique? If they have pursued primacy, are they, should they be, vulnerable to some kind of guilt? Like the peak of Everest, is incumbency as Number One Nation subject to winds and forces of unique velocity and mystery?

These introductory questions relate to the subject of this inquiry: What is the "hierarchical" status, internationally, of

the United States? Is that status changing in any major respects? In what respects? What significance, if any, attaches to such changes?

The following subjects, in sequence, constitute the subject matter of the successive divisions of data and analyses that comprise this study:

- the nature of power, inequality, and primacy,
  - international relations involving heterogeneous facets of primacy,
  - undistorted rankings of the United States among nations,
  - foreign perceptions of United States status,
  - domestic perceptions of United States status,
  - international changes affecting United States status,
- and
- implications for United States status in the future.

This is a research project. It is not a personal view, although some personal perceptions inevitably come to the surface; the selection of data, alone, despite one's efforts to keep from overdoing it, is at least a partial projection of support for one view against others.

This project attempts to determine the sense of whatever consensual view exists toward a highly complex--and, to some extent, controversial--subject; it assembles and organizes data from many scholars, experts, theorists, analysts, commentators, interpreters, and statisticians from many fields of knowledge and from a number



of points of view toward the United States and the changing international context. While the context is undeniably complex, the perspectives endorsed herein tend to be relatively simplified; many of the topics addressed briefly herein deserve far more comprehensive treatment than they receive in these pages. Although not totally absent, extremist polemics are mostly omitted from quotation, as well as polemical responses to them. Such theoretical constructs as are included for discussion appear primarily in the first and second chapters. The discussion of some concepts is so limited as to border on the superficial; but our endeavor, short of rigid exclusivity, is to limit discussion to whatever appears related to the core subject of processes affecting American primacy. There is much more to be said on both sides of almost every subject discussed here.

In the early sections of this paper, some aspects of history are recounted. The reader may well ask, is not this study long enough already? Why "pad" it with history? Are we not primarily concerned with current and future relationships among nations? These are reasonable questions. We include selected incidents and strands out of history, however, to provide antecedents for certain current dynamics. If we are not, all of us, "prisoners" of our pasts, we are at least the heirs of our inflexible pasts. History comprises events and counter-events, beneficences, grievances, and lessons which have left scars and memories; some of the memories are deep and long; some are buried deep in us and our environment, even though we are not aware of all of them. No modern nation has appeared as a tabula rasa; every one bears physical and psychological

residues that share in shaping its desires and its course among the numerous and varied other nations.

This study penetrates unevenly, in no instance to more than a modest degree, into a number of disciplines and fields of study, each concerned with knowing much about a limited part of man, his world, or his institutions. Many of these fields overlap or intersect in various ways. None appears to have an exclusive monopoly on valuable insights into the truth about any aspect of existence. Therefore, the reader will encounter several sections in which the same subject appears to be repeated; in such instances, our intent has been to approach the same aspect employing the premises or perceptions of different fields, not altogether unlike the mirrors in the fun-house, each reflecting "incompatible" views of the identical subject (but not, we hope, similarly distorting the subject).

We have varying degrees of confidence, or lack of it, in the different approaches, techniques, methodologies, perceptions, assumptions, and conclusions cited in different places throughout this study. One particularly deep misgiving should be cited early and recalled throughout: we are highly skeptical about assertions concerning motivations, about assurances that some articulator knows why persons, or groups, or nations do certain things. With occasional exceptions, we hold that at best the assurer may be partially right.

Richard Means in The Ethical Imperative says that there are three indicators of values: what people say their values are; what people's actions and choices indicate their values to be; and what

values appear to be evaluated high or low in their particular cultures. Even at best, these can be very vague and misleading indicators. Even explanation, what people say their values are, is not always reliable. In conducting surveys, for example, experienced interviewers and poll-takers are usually aware that the respondent may not be able to understand his own reasons or behavior; or he may understand them but be unable to articulate them; or he may intend to mislead his questioner about them. Thus, even with clues direct from the source, one may experience difficulty and uncertainty in identifying the well-springs of one's own behavior accurately. How much more reason, then, to refrain from certainty when attempting to determine indirectly the motives of others!

Such uncertainty adds further to the speculative nature of many of the conclusions presented herein, conclusions expressed by various sources themselves, and conclusions reached by the author of this study in hand.

Comparative rankings and indicators of status among nations do not yet, in quantity or quality, provide definitive bases for total comparisons; yet they are numerous, they are proliferating, and they are becoming increasingly comprehensive and reliable. We cite many of them in the course of this study, but we do not pretend to include herein every comparative statistic available. We believe that a reasonably ample body of data is provided to ascertain America's status among nations, and to support the assessments ventured herein.

It may occasion mild surprise that an analytical venture of this sort sponsored by the US Army War College does not devote more



space and emphasis to military factors, especially in view of the pressing need for more, not less, integration of all interdisciplinary aspects of major international problems. However, it is my view that while the importance of military factors remains appreciably high, and while they are appropriately addressed in many current analyses, their relative importance is declining. Not that military factors are neglected here; they are explored, but in contexts which place perhaps greater emphasis upon economic, political, social, and psychological dynamics in international relations.

There remains a need to discuss one final general aspect: the relative nature of data and assessments. Few, if any, appraisals in absolute terms are presented in this study. One important area of appraisal (especially in later discussions of national character, national interest, and national image) involves alleged values and attributes of nations. However, it is not intended to deal with absolutes. There are no virtues or vices that are attributable in 100% potency to any nation. All nations have strengths and weaknesses, glories and imperfections--albeit ones somewhat different from each other. In exploring the nature, impact, and significance of primacy among nations, we are aware that the attribution of discreet characteristics to nations, and the assessment of overall *statuses based on aggregation of attributes and rankings*, cannot be rationalized as possession of unalloyed, absolute, or maximum possible realizations of one attribute or several.

Moreover, each attribute singled out as characteristic of a nation is almost invariably accompanied, in the same possessor, by



its reverse. Thus, when freedom is cited as one of the most significant attributes of American society, what is meant, of course, is that while unfreedom also exists for some people in American society, more freedom than unfreedom exists and prevails.

Thus, assessments herein are overwhelmingly projected, not as related to some theoretical ideal state of a particular quality, but merely as related to actual status among real nations in real life.

In 1797, John Quincy Adams, the son of the new second president of the United States, was sent by his father to Berlin, as this new nation's first Minister to the court of the King of Prussia. Upon his arrival in Berlin, it is said, "he was examined by a dapper young officer of the guard, who unblushingly admitted that he had never even heard of the United States of America."<sup>1</sup>

Within numerous limitations, this project analyzes certain elements of status that have since changed in connection with this once-anonymous nation.

## Summary of Volume I: Identifying The Tools of Measurement

This study emphasizes one dynamic among nations: primacy, one relationship about which not very much has been said up to this time. The identification of Number One status is perfectly normal almost everywhere; cognizance of success is of universal interest. Such a status always exists in some context of inequality; all complex human activities are organized in some form of stratification of hierarchy or pecking order. Each of a number of approaches to primacy provides a degree or nuance of illumination not provided by others: power, authority, influence, superiority, Number One, winning, bigness, leadership, and others. Power does not constitute the sole or exclusive agent or context relative to high international status, but it is the primary context.

To achieve eminence and influence in the world hierarchy, nations must possess or control enormous physical power over an extended period of time. Primacy requires physical power that exceeds, or at least equals, the physical power possessed by any other nation state; no abstract quality, such as respect, is likely to result in sustained influence comparable to that achievable by the control of physical power.

Many older thinkers link power drives to the allegedly base and corrupt nature of man, a root-concept of Christianity and of the American Founding Fathers. Most students of power agree that power is preferable to chaos and anarchy, that it will promptly emerge to fill any vacuum, and that it is essential in some degree at every level of organized human activity. Lasswell and Kaplan express modern dynamics in their impressive definition: "Power is participation in the making of decisions."

Military power has always been a primary component of national power, contingent upon military forces in being, the nation's mobilizable military potential, and the nation's military reputation. Economic power largely makes possible the realization of other forms of power. Also selectively influential are certain imponderables, such as national character, morale, effectiveness of government, and quality of diplomacy.

The central actor in the dynamics of power and primacy, as in every other important aspect of international relations, is the nation state. The desire for achievement, as well as the operation of chance, have been responsible for many of the differences in progress by various nations toward accretion of power and development. To their direct interests, superpowers add "world interests"--some responsibilities for international order. Nations are also distinguished by their national images; other nations respond not only to what America is, but to what they think America is.

Interactions among nations become steadily more complex; a number of concepts are helpful in understanding these interactions (e.g., balance of power; international community); but none is completely satisfactory. Many modern specialists insist that every national action has moral aspects, and that "reason of state" no longer automatically overrides moral considerations.

Some stronger powers exercise domination over fellow members or client states; some exercise hegemony; and some, as is characteristic of the United States, exercise primacy as leadership. The leader, the state with the greatest power, assumes extra burdens in a clearly differentiated role of leader, but deals with associates and other states as equals, with as little coercion as possible.

Any state in the status of Number One Nation will inescapably be involved in the maintenance of international order; and it is in the interests of other states to see to it that the Number One nation, if it is acceptable in that role, is supported in its capacity to carry out its unique role--to the extent that the role benefits not itself alone but other states as well.



## CHAPTER 1

### CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

#### General

In a realistic sense, the identification of Number One status within any collectivity of human beings is perfectly normal, both in the natural curiosity among all members about who's ahead, and in the one leading member's enjoyment in "being ahead while it lasts." Tennyson invoked primacy when he described Plato as "the first of those who know." Browning made a theological argument about primacy in "Pippa Passes": "All service ranks the same with God--with God--whose puppets, best and worst are we; there is no last nor first . . ."

It has usually been of considerable significance (at least, to the prince) to be the son of a king, but of very special significance to be the first son. Primogeniture played a substantial role for centuries in helping to keep order among estates and inheritances. Vast regions of the earth have been declared the property of one older nation or another, not because a particular explorer was more thorough, or braver, or more brilliant than others, but only because he was first in stepping ashore and articulating a claim in some form.

In more mundane circles, most students are interested in knowing who stands at the top of their class. Most citizens are aware of the identity of the reigning heavyweight champion and the current league-leading team. Older American movie fans will



remember Charlie Chan's exasperated indulgence of his "Number One Son." Avis Rent-a-car advertisements have impinged on our consciousness for several years that Avis is Number Two and, hence, feels that it must "try harder." Most folk wisdom contains advice that it is better to be a big frog in a small pond than a small frog in a big pond (compare Caesar's declaration: "Better first in a village than second in Rome!"), and also warnings to "Look out for Number One," that is, the entity at the top of everyone's hierarchy of concern: himself.

Moreover, interest in primacy and other superlative statuses may be on the ascendancy, if one judges by the popularity of such recent compendia as The Best, by Peter Passell (1974); Famous First Facts and Records in the United States, by Joseph Nathan Kane (1933, 1974); and the Guinness Book of World Records by Norris and Ross McWhirter (1956-1975), self-described as identifying "which is highest, lowest, biggest, smallest, fastest, slowest, oldest, loudest, greatest, hottest, coldest, strongest."

In sum, in all societies, various forms of comparison and competition produce winners and losers in politics, sports, business, scholarships, aesthetics, lotteries, jobs, and courts. Intermittently, societies are convulsed by drastic competitions called wars. Winning and losing, and interest in winners and losers, are part of universal experience.

Let us confront early the premise that there is something peculiar or abnormal about substantial interest in improving one's

status and standings. Professor Ernest Baker, in his 1973 Pulitzer-Prize-winning Denial of Death, asserts that such interest, in individuals (and by extrapolation, in groups and nations) is central and universal:

In childhood we see the struggle for self-esteem at its least disguised. The child is unashamed about what he needs and wants most. His whole organism shouts the claims of his natural narcissism. And this claim can make childhood hellish for the adults concerned, especially when there are several children competing at once for the prerogatives of limitless self-extension, what we might call 'cosmic significance.' The term is not meant to be taken lightly, because this is where our discussion is leading. We like to speak casually about 'sibling rivalry,' as though it were some kind of by-product of growing up, a bit of competitiveness and selfishness of children who have been spoiled, who haven't yet grown into a generous social nature. But it is too all-absorbing and relentless to be an aberration, it expresses the heart of the creature: the desire to stand out, to be the one in creation. When you combine natural narcissism with the basic need for self-esteem, you create a creature who has to feel himself an object of primary value: first in the universe, representing in himself all of life. This is the reason for the daily and usually excruciating struggle with siblings: the child cannot allow himself to be second-best or devalued, much less left out. 'You gave him the biggest piece of candy!' 'You gave him more juice!' 'Here's a little more, then.' 'Now she's got more juice than me!' 'You let her light the fire in the fireplace and not me.' 'Okay, you light a piece of paper.' 'But this piece of paper is smaller than the one she lit.' And so on and on. An animal who gets his feeling of worth symbolically has to minutely compare himself to those around him, to make sure he doesn't come off second-best. Sibling rivalry is a critical problem that reflects the basic human condition: it is not that children are vicious, selfish, or domineering. It is that they so openly express man's tragic destiny: he must desperately justify himself as an object of primary value in the universe; he must stand out, be a hero, make the biggest possible contribution to world life, show that he counts more than anything or anyone else.<sup>1a</sup>

Some modern observers, however, claim to detect unique degrees of unhealthy obsession among Americans with being Number One.

Analogies with sports rivalries are frequently drawn, and the modal expression of the American ethos is said to be provided by football coaches. Whether the position of primacy was sought or arrived despite American reluctance to receive it, America is variously said to be enthusiastic, exuberant, aggressive, even arrogant, in winning, in relishing, exploiting, and extending ascendancy over other nations in various ways.

We can readily concede that there is something (but very much?) to the charge. President Nixon, for example, repeated on many occasions the theme that the United States must be second to none. When President Ford announced a program to combat inflation, it seemed to many a characteristically American gesture to choose the slogan, "Whip Inflation Now," which supported the distribution of thousands of lapel buttons inscribed with the initials "WIN." In a 1971 American-sponsored survey of certain foreign countries, the question was asked: "Which country do you think is ahead at the present time in the cultural field--music, literature, the arts--the United States or the Soviet Union?"--as though even music and art were contexts of rivalry in which "being ahead" could be detected meaningfully.

It is said that the transcendent role of competition in American life produces an obsession with winning, with being on top, with being Number One. It is said that this obsession corrupts American life and American relationships with other nations and peoples.



Are these allegations true? Half true? Two percent true?  
Are sports enthusiasms indicative of existence of identical enthusiasms toward also excelling the whole world in everything else?  
Is obsession preponderant among Americans or only among a small minority of vociferous Americans? Is a conviction of American primacy in a number of attributes justified, or are some of these perceptions faulty? If the status of being Number One is considered vital by some Americans, who are they? How representative are they?

Are the foreign policies of America conditioned by hubris?  
If status differentials of the United States relative to other countries exist, how do they affect the conduct of American policy?  
Is some form of primacy actually sought? Does the United States construct policy in any field with the explicit objective to retain, or accentuate, its status as No. One among nations? Would some form of sufficiency be adequate for some, if not most, national purposes? Is America the only nation charged with hubris, or pride of place? What is the prevailing characteristic identifying America's approach to relationship with other nations--imperialism, leadership, authority, dominance, competition, cooperation, hegemony, altruism? How do foreigners perceive the international role and performance of the United States? How do Americans perceive themselves in relation to other countries? Are there forces at work in the world which are altering reality and perception in international dynamics?

One can propose still another set of interesting questions about alleged United States primacy:



Assuming that the United States does occupy the status of Number One nation in some, many, or most respects, has this status been unfairly achieved? Has America achieved this status primarily through its own efforts, primarily via the efforts of other nations, or primarily through the operation of chance? Has this position of primacy been achieved through manipulation or deception or exploitation of other nations? Are there one or more other modern nations entitled, morally or otherwise, to supersede the United States as Number One Nation? Which are they? If such a nation were to supersede the United States, what indicators exist, if any, that the role of Number One Nation would be performed more effectively, in the interests of all nations and peoples, than by the United States?

At this point, we merely raise these questions; but we shall return to many of them in some depth.

### Primacy

What do we mean by "being Number One"? Despite its deceptive surface simplicity, primacy is not a simple concept to understand and explain. The speaker employing the concept may mean any one of several things different from what is meant by another speaker. It is a concept that lends itself to vagueness, so that it is sometimes impossible to tell whether the speaker means anything more specific than generalized prominence or power or inequality.

Primacy, by definition, involves some context of inequality. We suggest here a number of cluster-approaches to the pluralistic

concept of primacy. Each approach is itself pluralistic, comprising a cluster of relationships differing in nuance. All cluster-approaches are partially overlapping. All are, ultimately, relative terms; it is difficult if not impossible to conceptualize any of these approaches, such as power, as identifying an absolute condition--one entity is only more or less powerful than another entity. Whether or not some self-contained condition of absolute or ultimate power can be conceived is irrelevant to this discussion, which is intended only to illuminate relationships among real entities in the real world. Clearly, a nation does not exist in a vacuum; its primacy, and other advantages and disadvantages, can only be appreciated relative to some other nation.

It is suggested that the following cluster-approaches can be perceived as conceptually distinctive:

**Power:** a central concept in understanding relations between individuals and groups, and particularly among nations, rooted in differences in physical strength, or manipulative skill, military quantity and quality, economic strength, etc.

Essentially connotes differential in ability to coerce with physical strength, although non-material factors may also be involved, such as political power, power of knowledge, psychological power.

**Authority:** a concept emphasizing non-material, derived legitimacy as decider or adviser, or approver, as source of political authority, moral authority, prestige, religious authority. May also involve projection of charisma, personality, expertise.

Influence: the capacity, whether intended or not, to affect the behavior of others, through exploitation of power, authority, eloquence, or projection of other attribute.

Superiority: higher status within some system of stratification, based on custom or tradition (e.g., the divine right of kings, noblesse oblige), ancestry, possession of wealth or social position, performance, real or self-ascribed prowess in physical, artistic, or intellectual pursuits.

No. 1: primacy, preeminence, supremacy, firstness, top ranking.

Winning: competitive success, victory, demonstrated superiority, exclusive domination, not losing, prizewinning.

Bigness: dominance via sheer scale, size, or quantity; drastic inequality.

Leadership: role of primus inter pares; among several entities facing a situation in common, primacy of one usually based on possession of relative physical power but conditioned by possession of non-material attributes, such as authority, moral certainty, charisma, personality, style, or trust; usually involves some concession by others to leadership role via adoption by others of some degree of followship.

These are somewhat arbitrary categorizations. A number of other concepts might serve as reasonable candidates for discussion in this context, such as greatness, rule, force, persuasion, coercion, compulsion, consensus, vanity, pride, ambition, patriotism, chauvinism, egocentricity, deference, machismo, hegemony, imperialism, and others which express some additional nuance of relationship between unequal entities. We are not able to explore



all these concepts, but we may be able to explore a limited number of them for relevance to this study. Initially, we shall conduct exploration of these terms on the abstract or individual level, gradually expanding application of the discussion to more concrete contexts and group levels, and, in particular, discussing them on the level of the nation-state. In this initial chapter, a number of concepts are practically confined to mere introduction, with more extensive discussion deferred until Chapter 2.

Three additional concepts have not yet been mentioned but will also be included in our discussion: the issue of operant conditioning, perception, and the normative area. In exploring the concept of norm, and without attempting to probe deeply into the related areas of equity and justice, we shall endeavor to remain aware of distinctions between norms of custom, norms of effectiveness, and norms of ethics--that is, patterns of behavior that are basically culture-bound (e.g., "we do it this way primarily because our people have always done it this way"); patterns of behavior that are justified primarily by criteria of effectiveness (e.g., "we do it this way because this way works"); and patterns of behavior that appeal to ethical principles (e.g., "we do it this way, not because it's the way we've always done it, nor simply because it works, but because we believe it's the right thing to do").

There is nothing new, of course, in the general concept of determinism; religious denominations have wrestled for centuries with such issues as determinism vs. man's alleged possession of free will. Behaviorism is a Twentieth Century version. The concept

of determinism (or, as labeled in at least one modern theoretical school, operant conditioning) can be inadequately explained as suggesting that individuals or groups do what they do, not because of the conscious reasons for choice which they articulate, but because of structural, institutional, or relational conditions in their environment of which they may be unaware or only dimly aware, or because of forces in the human psyche which neither they nor external observers as yet fully understand.

We include these conceptual areas for discussion because they have emerged into sufficient prominence to be included in modern discussions of international dynamics, of why nations act toward each other the way they do. However, we pretend to no expertise in the elusive areas of ethics or psychology; we hope our discussion is meaningful enough to demonstrate their relevance to the central subject, while suggesting that much more needs to be learned about them before one can have high confidence that his discussion will meet with an extensive approving consensus. We shall return to these concepts.

Thus, we are committed to exploring several concepts important to evaluation of primacy--cognition and perception; operant conditioning; chance; power, influence, and associated concepts; equality and inequality; the concept of norm; conflict and cooperation; and leadership.

## Perception

Perception, says John Platt, has always been one of the hardest things in the world to explain.<sup>2</sup> We are all of us aware that there are differences between perception and reality, between what we see (or think we see) and what there really is to be seen. Only occasionally and intermittently do we become aware that our observation is selective and subjective--that, among all the details there are to be seen in reality, we tend to see what we are looking for, what we want to see.

This phenomenon produces two contrary effects:

Centuries ago, the Buddha wrote: 'Life does not depend on man's view that the world is eternal, or that it is finite, or that the body and soul are distinct, or that Buddha exists after death. Whether these views or their opposites are held, there is still re-birth, there is old age, there is death and grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow and despair.'<sup>3</sup>

Despite innumerable beliefs ranging along a spectrum of variability, despite many contradictory beliefs about the same, identical events, the events occur, possessing their own nature, not dependent on what is believed about them. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, famine-generating droughts, floods, and similar natural events will occur, whether men approve or disapprove, praise or curse them, welcome or fear them, or pray for them to come or pray for them to go, or acknowledge or deny their occurrence.

In short, events will happen, and happen in certain ways, no matter what man's opinions or attitudes or beliefs or perceptions about them may be, one way or the other. This observation can be extended to include events in which human beings play roles,



conceding yes, certain events happened, in certain ways, but for reasons we do not understand fully. Thus, we might argue that people's perceptions are not important; whatever they see or believe, what really matters is what really happened. The point of this argument is to hold that, again, certain events will occur in certain ways, no matter what are the opinions, beliefs, and attitudes about them held by observers. (There are highly complex nuances here which we shall not pursue further.)

But this observation can be stood on its head. Particularly regarding interactions involving human causation, we may come to observe that in certain situations what really happened is not nearly so important as what people believe to have happened, according to their perceptions. One nation may be dealing fairly with another; but, due to skillful orchestration of damaging propaganda, the first nation may be erroneously perceived as bullying the second nation. Outcry and opposition against the first nation may erupt and influence the outcome, not because of what really happened nor because of what did not happen but simply because of what people think happened. Thus, says K. E. Boulding, "It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior."<sup>4</sup>

Thus we may choose to emphasize that certain outcomes will occur in human affairs no matter what our beliefs or perceptions about them may be; on the other hand, we may choose to emphasize that perceptions are more important than reality--in which case

people will generally act, not according to reality, but according to their perceptions.

To relate this concept to our discussion, we express major interest, for example, in the perceptions of the United States held by foreign countries and their citizens. In current terms, the "image" of America held by foreigners affects their relationships with America on any number of issues. For example, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger emphasized the importance of perception in a November 1974 comment that:

. . . the nuclear balance rests on 'perceptions'  
. . . if it is 'perceived' that the United States has  
slipped into a position of strategic inferiority, then  
the Soviet Union would engage in more adventuresome  
political and military policies.<sup>5</sup>

Singer says

". . . It is argued, although not demonstrated, that stereotypes among nations are more important than the facts about the nations themselves. More important than the truth about America is what Europe thinks about America, if we view the matter from the standpoint of relationship; for Europe will be more influenced by its own picture of America than by America itself.<sup>6</sup>

Whether the United States is widely perceived to occupy a position of primacy is conditioned by the perceptions of many countries toward many factors--some quantifiable, some imponderable. Some will perceive the same things; some will perceive different things; some will perceive the same things differently. We shall take up later what these current perceptions by foreigners happen to be. We note here only that perceptions of events may differ from the reality of events, and that, notwithstanding such

differences, it may be the perception, and not the reality, that determines or influences the outcomes of subsequent events.

An old Danish proverb says: "If you would be powerful, pretend to be powerful." Up to World War II, much of the world, including France, believed that France had the most powerful military establishment; but that perception was a delusion. We doubt that any modern nation can be willfully deceived by others about the main facts of power, especially at higher levels of status in the world hierarchy. However, any one nation might deceive itself, by choosing to overrate or underrate another's power. In any event, the secrecy which most nations sought in the past in order to deceive potential adversaries as to its real power is no longer a viable tool. In today's world, it is essential that a nation intending to use power and influence have genuine power, and further, that other nations be provided with sufficient data to perceive by themselves accurately what the reality is. In this aspect of interaction, it is to a powerful nation's advantage, not only to maintain real power, but also to project an image of its power that reflects reality.

#### Determinism

Turning from the concept of perception to the concept of determinism, we are compelled to note that the latter theoretical area is still controversial; nevertheless, it holds promise for contributing to understanding of the interrelationships between



man and his environment. C. D. Broad, a British philosopher, gives this definition: "What determinism asserts is that given the totality of all antecedent conditions in the universe that lead to the present occasion (in which we are to choose or act), one and only one future can follow."<sup>6a</sup> Probably the best known current proponent of that form of determinism known as "operant conditioning" is Professor B. F. Skinner, a Harvard behavioral psychologist.

Essentially, claims Skinner, there is a science of behavior, which as yet we understand only imperfectly. Study shows already that man largely behaves as he does, not because he exercises a free choice among several available behaviors, but because the environment (society, custom, law, parents, organization, his history, and similar auspices and forces) all influence (or "condition") him to behave in a certain way. If one wants to change his behavior, it is ineffective to work directly on changing that person; instead, one should seek to change the environment, so that the environment will reinforce desired behavior or punish undesired behavior--preferably, the former. Although all commentators acknowledge the high quality of Skinner's scientific work, there are a number of responsible critics of Skinner's theories.<sup>7</sup>

We cite one here:

. . . It is the same with punishment systems, according to operant conditioners. In simple societies in which personal contacts are few and not densely intertwined, the evil effects of punishment techniques are dissipated; but under complex conditions, they produce a noxious form of social pollution. They produce Vietnam-type wars; rootless, disillusioned youth; anomic, suicidal adults; disaffected ethnic minorities; cynical, manipulative leaders; presidential assassins; and Manson families. Fortunately, so the argument runs, behavior can be controlled in a better way, in a way that produces expressive rather than suppressed individuals, a way that is rewarding and reinforcing rather than punishing. Nearly everything that can be done by punishment can be done better and with fewer bad side effects through reinforcements. Moreover, everybody will be happier. How do operant conditioners know this?

The answer is that they do not yet know it.<sup>8</sup>

Some critics say that Skinner's is a laboratory explanation, in which the behavior studied has been limited unrealistically to fewer alternatives than most real life situations involve. Some critics say that Skinner really discusses no relationships more complex than two-person behavior (which is highly complicated, to begin with).<sup>9</sup> Some doubt that any controls devised by Skinner or anyone else will control the category of men "who are inveterate and unalterable seekers and users of power."<sup>10</sup> Perhaps the most frequent criticism is of Skinner's alleged "elimination of freedom," or free choice.<sup>11</sup>

Skinner defends himself:

I simply ask my reader to consider the possibility that human behavior is always controlled, and by conditions which we are slowly coming to understand . . . control does not mean physical restraint or manipulation . . . The behavioral scientist simply changes the environment in such a way that behavior is changed. The literatures of freedom and dignity have not been concerned with freeing man from control but merely with changing the kind of control . . .

. . . In the past, individuals have emerged to seize power and use it to advance their own interests. They have done so because the culture has permitted them (indeed, induced them) to do so. In a different culture, power will be used in a different way . . .

. . . Some kind of uneasy equilibrium is maintained between nation and nation, nation and system, capital and labor, therapist and patient, teacher and student, or parent and child. Control and countercontrol explain the behavior of the parties involved--although, traditionally, such behavior has been mistakenly attributed to personal traits, such as compassion or benevolence . . .

. . . The Soldier who gives his life for the good of his country or to make the world safe for democracy or communism is under the control of a particular kind of social environment, and religious martyrdom shows a similar pattern. . . . Where are we to find the conditioned reinforcers which will work for the future of mankind?<sup>12</sup>



. . . If despotic rule is bad, immoral, or unethical, then it is the sign of a bad culture, and another kind of culture will be more likely to survive--if it can get its chance. Such a chance could conceivably arise by accident, but we have reached the point at which it may come from explicit design.<sup>13</sup>

J. David Singer suggests an example of conditioned behavior, as that of an individual who, say, teaches a subject such as national security in a private college. He behaves within certain parameters. However, should the same person move into a position as consultant to the government, even though in the same field, his role, and hence his behavior, would change. Should he then move into a still different position as a government official, though still in the same field, additional changes in role and behavior would occur. Singer observes:

. . . the pressure to conform to the expectations of a new peer group is only one of the factors at work; every role change can be expected to produce attitudinal and behavioral change, and in the same vein, the most diverse personalities will tend to converge if they are put into the same policy-making role.

. . . Now it might be argued that there are, in this world, a great many individuals who are not likely to acquiesce in such a fashion. True; but it can be asserted that this sort of 'rugged individualist' is generally screened out from the beginning; there is very little room for someone who is not a 'team man' in bureaucracies.<sup>14</sup>

This observation accounts for conformity among those who remain in or enter a particular environment, but it does not account for non-conforming responses among those who remain outside or who depart.

A veteran observer and "father of exchange theory," Dr. George C. Homans (author of the classic The Human Group), has no doubt about

the effectiveness of determinism; his reservations stem from our still-fragmentary ability to understand how it works:

In a way, the issue of determinism is a bogus one. All of our behavior is absolutely determined; however, because you don't know how it's determined, except in certain crude cases, it doesn't make any difference. You still retain the feeling of freedom. Suppose we knew much more about the general laws of behavior than we now do. Because we don't know the circumstances of a man's past history, we still would not know how the laws would apply in his particular case. Suppose we not only knew the general laws, which in many ways we do, but also the circumstances of a particular person's past history that might affect his current behavior. Further, suppose that we could design a computer and feed into it all of the general propositions and the given conditions. Suppose we could do all this. Would the result be worth the cost of doing it? . . . My bet is that it wouldn't be . . .

In human terms, it is hopeless. All of us believe in determinism at times--that is, experimentally believe in it. At other times, we believe we're free. Our behavior is completely determined, but it doesn't make a damn bit of difference to me because I can't predict it. I can't show how the behavior of different men, behavior exemplifying the same general propositions, combines over time to produce particular results. The trouble is that the past behavior that affects--determines if you will--present behavior is linked together in complex chains, creating the illusion of freedom. I like to quote Justice Holmes, who also was a determinist. He used to say, 'The way the inevitable is brought about is through effort.'<sup>14a</sup>

It appears that neither Skinner nor anyone else yet knows much about constructing a culture that "controls" behavior in desirable ways, or whether it will ever be possible to do so.

Yet, we grasp dimly what Skinner is driving at. We recall a broadly stated example in Abraham Lincoln's candid admission near the end of the Civil War: "I claim not to have controlled events, but frankly admit that events have controlled me."<sup>15</sup>

Increasingly, we become aware that our behavior and responses, if not totally "controlled," are shaped by many factors outside our choice; we shrink, however, from accepting any premise that we totally lack any freedom of choice. David McClelland's findings, discussed in the next chapter, modify our acceptance of Social Darwinism, and support a role for man as creator, as well as creature, of his environment.

In any event, we may not reach a point of desiring to devise a structure that would shape or control our behavior; but we may at least encourage further attempts to explain our behavior, why we persons interact the way we do, and especially why nations interact the way they do. We can hope that new knowledge will help us, at the least, to understand enough about such interactions in order that nations may cease to produce stimuli toward others that generate adversary behavior in response.

### Chance

From determinism, we turn to its opposite, chance, as a factor in human and international affairs. As "Ecclesiastes" intones, time and chance happeneth to us all. The effects of chance are, by definition, variable, unpredictable and immeasurable; but most of us will concede some influence to it. Moreover, most of us



will probably concede that, despite our brilliance, virtue, and prodigious effort, chance has already played some role in outcomes that affect us. While few Americans would concede that chance is exclusively responsible for American achievement of a position of primacy, most would concede that the degree of chance provided to the United States by such inadvertent factors as geography, climate, soil, resources, and the British fleet (that is, "propitious circumstances"--a phrase occurring later in this study) played no insignificant role in United States growth to primacy.

One may observe today, for example, the sudden economic eminence of the Arab oil-exporting countries, to which the Arabs have contributed very little, if anything. The Arabs did nothing to place the oil under their soil. Non-Arabs invented the necessary methods to extract and refine the oil, to make oil useful, and then taught the methods to the Arabs. Other peoples, in fact, produced the brains, effort, and imagination to construct an energy-dependent, advanced oil-using civilization, which is what gives Arab oil any value whatsoever in the first place. Here, in analyzing what factors raised the Arabs to economic eminence, it is undeniable that chance has played a significant role in international relations; and, no doubt, chance will continue to exercise a variable, unpredictable, but sometimes substantive role.

#### Transiency

Another aspect of primacy is related both to chance and change. One lesson from history is certain: relative statuses will change, sooner or later, and even the meaning and prestige of primacy will

doubtless change. Pride of place, hubris, vanity--all are subject to evanescence, as are the related concepts of greatness, ambition, pride, egocentricity, chauvinism, and jingoism. Pride has itself a kind of primacy; it is first among the Seven Deadly Sins. Who has not shared a grim and rueful smile upon reading Shelley's poem "Ozymandias"?--

Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair! . . .  
Around, the lone and level sands stretch far away.

Or, Carl Sandburg's similar thoughts about the ruins of an ancient Cretan city, lines which seem particularly evocative of the theme of this study:

The doors were cedar  
And the panels strips of gold,  
And the girls were golden girls  
And the panels read and the girls chanted:  
    We are the greatest city  
    The greatest nation:  
    Nothing like us ever was.  
The doors are twisted on broken hinges.  
Sheets of rain swish through on the wind  
    Where the golden girls ran and the panels read:  
    We are the greatest city,  
    The greatest nation:  
    Nothing like us ever was.<sup>16</sup>

Several references to transiency during this study will contradict any possible implications that any nation's primacy, American or other, can be expected to endure indefinitely. One case study of transiency, that of France, will be examined in some detail.

#### Power and Influence

We turn to two of the three overlapping central concepts of power, influence, and authority, sometimes (usually loosely) used interchangeably. The subject has fascinated a long string of

thinkers from ancient times, and a wealth of early insights illuminates the dynamics of power; efforts to develop systematic measures of power, however, date almost wholly from the 1950's.<sup>17</sup>

"Social scientists have not as yet been able to formulate a precise and widely accepted operational definition of power."<sup>18</sup> As a matter of fact, there is little agreement even as to whether power or influence is the more inclusive term.<sup>19</sup> In large measure, the concept remains elusive. In one passage, political scientist Robert Dahl writes:

Unfortunately, in the English language, power is an awkward word; for, unlike 'influence' and 'control,' it has no convenient verb form, nor can the subject and object of the relation be supplied with noun forms without resort to barbarous neologisms.<sup>20</sup>

In another relevant passage, Dahl deplores the absence of any universally accepted definition of power.

. . . There are students of the subject, although I do not recall any who have had the temerity to say so in print, who think that . . . the whole study of 'power' is a bottomless swamp.<sup>21</sup>

In a preface to Knorr's Power and Wealth, Benjamin Cohen writes:

In the literature in this area there is remarkably little consensus about, for example, what determines national power in the international arena, or how power can be utilized, or what its consequences may be. In fact, most writers do not even seem to be sure what power is.<sup>22</sup>

Speaking generally, any form of influence may also be a form of power, but not necessarily.<sup>23</sup>

We cite these inconclusive explanations of power by authorities in order to assure the reader, should our own explanations prove unsatisfactory, that our imperfections in this regard are



representative of the prevailing state of wisdom in this field. Moreover, despite the misgivings expressed above, we shall continue to try to cope with the concept of power and its relationship to primacy.

Bertrand Russell once asserted: ". . . the fundamental concept in social science is power, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics."<sup>24</sup> R. H. Tawney held that ". . . power is the most obvious characteristic of organized society, but it is also the most ambiguous . . ."<sup>25</sup> J. David Singer insists: ". . . Power remains, even in the contemporary phase of the international system, the central and dominant phenomenon . . ."<sup>26</sup>

Adolph Berle cites Professor Alfred Adler's insistence, differing from Freud, that power, more than sex, is the prime determinant of the human personality.<sup>27</sup> And Russell is skeptical of economic centrists: "The orthodox economists, as well as Marx . . . were mistaken in supposing that economic self-interest could be taken as the fundamental motive in the social sciences."<sup>28</sup>

Berle holds that most men are familiar with a number of power structures and have some experience of exercising power, even if the power they have had access to is quantitatively minute (e.g., only over one's own dog); moreover, he holds, most men want some measure of power.<sup>29</sup>

Berle calls Machiavelli's The Prince "the greatest single study of power on record." It has been condemned over centuries, of course, for lack of interest in moral aspects. Although Machiavelli recommended "good laws" as expedient in attracting

support to a power holder, Machiavelli held that hatred is gained as much by good works as by evil works (an observation of direct relevance to some late-20th-century problems, such as foreign aid, impacting on any higher-status nation).<sup>30</sup>

The justification of political authority, the location of sovereignty, the balancing of freedom and authority, the requirements of political obligation--all these aspects of political power have been critical questions for political philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to present times. Gradually, emphasis has shifted, through a long succession of thinkers--Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau--from concern solely with "what ought to be" to expanded concern with analysis of how power and authority are actually distributed in society.<sup>31</sup>

As noted, attempts to analyze power systematically are of relatively recent origin, such as in William Riker's attempt to analyze five formal definitions of power, or Dahl's amplification of the premise that A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would otherwise not do.<sup>32</sup> One is said to have power to the extent that he influences the behavior of others in accordance with his own intentions. One may achieve influence on others' behavior in three ways: by physical force, by explicit domination and direction, or by manipulation without being explicit.<sup>33</sup> One simple definition, by Lasswell and Kaplan, holds up well throughout any discussion of power in modern contexts: "power is participation in the making of decisions."<sup>34</sup>

Bertrand Russell offers a useful caveat:

Love of power, in various limited forms, is almost universal, but in its absolute form it is rare . . . The impulse of submission, which is just as real and just as common as the impulse to command, has its roots in fear . . . Whenever there is acute danger, the impulse of most people is to seek out authority and submit to it . . .<sup>35</sup>

Russell continues:

. . . those who most desire power are, broadly speaking, those most likely to acquire it. It follows that, in a social system in which power is open to all, the posts which confer power will, as a rule, be occupied by men who differ from the average in being exceptionally power-loving. Love of power, though one of the strongest of human motives, is very unevenly distributed . . . Those whose love of power is not strong are unlikely to have much influence on the course of events. The men who cause social changes are, as a rule, men who strongly desire to do so . . .<sup>36</sup>

Russell perceives these dynamics:

To those who have but little of power and glory, it may seem that a little more would satisfy them, but in this they are mistaken: these desires are insatiable and infinite, and only in the infinitude of God could they find repose . . . this . . . is most notable in the great conquerors, but some element of it is to be found in all men . . . Hence competition, the need of compromise and government, the impulse to rebellion, with instability and periodic violence. And hence the need of morality to restrain anarchic self-assertion . . .<sup>37</sup>

Singer identifies five "common and important" types of power:

reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power

(two parties' identification with each other), and expert power.

These sometimes overlap; for example, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the power to coerce and the power to reward.

"Legitimate power" is possibly the most complex, with plural roots, involving some kind of internalized acceptance by one party of the notion that the other party has a legitimate right to expect conforming responses from him. The range of "expert power" is



limited; for example, as Singer dryly observes, "some of our renowned physical scientists have found quite painfully that their expert power in physical sciences does not extend to regions involving international politics."<sup>38</sup>

Berle discerns five "natural laws of power," applicable in all situations large and small:

1. Power invariably fills a vacuum; power always prevails over chaos.
2. Power is invariably personal; there is really no such thing as "class power," "elite power," "group power," etc.
3. Power is invariably based on a system of ideas, or philosophy; without such a base, power is ineffective and will be replaced.
4. Power depends on, and is exercised through, institutions.
5. Power invariably acts in relation to a field of responsibility.<sup>39</sup>

Lasswell and Kaplan define power simply as coercive influence. Morton Deutsch partially disagrees, feeling that power is purposive influence that may be coercive but need not be. Morton Deutsch identifies six types (like Singer's five types) of the power to influence others (coercive, exchange, expert, etc.).<sup>40</sup>

Power is an interpersonal situation; [says Lasswell] those who hold power are empowered. . . . The power relation [like leadership and followership] is give-and-take . . . cue-giving and cue-taking. . . . Although cue-giving is highly concentrated in the conductor, commanding officer, or foreman, the function is not wholly monopolized by any one of them.<sup>41</sup>

Power can be considered unilateral if only one party exercises power over another, and bilateral if both exercise some power over each other (e.g., in bargaining).<sup>42</sup>

Many writers hold that man's search for power is not only universal, but primary. Says Bertrand Russell: "Of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires for power and glory."<sup>43</sup> Thomas Hobbes wrote: "The general inclination of all mankind is a perpetual and restless drive after power, which ceaseth only in death." An example of power-lust (or perhaps of overweening hubris) was provided by one of Nietzsche's characters in Thus Spake Zarathustra: "If there were gods, how could I bear not to be a god? Therefore, there are no gods!"<sup>44</sup>

A critical dilemma related to power and its exercise by some men involves the controversial assumption that man is basically evil:

The belief that man is predominantly base, corrupt, untrustworthy, and sinful is of long standing; it lies, for example, at the roots of Christianity. By the late Middle Ages, the Christian bias had become ingrained into political thought, laying the basis for the separation-of-powers doctrine proposed by Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws, in 1748. It deeply influenced the American Founding Fathers, who, except for a few like Jefferson, believed that man is mostly beast and satyr.<sup>45</sup>

Madison in Federalist 37 insisted that "the infirmities and depravities of the human character" determine the major motivations of political life, and in No. 78 held that human nature is "depraved" and "all mankind prone to folly and wickedness." These were widely held views; most delegates to the Constitutional Convention were hostile to government power and were anti-majoritarian. Sherman, of Connecticut, said, ". . . the people should have as little to do as may be about the government. They want information and are constantly liable to be misled."<sup>46</sup>

Madison wrote in Federalist No. 6: "Men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious"; where selfish interest and opportunity coincide, "neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on to prevail."<sup>47</sup> These views doubtless influenced the tenor of the American constitution.

Some eminent theorists such as Mosca, Pareto, Nomad, and Michels, have elevated generalizations about the alleged inevitability of abuse of power into social laws.<sup>48</sup> The "dictum" of Lord Acton has become universally familiar: "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely."

Some theorists who are equally, or more, eminent reject this thesis, in part or in whole. Modern analysts reject the premise as psychologically untenable.<sup>49</sup> Robert Lynd rejects the "innate insatiable lust for power" theory, simply because there are so many people who obviously do not exhibit it.<sup>50</sup> Professor Sidney Hook says, "It is extremely questionable whether there is any such thing as a love of power in the abstract. . . ."<sup>51</sup> Lasswell and Kaplan argue that hunger for power is not dominant in all persons, groups, and cultures.<sup>52</sup>

Arnold Rogow joins with Harold Lasswell in questioning Lord Acton's famous dictum, citing some of history's most powerful rulers (e.g., Cincinnatus, Peisistratus, Trajan, Charlemagne, Marcus Aurelius, Charles the Fifth, Lincoln) as being least corrupt or power-hungry:

Most modern empirical research . . . rejects the premise of an innate power drive in human behavior. The evidence suggests that the crucial factor in any



generalization involving the power value is the personality structure of the power-seeker. The central hypothesis about such individuals is that they seek power as compensation for deprivation . . .

--of self; family; friends; professional or business associates; or ethnic, religious, or national group.<sup>53</sup>

Moreover, insist Rogow and Lasswell,

There is no evidence that power in and of itself tends to corrupt. . . . The Acton assertion is a gross oversimplification of the facts, since power also ennobles, and powerlessness also corrupts or ennobles. . . .<sup>54</sup>

For comparison of a powerful incorruptible, one recalls a striking passage from the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius that has worn well over the centuries:

See thou be not Caesarified, nor take that dye, for there is the possibility. So keep thyself a simple and good man, uncorrupt, dignified, plain, a friend of justice, godfearing, gracious, affectionate, manful in doing thy duty. Strive to be always such as philosophy intended to make thee. Revere the gods; serve men. This only is the harvest of earthly existence, a righteous disposition and social acts.<sup>55</sup>

My own kit of life experiences inclines me to be skeptical about extremist nuances in this debate. I have no scientific laboratory findings to report, so that I must express my reservations carefully; but these reservations arise from 40 years in the work force (including 30 years in the military), during which a number of opportunities occurred to observe and reflect upon behavior in positions of power.

In addition, I partially reject and partially accept that part of Acton's dictum asserting that "absolute power corrupts absolutely." In modern times, especially in the American system of

checks and balances, there is practically no chance of anyone's achieving a position of absolute power (and, therefore, no chance of observing incumbents in absolute circumstances). Laboratory hypotheses cannot be other than speculative. So that one wonders how anyone in America could predict "absolutely" what the behavior would be of one given absolute power.

Lasswell and others quoted above cite examples from the (mostly distant) past of men of great power who did not abuse power; but those citations, too, arouse some skepticism. How can we be satisfied that their positions were indeed positions, not merely of great power, but of absolute power? They cite Lincoln, for example; but in America not even a president, including Lincoln, possessed a degree of power that, while great, could be considered anywhere in the vicinity of absolute power. Even in an age which, like all others so far, witnesses the existence of some totalitarian states and dictators of varying degrees, some obviously wielding enormous personal power over others, one wonders whether the power of any one of them can be appraised as genuinely absolute. Acton may be right, but I question his extremism on this point.

In any event, many of us have probably read about, or even encountered, a few persons whose behavior in various limited-power circumstances was such that one feels justified in expecting that, if they were ever given absolute power, their performance would remain uncorrupt, scrupulously accountable in rectitude. But again one can only speculate in advance; and one's predictions may simply follow one's predilections for tough-minded or tender-minded judgments.

For myself, I concede that one might uncover rare, extremely rare, persons (saint? the philosophers of Plato?) who would not abuse unlimited power if they attained it; but I am unwilling to take the chance of conferring it on them, and I would make no exception. The behavior of any person in such circumstances cannot be predicted with any degree of confidence, and concessions of absolute power may prove not retrievable.

In that sense, Acton's judgment may be too harsh in regard to a tiny proportion of men, but any experiment to prove its falsity or truth by conferring absolute power is too risky; it should remain unproved. So much for the second part of Acton's principle.

The first part of Acton's dictum, however, seems reasonable. He did not say that power corrupts, in all men, everywhere; he said that power tends to corrupt; and it seems to me that persuasive evidence is all around us, all our lives. Lasswell says that power drives result from status deprivation, but that basis seems too restrictive. Have we not seen what appear to be status-maintenance and status-enhancement drives (that is, still further enhancement of status that has never been low) as motivators and rationales for power-abusing behavior? I speak of people who exercise considerable unearned power, and who want to retain it and to increase it. Consider the inheritor of great wealth, or the scion of a prominent family, or the recipient of other unearned ascriptive advantages (intelligence, blood, beauty, strength)--hardly classifiable as "deprived" in the ordinary, familiar sense, yet many quite heavily



committed early in life to the concept that they are entitled to wield power of some kind in some degree. Resistance to their pretensions is regarded as an affront. This process may be simply one link in the chain of powerseeking which Hobbes, Russell, and others see as unrelenting, ceasing only in death. It is easy to succumb to suspicions that since one is better born, worthier, brighter, stronger, more beautiful, or wealthier than the great majority of others, others should defer to one's dicta. Looking back on a number of contexts of power, including those in which temptation appeared to be resisted, it seems to me that it is inarguable that power does indeed tend to corrupt.

To anticipate some future citation of implications from these dynamics, it may be appropriate to observe here that in this respect, as in others, the Founding Fathers were wise indeed. The American system of checks and balances could, no doubt, be improved upon; but it has proved to be a singularly effective system in curbing the opportunities for excess that powerful positions make tempting (and which incumbents all too often exploit). There is no place in the American system for unlimited, absolute power, but there are plenty of opportunities (as everywhere else) to abuse some grant of power. While systemic curbs may hamper certain possibilities of accomplishment in occasional circumstances, they appear to have prevented far more harm than they have prevented good.

In any event, after this brief caveat regarding the corrupting effect of power, we return to the theoretical discussion of power.

Morton Deutsch argues that the power aspirations of most people are not unlimited; he cites the desire to avoid the

responsibilities of high position and fear of competitive success as examples of self-imposed limits, as well as the non-unfamiliar self-imposed limitation on one's striving only toward a rank occupied by others whose abilities and opinions appear comparable to one's own.<sup>56</sup>

Also rejecting the notion that power is inherently evil or dangerous, Berle insists that power is an essential ingredient at every level of human organization.<sup>57</sup> Russell says, ". . . the

existence of civilized communities is impossible without some element of force. . . ." Both Berle and Russell hold that some exercise of power is always preferable to anarchy and chaos; a vacuum in power will promptly, inevitably, be filled by other power.<sup>58</sup>

Power can emerge, of course, on one or more foundations--military strength, wealth, knowledge, skill, respect, and other qualities. Power and its bases interact, not only between parties to a coercive relationship, but also between those parties and the overall environment, between other observers and the environment, and so forth. In most instances, like leadership, power exercise is an interaction, a giving-and-taking situation; as cited earlier, Lasswell puts it this way: "Those who hold power are empowered."<sup>59</sup> The nature of the power wielding can be fairly evaluated only in terms of the circumstances and the intention and performance of the power-wielder (this point has relevance, as we shall see, to international attitudes holding, for example, that bigness or possession or preponderant power alone is sufficient evidence of a nation's deficient moral status).

#### Authority

Observed Bertrand de Jouvenel:

The phenomenon called 'authority' is at once more ancient and more fundamental than the phenomenon called 'state'; the natural ascendancy of some men over others is the principle of all human organizations and all human advances.<sup>60</sup>

"Authority" is variously defined as a property, a relationship, a quality of communications or community. Lasswell and Kaplan



define "authority" as "formal power."<sup>61</sup> Max Weber distinguishes three types of authority: legal-rational (the more restricted type); traditional (when subordinates believe in the broad system of traditions supporting the holder's use of power and authority); and charismatic (based on devotion to the personal qualities of the leader).<sup>62</sup>

Michels defined authority as "the capacity, innate or acquired, for exercising authority over a group." Bierstadt criticized this definition, feeling that Michels had confused "authority" with "competence"; authority, said Bierstadt, is a relationship, not a capacity--it is not "innate." Both agreed, however, that authority is a "manifestation of power, sanctioned power, institutionalized power. . . ."<sup>63</sup>

#### Political Power

"The doctrine of power is political doctrine and the science of power (in the narrowest sense) is political science. . . . In a wide sense, all the forms of power are 'political'. . . ."<sup>64</sup> This is Lasswell's opinion. R. H. Tawney says of political authority that it is "a genuine form of power and is often, both for good and evil, an important form. But it is one form, not the only form. . . ."<sup>65</sup> Morgenthau says: ". . . Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised."<sup>66</sup>

One of Lasswell's key hypotheses about the power seeker is that he pursues power as a means of compensation for earlier

deprivation. Power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it functions.<sup>67</sup> "The distinguishing trait of the political personality type, common to all leaders, is an emphatic demand for deference--power and respect, rectitude and affection. . . ."<sup>68</sup>

The political type is characterized by an intense and ungratified craving for deference. These cravings . . . are displaced upon public objects (persons and practices connected with the power process). This displacement is rationalized in terms of public interest.<sup>69</sup>

Rogow and Lasswell expand this judgment:

Much of /American/ politics has been based on the assumption that human nature is base nature and that the political man embodies human nature writ large . . . In an age of democracy the fear of government is, in essence, a fear of the majority based on a fear of the self. In the modern day of self-government the real meaning of 'power tends to corrupt . . .' is not 'the rulers may be corrupt' but 'I am corrupt.' . . ."<sup>70</sup>

#### Effective and Naked Power

Effective power depends upon several contingencies: control of the resources which generate power; motivation to use those resources to influence others; skill in conversion of resources to usable power; and good judgment in employing power in situations of appropriate type and magnitude.<sup>71</sup>

Naked power is non-"authoritative" power, openly exercised; it is power which, though it may be submitted to, is not accepted.<sup>72</sup> The theory appropriate to naked power, says Russell, was stated by Plato, speaking through Thrasymachus in The Republic; when Socrates casts about for an ethical definition of justice,

Thrasymachus asserts, "My doctrine is that justice is simply the interest of the stronger."<sup>73</sup>

Asserts Bertrand Russell: "Most of the great abominations in human history are connected with naked power."<sup>74</sup>

Certified lunatics are shut up because of their proneness to violence when their pretensions are questioned; the uncertified variety are given the control of powerful armies, and can inflict death and disaster upon all sane men within their reach. The success of insanity, in literature, in philosophy, and in politics, is one of the peculiarities of our age, and the successful form of insanity proceeds almost entirely from impulses toward power.<sup>75</sup>

Few observers of America discern any deeply ingrained aversion to power. Professor Galbraith writes:

Power obviously presents awkward problems for a community which abhors its existence, disavows its possession, but values its exercise . . . Despite this convention of understatement which outlaws ostensible pursuit of power and which leads to a constant search for euphemisms to disguise its possession, there is no indication that, as a people, we are averse to power. On the contrary, few things are more valued and more jealously guarded by their possessors in our society. . . ."<sup>76</sup>

### Inequality

We turn next to the concept termed here "inequality," one which could as well be termed "hierarchy," "stratification," "pecking order," or any of a number which convey the fact that all societies have been and still are stratified, with allocation of power and influence greater at higher layers than at lower layers (whether such distribution is fair or just is immaterial to this concept at the moment).

Said the famous "founder" of sociology, Pitirim Sorokin:



Any organized social group is always a stratified social body. There has not been and does not exist any permanent social group which is 'flat,' and in which all members are equal. Unstratified society, with a real equality of its members, is a myth which has never been realized in the history of mankind.<sup>77</sup>

"Pecking order" is one of those pieces of slang that are often more informative for most purposes than the formal terms of scholarship. As Margaret Mead points out,<sup>78</sup> the term reflects conditions in the real world of living creatures; members of many living groups, even among lower orders of animals (such as cows and chickens), appear well aware of their place in an ordered stratification of power and influence--stratification which appears to develop not artificially out of individual drives toward self-aggrandizement, but naturally out of instinctive group (or other structural imperative?) requirement for some individual members to exercise some form of primacy within the group.

Thus, even a chicken knows which others in his barnyard have the prerogative of pecking on him, and which others he may peck on. It is interesting to observe, by the way, that like many human counterparts, some who object most intensely to being pecked on are themselves the most unrelenting and definitive peckers on others. (A situation not unrelated to complaints by some nations that those other nations above them in international pecking orders are, simply because they are bigger, immoral and insensitive; some of these complainers do not accept, however, that by such criteria, they themselves must be immoral relative to nations smaller than they. Some of the most sensitive concerning themselves reflect

anything but sensitivity when dealing with nations below them in pecking orders.)

Without mystifying abstractions, Henry Myers has taken up the issue of equality vs inequality, as it relates to the American character. Doctrines justifying inequality, as Myers points out, are among the oldest in the history of thought. An ancient French proverb, for example, asserts: "Equality begins in the grave." In any sense which leaves out questions of final or total or intrinsic worth, inequality among men is perfectly obvious, what with the great range of physical, mental, and moral differences we observe among men. Most of those who possess superiority in one or more skills or attributes consider any hierarchy which emphasizes their form of superiority to be fair and just. Order tends to prevail when all accept their "places," and the temptation to achieve the "order" is seductive in tempting all to accept the unequal places. The disorder that arises from non-acceptance of unequal places, however, is disturbing, "disorderly," and perhaps alienating.<sup>79</sup>

Still, hierarchies invariably occur, and inequality is often accepted by those who believe the criteria for evaluation (as higher or lower) to be fair. Nietzsche twists the central concern in an interesting way; justice, he said, lies in equality for equals and inequality for unequals. Plato made a persuasive case in the Republic for political justice based on inequality. There is no question that the ideal society proposed by Plato is based on inequality; its saving grace is that no person's place in it

is established by favoritism, inheritance, or physical coercion; the prevailing criterion is to be personal merit, evaluated by processes of reason. Still, the result is an authoritarian, undemocratic society.<sup>80</sup>

Hitler provided a different blueprint. Nature is an aristocracy, he said, providing on every side examples of good and bad, better and worse, and best and worst. One people and nation is discernibly better or worse than another. It is simply justice that one society must stand at the top: the master race. The Eternal Will "dominates this universe to promote the victory of the better and stronger, and to demand the submission of the worse and the weaker." In Hitler's ideal hierarchy of nations, the distinguishing criterion was not merit or reason, but brute force.<sup>81</sup>

Inequality as an attribute of primacy provides one form through which the tensions involved with primacy can be expressed, perhaps as the "asymmetry that pervades relations between great and small states."<sup>82</sup>

Power, [says Vital], generates self-confidence and egotism very easily. Very great power seems to engender a certain self-righteousness as well. Psychologically, its function seems to be to provide a moral basis for the political exploitation of preponderant strength. It is thus interesting to compare with the not altogether dissimilar manner in which the leaders and ideologies of small nations compensate for their perceived weakness. So far as the great powers are concerned, nowhere is the moral complacency so apparent today as in the campaign waged against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>83</sup>

Later, we shall be able to extend these reflections on equality into the context of relations among states. Meanwhile,



we shall turn here to consider certain fundamental aspects of conflict and cooperation.

### Conflict and Cooperation

Singer considers it safe to say that conflict is inherent in almost all social systems and that almost all social relationships will have some element of conflict. The problem, he says, is not the elimination of conflict, but the management of it, so that the interaction involved does not damage or destroy interests worth protecting.<sup>84</sup>

To analyze any conflict, a host of complex factors may be useful, perhaps essential, to know; for example:

- the characteristics of the parties to the conflict (values; motivations; objectives; strategy; physical, intellectual, and social resources; etc.).
- their prior relationships (attitudes, beliefs, and expectations concerning each other, such as polarization on categories as good-bad, trustworthy-untrustworthy, etc.).
- the issue giving rise to the conflict (scope, significance, recurrence, etc.).
- the social environment serving as context (facilities and restraints, social norms, institutional forms, etc.).
- interested audiences (relationship to parties, interests in conflict, etc.).
- strategy and tactics employed (perceived utilities and disutilities, positive and negative incentives, etc.).

- consequences of the conflict to each participant and to others.<sup>85</sup>

Some or all of these factors exert influence on any interaction among nations. Any current context in which they interact is bound to include certain residual perspectives lingering from past interactions--and, no doubt, some elements of the operant conditioning of which Skinner speaks. Such dynamics, common to all interactions, become intensified on occasions of potential conflict.

In almost every interaction, says Singer, there are three possible basic related orientations: individualistic (each actor interested only in benefiting himself; uninterested in what happens to the other side); competitive (interested in doing well for himself, and also in doing better than opponent); or cooperative (with a positive interest in the welfare of his opponent as well as in his own welfare).<sup>86</sup> In any conflict among two members of the system of nations, there are at least two other important aspects of relationship: (1) the relative power ratio between the two or more opponents, and (2) depending upon circumstances, possibly more important than the bilateral ratio between opponents is the ratio between the larger system and its conflicting members.<sup>87</sup>

The United States is said to be like most other societies in the world--especially other "young," expanding, individualistic societies--essentially competitive, with "success" a powerful value; emphasis is said to be on more than personal achievement for the self, and includes emphasis also on beating out others. This appears to be a culturally conditioned value, for the prevailing

opinion in psychology is that a competitive orientation is not instinctive.<sup>88</sup>

In connection with competitive orientation, some observers argue several pertinent points:

- with simple tasks, individuals produce a greater quantity of work under competitive conditions, but work of poorer quality;
- when tasks are novel and complex, the combined experience of the group is superior to that of the average member;
- too much emphasis on winning (win at any price) erodes morality;
- overemphasis on winning discourages losers, whose aspirations decline.<sup>89</sup>

Morton Deutsch provides a number of aids to the analysis of cooperation and conflict, including a typology of six different types of conflict and five types of issues in conflicts, as well as some key notions in social-psychological approaches to social interaction. For example, in most confrontations, each participant responds in terms of his cognitions and perceptions of the other, which may or may not correspond to actualities. Each participant, conscious of the other's capacity for awareness, is influenced by his own expectations concerning the other's conduct; these expectations, like others, may or may not be accurate. Neither in interpersonal nor international crises does there usually emerge any noteworthy capability to place oneself in the role of the opponent and, in that role, to predict his behavior.<sup>90</sup>



Trust is an important aspect of interaction. Even in people with an individualistic orientation, mutual trust can be increased through communication, especially through communication of such basic features as one's intentions, one's expectations, one's planned reaction to violations of expectations, and one's suggestions on means of restoring cooperation after a violation.<sup>91</sup>

One of the most interesting attempts to probe the nature of interpersonal conflict and cooperation is contained in the history of a game called "The Prisoner's Dilemma." Various pressures of reward and punishment are imaginatively interwoven in this complex of conflict and cooperation. The performance record is perhaps more interesting than the game outcomes; it becomes evident over time how afraid many people are of being made "suckers" themselves, but how eager they are to make a sucker out of (to snatch an advantage from) the unwary "other." When both sides try to outsmart the other, they regularly outsmart themselves.<sup>92</sup>

The following is the general experience with this game, based on more than 100,000 plays. When players start, they cooperate about 50% of the time, then cooperation declines. After some experience (say, 50 plays) they are punishing each other and themselves about 75% of the time. Becoming aware of this outcome, they then try to signal each other to be more reasonable; and the character of the game changes. Gradually, after 100-150 repeats, the trend again approaches 50% cooperation. By 200 repeats, cooperation reaches about the 75% level and remains level; cooperation does not go higher. In reference to game-play communication, it

may be significant to note that whenever a payoff matrix with full information is made visible to the players at all times, cooperation play doubles in frequency.<sup>93</sup>

Karl Deutsch comments: "Kant would be pleased that on the whole people learn to become more cooperative, which is what he predicted (although Hegel would point out that they first have to become less so)."<sup>94</sup>

Morton Deutsch draws a number of conclusions from his own research, and believes his findings to be supported by the work of numerous other scholars. For example, cooperation that is elicited by coercion is likely to be minimally productive and less economical and reliable than self-chosen cooperation; the fact that one side claims inherent superiority (whether of legitimacy, morality, authority, relevance, etc.) over the other reduces any existing likelihood that the conflict involved will be resolved cooperatively.<sup>95</sup> Presumably, repeated articulation of superiority (even if true) by one side intensifies alienation of the other side. The experience of living tells us that someone else's actual superiority or success may not repel us so much as their repeated trumpeting of such a condition.

In general, when compared to groups with a competitive perspective, groups with cooperative orientations produce more effective inter-member communication; more friendliness, helpfulness, and satisfaction; more coordination of effort; and higher productivity.<sup>96</sup>

Cooperative approaches produce positive communications, perceptions, attitudes, and task orientations. For example,

cooperation tends to increase each side's sensitivity to the similarities and common interests of both sides; whereas competitive orientation tends to increase each side's sensitivity to their differences, and to intensify bias toward misperceiving the other side's neutral or conciliatory actions as malevolent. A competitive orientation stimulates one side's expectation that a solution will have to be imposed on the other, and emphasizes coercive processes rather than persuasion; whereas, a cooperative orientation emphasizes the opposite.<sup>97</sup>

These observations have obvious significance for a study of primacy, but the drawing of conclusions this early in this study would be premature. We have much more ground and many more concepts to traverse before conclusion-drawing becomes appropriate.

Meanwhile, two concepts remain for introduction in this early chapter: norm and leadership. They are not dovetailing concepts, although in applicatory stages later, their relationship will be seen to be closer than it appears to be here.

#### Norm and Leadership

Concerning the concept of "norm," interest has been increasing through all the social sciences, without the concepts having yet arrived at any definitive condition. A number of scholars have wrestled with the concept, including Aron, O. Holsti, Sullivan, Burton, and Schwarzenberger. British political scientist John Burton says that norms of behavior are of value, but must be distinguished from mores that are cultural, religious, legal, or



matters of etiquette. Some communities render even moral judgments on the behavior of others, with no basis other than their own tradition, religion, class, or ethnic conventions; but the only morality or ethical system applicable in world society is that arising out of the entire world society.<sup>98</sup>

One proposition may be advanced: all behavior is a response (not necessarily a "controlled" response, per Skinner?) to the environment in which it takes place, in ways best calculated, in the light of available knowledge, to achieve given purposes. All behaviors that satisfy their societies' standards are of equal moral quality. Still, various aspects of behavior--types, priorities, sanctions--occur similarly in many societies worldwide; without invoking ethical implications, one may accept such behavior patterns as norms. Where behavior norms can be identified, they exercise legitimate influence. We shall have more to say about norms as we move to consider primacy in the international context in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, we turn to the concept of leadership, about which we know less, apparently, than we used to think we did. Andrew McFarland, in usage which he says is consistent with that of Robert Dahl and Sidney Hook, speaks of leaders as "those exercising the greatest causal impact on social events"; the leader, he says, is "one who makes things happen that would not happen otherwise."<sup>99</sup> He does accept a role for "general social forces," which structure "the alternatives available to the leader and the responses of his followers."<sup>100</sup>

Says Daniel Bell, almost all the literature on leadership stems from Aristotle and Machiavelli, and is committed to "the image of the mindless masses and the image of the strong-willed leader."<sup>101</sup> In contrast, exhaustive testing and analysis over the past 40-50 years have largely discredited the premise that leadership involves syndromes of identifiable traits possessed by rare individuals, invariably successful, whereas most other individuals would be unsuccessful. Traits are seen to be distributed continuously, not dichotomously, in any population; that is, a large number of people, in varying degrees, possess any particular trait.<sup>102</sup> The "Great Man" syndrome of Thomas Carlyle appears to be on the decline.

Weber classified leadership (similar to the classification of authority cited earlier) as legal or traditional or charismatic; and many other classifications have been advanced, with varying acceptance. Leaders in the political context, for example, have been categorized into two types:

- the national hero, typified by de Gaulle, personifying the nation's general will, even the "higher interests" of the entire nation; and

- the skillful executive, typified by Franklin D. Roosevelt, operating as political broker among the nation's conflicting groups, as an artful synthesizer.<sup>103</sup>

Study of leadership has not yet resolved all the complex relationships involved, especially in distinguishing contexts from the small group to nation-state systems. Nevertheless, available

findings appear to sustain certain premises more firmly. Gibb holds that four elements are involved in any instance of leadership: the leader (with individual ability, personality, and resources); the followers (with multiple abilities, personalities, and resources); the task; and the context or environment.<sup>104</sup> Substantial change in any element may change the quality and effectiveness of the leadership; for example, if the task is changed, one of the followers may be capable of more effective leadership in the new task than the person recognized as leader up to that point. Appointed leadership is considered to be "headship," one particular form of leadership.

Thus, as perceived earlier in relation to the modern exercise of power, modern explanations of leadership emphasize its multilateral nature, its multidirectional dynamics, its content of giving and receiving among leader and followers.

Many insights recorded in this chapter are expected to benefit our deliberations in future chapters. We need not swallow every appraisal whole; nevertheless, the sources cited tend to be among the most authoritative and experienced in study of these questions. As we move on into the international arena, we will be able to apply some of these insights more directly to aspects of primacy.



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The purpose of power is to permit moral ideas to take root.

- Admiral A. T. Mahan

The great question, which, in all ages, has disturbed mankind and brought in them the greatest part of the mischiefs which have ruined cities, depopulated countries, and disordered the peace of the world has been, not whether there be power in the world, nor whence it came, but who should have it.

- John Locke



## CHAPTER 2

### CONTEXTS FOR MEASUREMENT

#### General

In this chapter, we continue investigation of a number of concepts involved with interaction among collectivities of humans, so as to explain, and where possible measure, statuses, rankings, and trends. Some familiar concepts introduced in Chapter 1 are reintroduced for more elaborate discussion in this chapter. Some emphasis is retained on abstract and theoretical analysis, in awareness of overlap among concepts. A major distinguishing characteristic of this chapter lies in a step which may partially diminish confidence in the result--namely, projection of certain concepts into the international context.

No consistent thesis is pursued; for conclusions differ among specialists as to the components, momentum, effects, and significance of one or many of these concepts. Nevertheless, one overall disciplinary perspective is primarily utilized here, that of political science, which Lasswell and Kaplan define as an empirical discipline concerned with "the study of the shaping and sharing of power."<sup>1</sup>

We note at the outset the increasing attention paid in political science, as in all modern disciplines, to the human element. "The subject matter of political science is constituted by the conduct of persons with various perspectives of action, and organized into groups of varying complexity."<sup>2</sup> Even in the study of international relations, we follow Lippman, Lasswell, and Kaplan in emphasizing

the human element; even in the dynamics of interactions among nation-states, one discerns a shift in modern times critical to considerations of primacy: rising sensitivity to humanistic, as differentiated from mechanical and systemic, interests. Lasswell and Kaplan employ a term, "hominocentric politics," which, as science,

finds its subject matter in interpersonal relations, not abstract institutions or organizations . . . As policy, it prizes not the glory of a depersonalized state or the efficiency of social mechanisms, but human dignity and the realization of human capacities . . ."<sup>3</sup>

One recognizes and sympathizes with this trend, but retains reservations. Nation states are not individual human beings, and their behavior is different in many respects. It is one of the purposes of this study to describe certain behaviors of states; individual human behavior is described only as it serves to illuminate the behavior of nations.

Concern with "power for the sake of power" is said to be too limited a basis for inquiry. "For power is only one of the values and instruments manifested in interpersonal relations; and it cannot be adequately understood in abstraction from the other values operative."<sup>4</sup>

There may be widely acceptable political values in general study, but again we retain some reservations. Singer does not find political science concepts to be particularly sophisticated; they are not as fully developed, for example, as those of sociology or psychology ("although it is perfectly evident that these, too, have a long way to go").

In one way or another, [says Singer,] many of us feel that we [students of international politics] have progressed but a short distance since Thucydides . . . We have limped along with vague and open-ended concepts such as collective security, functionalism, balance of power, or alliance, which we define in a multitude of private ways. . . ."<sup>5</sup>

Singer cites three areas in which the behavioral sciences have made helpful contributions to the systematic study of international politics: (1) selected findings (e.g., the impressive body of social psychologists' data on attitudes, such as identification of personality types hostile to foreigners or description of types inclined toward aggressive behavior); (2) adaptable concepts and models (e.g., "diffusion" from anthropology, "mobility" from sociology, "response-set" from psychology, and "zero-sum game," "mixed strategy," and "expected utility" from mathematical economics); and (3) most important, methods.<sup>6</sup>

We cite these cautionary comments here to forestall any impression that might occur to the reader that we have illusions that the data, discussions, and reliance on political science perspectives result in advanced precision or definitiveness.

#### Basic Building Blocks

What is a nation-state? Max Weber's definition is adequate, to begin with:

A compulsory political association with continuous organization will be called a 'state' if and insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.<sup>7</sup>



Using a simplified image, we may say that each nation-state is a system of subsystems. Within each national system, we see that each central government necessarily exercises preponderant power over the subdivisions, or subsystems; such a structure is called, for certain purposes, "system dominant." The international structure, loose as it is, is also a system of subsystems; on the international plane, however, on which nations (subsystems) dominate the larger overall international system, the structure is called "subsystem dominant." For the fundamental relevant premise is that expressed by Adolph Berle: "The institutions actually possessing international power, commanding the use of some or all of its instruments, are the individual states."<sup>8</sup> This situation remains the central aspect of international relations; and, despite some important changes, promises to remain so for some time to come.

During large periods of the 19th and 20th Centuries, it was frequently said that the sun never set on the British Empire. Actually, in the nature of the transiency of human affairs, the term had been applied to Spanish holdings long before it was applied to the British Empire. When appraising the dimensions of American primacy, one may refine his perspective by recalling the dimensions of the British Empire, the most extensive the world has ever known or is ever likely to know; for it embraced approximately one-third of the land area of the globe and almost half of its people. In a number of ways, Great Britain in its period of primacy was more of a pace-setter than America is (or than any nation can be) in

current decades. Many modern concepts of law and equity manifest strength not only because of their inherent qualities but also because they were disseminated, despite its imperfections, by the British Empire.

In any event, the days of empire are largely memories. In 1914, there were 63 independent nations, a total which, by 1939, had declined to 60. By September 1974, however, the former Portuguese colony Guinea became the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the world's 150th independent state.<sup>9</sup>

Some sense of distribution may be helpfully recalled; 115 nations are in the Northern Hemisphere, 24 in the Southern Hemisphere, and 11 straddle the Equator. In the Western Hemisphere are 19%,

Europe 24%, and Africa 31% of the nations. Of the 150 total, 29 are completely landlocked, 28 are insular, and 93 are on continents and face oceans (five with more than 10,000 miles of coastline).

Great differences exist. For example, the combined land area of the five ministates of Europe (Liechtenstein, Andorra, Vatican City, San Marino, Monaco) covers less than 1/4 of Rhode Island at high tide; if their combined populations were transported to Pasadena, they would occupy no more than 2/3 of the seats in the Rose Bowl. In all, the 150 nations cover 48.8 million square miles (93% of the world's land area); and in 1974 their combined population of 3.63 billion accounted for 98% of the world's population of 3.706 billion.<sup>10</sup>

Almost half of the world's nations have fewer than five million inhabitants each; the smallest independent populations occur in the Maldiv Islands (119,000) and Qatar (180,000). On the other hand, 14 countries have more than 50 million people each; together, the same 14 countries account for 70% of the world's population and almost half its land area.

In 1972, the world's population grew by 71 million. China and India accounted for 26 million, over a third of the world's total. Third in amount of increase was Indonesia, with 3.4 million. The United States increased by 1.3 million--about the same as the Philippines; slightly more than Thailand, Iran, and Turkey; and less than Mexico, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.<sup>11</sup>



Some 100,000 miles of borders separate adjoining states throughout the world.<sup>12</sup> A few endemic tensions are rooted in the state of existing borders.

One important fact to be kept in mind from these data is that practically all the territory on the earth's surface is now accounted for beyond doubt or argument as the property of some more or less clearly identified polity. Few areas are considered to be remote, or mysterious, or inaccessible, or unknown--or available for the taking. Colonialism and imperialism have no place to go, except away. Beyond a few lingering disputes, borders between nations are settled and firm. Even though tensions remain that may erupt in conflict and overthrow of some regimes, the boundaries and identities of most political states are now established, familiar to everyone, and unlikely to change very much.

As Vital expresses this primary and recently established fact of international life, "there are no territories left which are not formally part of a fully recognized sovereign state." At the same time, the formal integrity and sovereignty of every state have acquired universal status as a principle of increased importance.<sup>13</sup>

With one exception, the modern possibility of combining political entities into a worldwide empire is practically nil. That exception involves more desire and passion than actual possibility, namely, the world Communist movement; whether or not it is fully or only partially monolithic, it constitutes the world's only universally interconnected and materially supported ideology aiming at world supremacy.

Yet, it is well to be reminded of the relentless dynamics of change. While the globe is now clearly divided into 150 nation states, it may not always be so. Morgenthau reminds us that: "The national state itself is obviously a product of history and as such destined to yield in time to different modes of political organization."<sup>14</sup>

So long as the nation-state provides the core structure of the international system, however, there will remain three concepts intimately associated with differentiation among nation-states: "national character," "national interest," and "national image."

#### National Character

Two concepts often running in tandem are National Interest and National Character. As to which concept breeds the other, it is difficult to be certain. Do the physical and spiritual circumstances of a particular time, place, and people shape a nation's collective character, and in turn, the interests which its citizens emphasize and pursue, to the neglect of other possible interests? Or do the circumstances in which they must carve out their existence dictate their interests, which, in turn, shape their character?

We examine versions of both concepts briefly here, recognizing that neither version is universally endorsed. A number of factors are blended into the concept of national character, regarded by some as a useful construct, but by others as a useless, dangerous, or misleading, stereotyping notion.<sup>15</sup> There are two dominant ways in which expressions of "national character" are formulated. In

one, the statistical distribution of what are considered crucial attributes in the general population is determined, and a fictitious "modal personality" is devised according to the proportionate distribution of prevailing characteristics. Another approach is more anthropomorphic (some would say stereotypical); it attempts to express the nation's collective character as though it were a single personality--some of these are universally familiar, such as "Uncle Sam" and "John Bull." Singer argues that this second approach is essentially "a poetic and non-operational metaphor which hinders, rather than helps, an understanding of the behavior of a complex society."<sup>16</sup>

Morgenthau accepts the notion of distinctive "culture patterns" in which "certain qualities of intellect and character occur more frequently and are more highly valued in one nation than in another." Coleridge called it "an invisible spirit that breathes through a whole people . . . a spirit which gives a color and character both to their virtues and vices. . . ."<sup>17</sup>

Is it not an incontestable fact, asks Hans Morgenthau, that, as John Dewey and many others have pointed out, Kant and Hegel are as typical of the philosophic tradition of Germany as Descartes and Voltaire are of the French mind, as Locke and Burke are of the political thought of Great Britain, as William James and John Dewey are of the American approach to intellectual problems? And can it be denied that these philosophic differences are but expressions . . . of fundamental intellectual and moral traits that reveal themselves on all levels of thought and action and that give each nation its unmistakable distinctiveness?<sup>18</sup>

This thesis, I believe, can be accepted to a considerable extent, but it must not be relied on too heavily or too far. Every



developed culture contains several divergent strands of thought within it, some antithetical. Which divergent voice, Burke or Wellington or Adam Smith or Kipling or George Orwell, is "most representative" of the British character? Is Napoleon or Voltaire, or Montesquieu or Hugo or DeGaulle or Sartre, the authentic voice of France? Is Jefferson, or Hamilton, or Walt Whitman, or William James, or Admiral Mahan, or Woodrow Wilson the definitive spokesman of the American ethos? Was it Tolstoy or Pushkin or Bakunin or Stalin who bespoke "the Russian character" most accurately?

I am inclined to feel that they all "had a piece of the action"--each one bespoke one of the several strands that combined to make up the pluralistic national character of every major nation. Nevertheless, there are prevailing values or attitudes that recur in certain nations more often, or perhaps more intensely, than in others--what Morgenthau, for example, calls the elementary force and persistence of the Russians, the individual initiative and inventiveness of the Americans, the undogmatic common sense of the British, the discipline and thoroughness of the Germans. The German and Russian governments in this century, for example, successfully launched certain foreign policies that no government could have pursued in the name of the peoples of Britain or America. For example, asserts Morgenthau, "antimilitarism, aversion to standing armies and to compulsory military service are permanent traits of the American and British national character"--resulting (except in a recognized national crisis) in considerable handicaps on American and British foreign policy.<sup>19</sup>

We may usefully have recourse here to three well-known premises related to character and personality, and by extension, to the aggregation of personalities that we call National Character:

1. Each person is partly like all other persons (the universal component of the human personality);
2. Each person is partly like some other persons (the critical premise related to formation of groups and, eventually, of some set of allegedly common characteristics among the population of a nation).
3. Each person is partly like no other person (the unique component of the individual personality and character).

We need not belabor this complex aspect here. Nevertheless, we may properly observe that, to the extent that varying concentrations of different combinations of characteristics (or values, or motivations) are present to significant degrees within different national populations, each different nation is partly like all others, partly like some others, and partly like no other. Despite the observations of Skinner and other determinists, there seems to be some connection between what different operative values people believe in, what different operative goals they seek, and what different kinds of goal-seeking behavior they engage in.

In 1961, David McClelland, a psychologist, produced The Achieving Society, a provocative book along these lines which has become a kind of classic.

McClelland concluded:

Our analysis has been pursued to its logical conclusion. We have uncovered certain psychological forces apparently making fairly universally for economic development, shown how they alter the activities of individuals in a society, particularly in the entrepreneurial class, and traced their origins to certain beliefs and child-rearing practices in the family [e.g., achievement imagery in children's readers].

. . . The desire for gain, in and of itself, has done little to produce economic development. But the desire for achievement has done a great deal. . . .

The whole view of history shifts once the importance of the achievement motive is recognized. For a century we have been dominated by Social Darwinism, by the implicit or explicit notion that man is a creature of his environment, whether natural or social. Marx thought so in advocating economic determinism, in arguing that a man's psychology is shaped in the last analysis by the conditions under which he must work. Even Freud thought so in teaching that civilization was a reaction of man's primitive urges to the repressive force of social institutions beginning with the family. . . .

If our study of the role of achievement motivation in society does nothing else, perhaps it will serve to redress the balance a little, to see man as a creator of his environment, as well as a creature of it . . . A defeat in battle means one thing to a people low in Achievement, another to a people who are high. Discrimination leads to counterstriving among Jews in the United States who are high in Achievement, but not among lower-class Negroes who are low. A bureaucracy filled with men high in Affiliation (Turkey, Italy) is a different kind of bureaucracy from one staffed by men high in Achievement (the United States, Poland). The focus changes. History must be written again, as it was in the 19th Century, at least partly in terms of the national character, in terms of what a people is trying to do or is most concerned with.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, the work of McClelland and others tends to support the premise that even in pluralistic societies, there are clusters of values and character that tend to influence greater incidence of one kind of behavior in one national population than in another.



### National Interest

National interest, of course, directs the behavior shaped by National Character toward specific goals. Singer sees the nation as a goal-pursuing organization, with its goals, or interests, flowing from three sets of variables:

first, the nation's basic preferences, both generalized courses and some specific choices, stemming from the nation's cultural values, norms, ideologies, and aspirations (in other words, stemming from what might be called its "national character");

Second, the restraints and incentives that can be discerned in the international environment;

third, the nation's resources of national power, with which to forestall or overcome restraints, or to respond to incentives, discernible in the international environment.<sup>21</sup>

Alfred T. Mahan, the famous proponent of seapower, was unequivocal about the importance of national interest in motivating the international behavior of nation-states. "It is vain to expect governments to act continuously," he asserted, "on any other ground than national interest. They have no right to do so, being agents and not principals" (*italics original*).<sup>22</sup> Historian Charles A. Beard termed national interest "the central concept of modern diplomacy," and quoted Charles E. Hughes, as Secretary of State, on the subject:

Foreign policies are not built upon abstractions. They are the result of practical conceptions of national interest arising from some immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective.<sup>23</sup>

The concept of national interest has emerged only in recent centuries, lagging behind the crystallization of the concept of the nation-state itself. Early peoples do not seem to have grasped or pressed the concept. For centuries after the Roman Empire, there were no national states. Early Christians, when asked which was their country, answered, "I am a Christian." As the Church developed political as well as spiritual power, she herself became an enemy of other "national interests." A number of evolving concepts succeeded one another over the centuries--"the will of the prince," "dynastic interest," and "reason of state." "National honor" enjoyed a considerable vogue until the early 20th Century, although, as early as the end of the 17th Century, it began to be superseded by "national interest."<sup>24</sup>

Over many decades, this latter concept has had some difficulty in emerging with clarity. The phrase "national interest," say Berkowitz and Bock, "has usually meant nothing more than the sum of all policies and activities of a state which might bring it some advantage." Earlier attempts to define it generally equated the principal national interest with the quest for power--military, economic, or political.<sup>25</sup> Other writers defined national interest differently. Beard found supreme value in the self-interest of the dominant economic classes in any society. Stephen B. Jones found that a number of analysts, following Napoleon, shared the assumption that a nation's geographic position is the most fundamental factor in determining its national interest.<sup>26</sup>

George Kennan furnishes a prototype via statement of the interests of the United States:

The fundamental interest of our government in international affairs is . . . to assure that we should be permitted, as a people, to continue our Pilgrim's Progress toward a better America under the most favorable possible conditions, with a minimum of foreign interference, and also with a minimum of inconvenience or provocation to the interests of other nations.<sup>26a</sup>

Though finding the concept elusive enough to be susceptible to misinterpretations (such as "limitless imperialism" and "narrow nationalism," neither of which is "in keeping with the American



tradition in foreign policy"), Morgenthau equates the concept to the "great generalities"--general welfare and due process--of the Constitution. The whole concept, says Morgenthau, contains two elements: according to the first element, "all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations"; and the second element combines all the other domestic variables that demand political representation, "All the cross-currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral folkways. . . ."27

Singer and Winston distinguish between interests in terms of the physical, structural, and cultural attributes of the social system concerned, and interests in terms of the quality of life of those human beings who comprise the system, between national (or other group) interests and individual interests. "It seems hardly necessary to emphasize that what is 'good' for a given social system, qua system, may not necessarily be 'good' for most of the individuals who live within (or under?) that system." This distinction is useful; and the authors embellish it:

The literature of political philosophy and classical sociology fairly brims over with logical argument (and some empirical evidence) that the needs and interests of the rulers are not only different from, but often incompatible with, those of the ruled. Whether the focus be on order versus freedom, authority versus representation, coercion versus consent, stability versus change, or privilege versus equality, the picture is much the same; the preferences of elites and of masses can seldom be fully (or even adequately) reconciled. To put it another way, events and conditions which may be highly functional for a given system--or those who either exercise a high degree of control over it, or benefit most from its current state--are

often considerably less functional (or even dysfunctional) for that much larger number whose influence and benefits are relatively low. In sum, one must be--as the expression goes--either a fool or a knave to <sup>28</sup>equat<sup>e</sup> the national interest with the individual interest.

On the other hand, one may be highly perceptive in finding much in common between individual and national interest. We do not know, in fact, how to determine how much the interests of each individual, at elite or any other level, are co-terminous with such national interests as security, safety, prosperity, and so forth--even though the individual may not appreciate the relevance to his personal interests of such national conditions. We do not know how to allocate degrees or proportions of validity to national interest, elite interest, mass interest, and individual interest within any particular nation.

We can recognize that differences exist between some systemic national interests and some individual-citizen interests, without assuming that all such differences are incompatible or antithetical. Presumably, for example, it is arguable that the first interest of the nation is to exist, and that such a preeminent interest requires certain sacrifices and provides certain immeasurable benefits, in relation to every individual citizen.

Klaus Knorr, in a "revised" echo of Beard, says:

It is misleading to insist that, in addition to serving particular interests, governments also uphold basic national interests of 'national welfare' in any way that transcends /domestic/ particularist demands . . . /this/ is not saying that certain objectives relating to the external world may not be subscribed to by a large majority of the elite or of society as a whole. Security from foreign aggression is normally such a widely shared goal, and usually attracts wider support

than any other goal of foreign policy. This is because it represents a perceived self-interest that many, though not necessarily all, persons share.<sup>29</sup>

In any event, Singer and Winston attempt<sup>30</sup> to identify "intrinsic" values and indicators of them--five criteria for identifying "the good life." Like Abraham Maslow's 5-step hierarchy of needs, Singer and Winston try both to identify universal needs and to arrange them in priority of intensity--universal basic and external needs of all individual persons, which everyone must look to some political system to provide:

1. "Bodily survival" (the precondition for enjoying any other values), related to different characteristic probabilities within any particular social system of one's dying a natural death; this probability involves medical care; public health procedures; provision of food and shelter; quality of life expectancy; and absence of war, revolution, massacre, homicide.
2. Freedom from disease, starvation, and punishment by the elements, involving (at some level above mere survival) adequate levels of food, shelter, public health, and medical care.
3. Liberty, including all public and private sectors of life.
4. Self-fulfillment, including both employment and avocational opportunity.
5. Equality as justice, to the extent realized by a few, many, or all individuals in the system.

Compiling such data internally within nations might permit aggregation of international averages or standards against which



individual nations might be compared to determine relative ranking of achievement or condition, or the excess or shortfall attending any particular nation. Obviously, no one knows how to put quantitative evaluations on such factors, so as to validate differentiation and rankings. We cannot pursue the subject further here, but must be content to be aware of the existence of certain approaches to identifying and quantifying relationships between individual and national interests.

In reference to the interests of states, an analogous approach, that of national development, as distinguished from levels of national power, Sociologist Henry Barbera has explored this area extensively; and we shall encounter his data later in this chapter.

As emerges elsewhere in this study (with different nuances), one aspect of national interest appears to be widely misunderstood. For example, domestic and foreign critics of America's involvement in Vietnam repeatedly charged that the United States "had no interests" involved in Vietnam since Vietnam is 10,000 miles away--as though all interest, like magnetism, were dependent upon proximity, and as though it were measured in miles.

All nations have national interests projected beyond their domestic frontiers--interests involving their national security, or economic health, or ethnic association, or other important linkage affecting status. Most such interests naturally cluster in the vicinity of the homeland, but specific vital interests may reach out to other nations halfway around the globe.

Great nations, however, also possess, or bear, another class of interests--interests which relate to the maintenance of international order, which project beyond relationships affecting merely their domestic society to the level of international relations among multiple states. So long as the principle of national sovereignty reigns supreme, and so long as no transcendent universal authority exists for the maintenance of international order, such order as is attainable will have to continue to be effected through the influence of the most powerful states. Superpowers, for example, bear responsibilities that lesser states do not bear. In brief, when one refers to the national interests of Malta, for example, one can only mean factors that directly affect Malta. On the contrary, when one refers to the national interests of the United States, one may be referring to (and should be aware of, and make clear the distinction) only one or both of two classes of American national interests: (1) interests of domestic importance only, or (2) interests involving the maintenance of international order.

It is extremely myopic, therefore, to allege that the latter activities constitute "intervention" or "imperialism." Activities related to world order are not undertaken by a Number One nation solely by choice, for it has no other choice than involvement to some degree. If the nation in the position of primacy does not participate effectively in the maintenance of such order as is attainable, some lesser degree of order, or perhaps anarchy or chaos, will ensue; for the vacuum in the exercise of power will be filled by one or more other nations. Thus, as Hedley Bull asserts


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elsewhere in this study, all states (except, perhaps, would-be predators) have a stake in the maintenance of international order, and in the capacity and willingness of "suitable" great states to maintain order.

In any event, as Morgenthau reminds us:

As long as the world is politically organized into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word in world politics. When the national state will have been replaced by another mode of organization, foreign policy must then protect the interest in survival of that new organization.<sup>31</sup>

#### National Image and National Prestige

John F. Kennedy once asked: "What is prestige? Is it the shadow of power or the substance of power?"<sup>32</sup>

Morgenthau calls prestige a basic manifestation of the struggle for power on the international scene. Whatever the ultimate aim in international politics may be--freedom, security, prosperity, or power--the immediate aim is always power.<sup>33</sup> To be sure, cautions Morgenthau, nations may seek power through means other than political (such as technical cooperation); and not every act undertaken

by one nation in relation to another is motivated by power considerations (e.g., many acts in legal, economic, humanitarian, and cultural categories):

While it is generally recognized that the interplay of the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, and the respect or love for men or institutions, in ever-changing combinations, forms the basis of all domestic politics, the importance of these factors for international politics is less obvious, but no less real. There has been a tendency to reduce political power to the actual application of force or at least to equate it with successful threats of force and with persuasion, to the neglect of charisma. That neglect . . . accounts in good measure for the neglect of prestige as an independent element in international politics.<sup>34</sup>

Consistent with our discussion of perception in the previous chapter, Morgenthau writes:

. . . in the struggle for existence and power--which is, as it were, the raw material of the social world--what others think about us is as important as what we really are. The image in the mirror of our fellows' minds (that is, our prestige) . . . determines what we are as members of society.

It is, then, a necessary and important task to see to it that the mental picture other people form of one's position in society at least represents faithfully the actual situation, if it does not excel it. This is exactly what the policy of prestige is about. Its purpose is to impress other nations with the power one's own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nation to believe, it possesses. Two specific instrumentalities serve this purpose: diplomatic ceremonial in the widest meaning of the term, and the display of military force.<sup>35</sup>

These two specific instrumentalities, diplomacy and military display, put generalized sentiments to work in the world's workaday business. Underlying both, and of enduring importance in establishing a nation's image is the prevailing character of a nation's international performance toward other nations over a long time

--bellicose, generous, patient, or whatever. Another basic caution in deliberate image-building, as Adlai Stevenson warned, "is not to believe your own propaganda."<sup>36</sup>

Kenneth Boulding reinforces Morgenthau on image:

. . . we must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their 'image' of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior. If our image of the world is in some sense 'wrong,' of course, we may be disappointed in our expectations, and we may therefore revise our image; if this revision is in the direction of the 'truth' there is presumably a long-run tendency for the 'image' and the 'truth' to coincide. Whether this is so or not, it is always the image, not the truth, that immediately determines behavior. We act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it is.<sup>37</sup>

. . . In the formation of the national images, however, it must be emphasized that impressions of nationality are formed mostly in childhood and usually in the family group. It would be quite fallacious to think of the images as being cleverly imposed on the mass . . . Especially in the case of the old, long-established nations, the powerful share the mass image rather than impose it; it is passed on from the value systems of the parents to those of the children . . . Both history and geography as taught in national schools are devised to give 'perspective' rather than truth: that is to say, they present the world as seen from the vantage point of the nation. The national geography is learned in great detail, and the rest of the world is in fuzzy outline; the national history is emphasized and exalted; the history of the rest of the world is neglected or even falsified to the glory of the national image.

. . . Without the sharing, however, there is no nation. It is for this reason that war has been such a tragically important element in the creation and sustenance of the national image. There is hardly a nation that has not been cradled in violence and nourished by further violence. This is not, I think, a necessary property of war itself. It is rather that, especially in more primitive societies, war is the one experience which is dramatic, obviously important, and shared by



everybody. We are now witnessing the almost unique phenomenon of a number of new nations arising without war in circumstances which are extremely rare in history. . . .<sup>38</sup>

An important dimension of the national image, continues Boulding, is that involving friendliness, on one hand, or hostility. There is a tendency toward reciprocation; if one nation considers itself hostile to another, it tends to see the other nation as hostile. This seems to be an extended perception; most nations seem to feel that their enemies are more hostile toward them than they are toward their enemies. This is a typical paranoid reaction; a nation visualizes itself as "surrounded by hostile nations toward which it has only the nicest and friendliest of intentions."<sup>39</sup>

An important attribute of any national image is its consistency and stability over time.

Of this rare combination the Roman and the British empires and the Good Neighbor policy of the United States are the classic examples.

The longevity of the Roman Empire . . . was due primarily to the profound respect in which the name of a Roman was held within its confines. The contrast between the dismal fate of those who dared to challenge Rome, and the peaceful and prosperous existence, under the protection of the Roman law, of those who remained loyal, increased Rome's reputation for moderation in the exercise of its power.

The same reputation for power tempered by self-restraint was one of the foundation stones of the British Empire.<sup>40</sup>

Without straining the point, one might well note the comparable heterogeneity of sources of individuals who sought and received citizenship in ancient Rome and modern America. Diversity in composition of a national population may deter tendencies to assume superiority of one's homogeneous culture, ethnicity, blood lines, or similar attributes.

A nation may overdo or exaggerate its image of power--in which case, its bluff will eventually be discovered and become counter-productive. Or it may underdo its power image, and suffer untoward consequences:

At the outbreak of the Second World War, the United States was already potentially the most powerful nation on earth, yet the reputation for power of the United States--that is, its prestige--was so low that Japan could base its war plans upon the assumption that American military strength would not recover from the blow of Pearl Harbor in time to influence the outcome of the war . . . Far from demonstrating to the other nations what the human and material potentialities of the United States could mean in terms of military power, the United States seemed almost anxious to prove to the world its unwillingness, if not inability, to transform those enormous potentialities into actual instruments of war. Thus the United States invited neglect and attack from its enemies, failure for its policies, mortal danger to its vital interests.<sup>41</sup>

Without trying to resolve the chicken-egg puzzle of which comes first, interests or character, we recognize that both shape the national image. In connection with the United States, there are a number of notable aspects of image; but the aspect of central importance to this study is primacy, America's image as Number One nation.

#### Being Number One: Winning

In relations among nations, as among individuals, inevitably there arise questions of precedence. In a broad sense, this entire project weighs such questions; in this section, however, we focus upon narrow aspects, such as primacy.

In Their Finest Hour, Winston Churchill speculated interestingly about differences in the statuses of No. 1 and others:

In any sphere of action there can be no comparison between the positions of number one and number two, three, or four. The duties and the problems of all persons other than number one are quite different and in many ways more difficult . . . number two or three will have to reckon with numbers four, five, or six, or maybe some bright outsider, number twenty. Ambition, not so much for vulgar ends, but for fame, glints in every mind. There are always several points of view which may be right, and many which are plausible . . . At the top there are great simplifications. An accepted leader has only to be sure of what it is best to do, or at least to have made up his mind about it. The loyalties which center upon number one are enormous . . .<sup>42</sup>

Additional interesting aspects of being Number One emerged in the series of ubiquitous advertisements sponsored by the Avis Rent-a-Car Company, emphasizing the theme that Avis must "try harder" because it was "Number 2."

The company president has discussed his view of primacy:

We are careful to delineate between questions of being No. 1 in size and No. 1 in service or quality. By assigning most of the clumsy aspects of life to the larger in size, quite a bit of room is left for ego nourishment of the smaller. . . .

Propositions that size can license irresponsibility, or that the ability to produce the most goods implies the right to waste the most, or even that price is irrelevant where the funds of the largest nation are involved, are all a part of the clumsy area referred to above.

I think it is also safe to say that there is no special virtue in being second or first in anything; the question is what is done with that condition. . . .<sup>43</sup>

Barbera has also provided several observations about certain international dynamics in hierarchy, inequality, and status rankings:

1. In general, each nation knows its relative place, and other nations know it, too.
2. At the top of a hierarchy, over time, rank changes are few and small, compared to those at the bottom.



3. Since they experience less rank change, upper stratum nations tend to expend less effort in the achievement of external consensus.

4. When change occurs anywhere in the hierarchy, no nation's rank is totally unaffected; hence, most nations must constantly adapt.

5. The most careful attention in comparing self and others is exhibited by nations closest in ranking; the closer are two nations in ranking, the more likely it is that there will be tension, envy, and competition between them.<sup>44</sup>

I should like to suggest another theme that accentuates among men divisiveness and overemphasis on primacy: the sense of exclusiveness inculcated by most of the world's religions and the repeated citation of "power" and "glory" as the transcendent attributes of the highest deities. I am well aware of the constructive nature of many religious activities, and of the deep convictions of most religious adherents; and I have no wish to offend them. Some religious groups emphasize love and brotherhood as least as much as they emphasize anything else. Many, however, place as much or more emphasis upon "power" and "glory." Many denominations and adherents cultivate the conviction throughout their conscious lives that they are special, superior, unique, chosen people, eligible for eternal rewards, for which those outside their group are not eligible. Some persons and groups denounce nationalistic or ethnic pretensions or various other senses of superiority inculcated from childhood, but see no paradox in passing religious exclusiveness

("we are Number 1 in God's eyes") to their children along the same lines. Thus, barriers between peoples may be combination barriers made up of various contributing elements--ethnic, tribal, nationalistic, commercial, or other; and a religious component is often present. The effectiveness of such barriers is various in preserving and heightening tensions and conflicts among peoples, even in the absence of palpable issues.

As Eris Hoffer observed in The Ordeal of Change:

The pride that at present pervades the world is the claim that one is a member of a chosen group--be it a nation, race, church, or party. No other attitude has so impaired the oneness of the human species and contributed so much to the savage strife of our time.

Ferguson and others discuss the long-lived concept of winning as the outcome of a zero-sum game, that is, the concept that any gain by one player must mean corresponding loss by the other.

McLellan discusses an alternative approach:

It is unrealistic for any country to expect that it can impose solutions which reflect only gain for its own position. Indeed, the task of statesmanship is often to 'cut one's losses' and accept the least of several evils.<sup>45</sup>

Modern students of conflict and cooperation give increasing attention to the principle of the non-zero-sum game, in which payoffs are not necessarily "mirror images." Thomas McDonald suggests:

". . . To win may be to simply benefit from an improvement in one's own position--measured in subjective values--not necessarily at an adversary's expense."<sup>46</sup> So that, one primary objective can be said to be, not losing-- which may not necessarily be the same thing as

winning. Or, one's winnings may be valued in their own right, even if the opponent wins something, too--or wins nothing but also loses nothing.

Roger Fisher in 1962 translated this alternative from abstraction to an instance of practical national policy:

The fact that we are strongly opposed to having the Communists take over and run the free world does not mean that we want to take over and run the Communist world . . . In this struggle our first and immediate objective is survival--survival for ourselves, for other free peoples, and for our political way of life. We cannot afford to lose. But the overall contest is one in which we should not expect to 'win'; no permanent victory is in sight.<sup>47</sup>

Thus, it is not by any means always clear what objectives one is supporting merely by advocacy of "winning" and "being No. 1." It may be important to know how one proposes, and proceeds, to win, and, having won, how one arrives at, and conducts himself in, the status of being No. 1.

To be eligible to become Number One among nations, a nation requires great power. Meanwhile, in proceeding toward consideration of national image, we recognized that national character and national interest are among the contributors to shaping image. Probably the most important contributor to image, however, is reality itself, viz, the facts of national power.

#### Elements of National Power

Many specialists have analyzed national power. While differences exist among them, usually on lesser elements or issues, there is essential agreement on the principal elements that comprise national



power. Over millenia, of course, the most indispensable elements have been military and economic power.

Economic strength is an essential basis for actual and mobilizable military strength. The economic strength of a nation comprises its productive resources, such as labor, technology, natural resources, real capital (factories, power plants, dams, railroads, inventories, etc.), and claims on internationally liquid reserves of other nations (e.g., gold, currencies) and foreign investments.<sup>48</sup>

Even at the peak of crisis, only a portion of economic strength is available for allocation to the support of military strength. For example, at the height of World War II, Germany and Great Britain devoted about half their economic strength to war-fighting. Normally, about 7-9% of GNP is devoted to military budgets by major nations. For example, in 1967, world military expenditures amounted to about 7.3% of world GNP of \$2.482 trillion, and US military expenditures hovered around 9% annually throughout the 1950's and 1960's.<sup>49</sup>

Morgenthau is one of the soundest analysts of national power; he identifies the following as fundamental elements.<sup>50</sup>

1. The geography of each state (climate, area, nature of terrain, access to waterways, nature of soil, etc.) predetermines many of its policies and much of its destiny. Napoleon had said "the policy of a state is decided by its geography," and deGaulle quoted him on that point.<sup>51</sup> Jules Cambon wrote<sup>52</sup> in 1930: "The geographical position of a nation, indeed, is the principal factor conditioning its foreign policy--the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy at all."

2. The natural resources within its borders, such as raw materials and agricultural capacity (water power, food-growing permitted by soils, rainfall, climate, etc.).

3. Industrial capacity.

4. Military preparedness (including quantity and quality of armed forces, leadership, technology, etc.).

5. Population (size, age distribution composition, education, distribution of skills, trends, etc.).

6. National character.

7. National morale (e.g., current quality of social cohesion, stability, etc.).

8. Quality of government (e.g., balance among resources, popular support and confidence).

9. Quality of diplomacy (e.g., effectiveness of representation of society abroad, as perceived at all levels).

These major elements of power are more or less obvious; it is assumed that they need no definition or further elaboration in this paper. They each play substantial roles in the status of primacy, and hence each will play explicit or implicit roles during the unfolding of this study. These components figure heavily, of course, in the construction of national rankings set forth in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

#### Development

Professor Henry Barbera has approached the determination of differences among nations, not according to differentials of power,

but according to differentials of development. He expresses a relationship between them by explaining that potential power is based upon the combination of size of population and the level of that population's development.

The story of power, says Barbera, is told in wars fought, scope of diplomatic representation abroad, favorable treaties signed, extent of territory, length of boundaries, spheres of influence, interventions, and the like. The story of development is told in growth of schools, teachers, transportation systems, communications systems (e.g., telephones), quality and quantity of housing skills of the labor force, degree of urbanization, agricultural yields and protein counts, hospital beds, infant mortality rates, and other indicators of what Barbera summarizes as "mastery over the environment." The level of development of a nation depends, he holds, upon the accumulated corpus of its instrumental culture, the effective density of its communications network, and the degree of its internal cohesiveness.<sup>52</sup>

The principal thrust of Barbera's work along these lines was to determine whether or not war affects development; does its experience of war raise or lower, accelerate or retard, a nation's standing in development, compared to other states?

Noting that throughout history war has been the most consistently advanced hypothesis purporting to explain why some nations have become rich and others poor, and noting that war simultaneously escalates output and consumption of men, ideas, materials, and money, Barbera evaluates the contradictory literature and data on



four hypotheses about the effect of war on development (again, not the effect on accretion of power). The four possible hypotheses are that war either promotes development, damages development, affects development variably, or has no appreciable effect on development.<sup>54</sup>

Barbera assumes continuous general development, an assumption supported by the following table<sup>55</sup> on world growth of what may be the principal factor in development: energy.

World Production of Commercial Sources of Energy  
(Electricity Equivalents in Million Megawatt Hours)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Energy Total</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Energy Total</u>
1860	1,079	1910	9,1837
1870	1,674	1920	11,298
1880	2,623	1930	13,053
1890	4,056	1940	15,882
1900	6,089	1950	20,556

Confining his data to the 20th Century, and basing his conclusions on the effects of World Wars I and II upon the development of nations and upon each nation's development ranking among nations, Barbera concluded that the only hypothesis borne by the evidence is this: there is no substantial correlation between war and development at all. "Nations continue their normal rate of material improvement whether or not wars occur."<sup>56</sup>

In the next chapter, we shall consult in detail Barbera's rankings in development status among the world's nations.

#### Military Power

One of the most compelling and clear-cut components of national power (and, hence, one of the principal determinants of primacy) is

military power. The accumulation and exercise of military power have characterized and changed relations and statuses among states over and over again. In international politics, says Morgenthau, armed strength as threat or potential is the most important material factor making for a nation's political power, and if used, military power replaces political power.

Asymmetries in military power can be exerted to coerce or to reward (in certain circumstances, even the power to reward can also be argued as coercive); but the influence expected to emerge from asymmetry does not automatically operate to the full extent. The more powerful state may not be the more exploitative. Nevertheless, as Professor Knorr indicates, history shows that "the temptation of the strong, rich, and cunning to exploit the weak, poor, and ignorant is not easily resisted . . ."<sup>57</sup>

Knorr distinguishes helpfully between power as a means and power as an effect:

The phenomenon of power lends itself to two sharply different conceptions . . . Since coercive influence limits the conduct of an actor subjected to it, power can be seen to reside in the capabilities that permit the power-wielder to make effective threats. But it can also be seen as identical with, and limited to, the influence on the actually achieved behavior of the threatened actor. On the first view, power is something that powerful states have and can accumulate; power is a means. On the second view, power is an effect, that is, the influence actually enjoyed. It is generated in an interaction which is an encounter. On the first view, power is something that an actor can hope to bring into play in a range of future situations. On the second, power comes into being, is shaped, and enjoyed only in a specific situation; its measure is the amount of influence actually achieved.

Today most theorists conceive of power as actually achieved influence, whereas most laymen see it as reposing in the capabilities that permit strong threats to be made. Both concepts catch a part of reality. But it is critically important that we know which one we have in mind when we speak of 'power.'<sup>58</sup>

This distinction serves as the foundation for another of Knorr's useful distinctions, that between putative power and actualized power:

The distinction is extremely important. Many people believe that armies and navies are military power, or that great national wealth is economic power, and they are inevitably puzzled when, in real life, superior national power so defined fails to coerce a weaker state, or when the superior power gets bested by an inferior one.<sup>59</sup>

Knorr explains what putative military power is, analyzing it into three components: (1) military strength in being, i.e., military forces; (2) military potential, i.e., the economic and physical capacity to expand and improve existing military forces; and (3) military reputation, i.e., the perceptions and expectations of other nations derived from past experience about the state concerned (for example, its greater or lesser likelihood of resorting to military threats or actions when its vital interests appear threatened).<sup>60</sup>

Putative military power can become actualized (that is, effective) in three ways--one, through war itself; two, through threat; or three, through "the anticipation or anxiety of other states . . . This third mechanism is extremely important, even though it is the least noticeable, and is often expressed only in the councils of the influenced state, but not always even there . . ."<sup>61</sup>



This analysis appears to assume that the effects of preponderance in such asymmetries apply only in one direction: in appeasement by the weaker state of preferences of the more powerful states, preferences which the stronger state may not have explicitly articulated but which the weaker state has merely inferred. The weaker state may erroneously, however, make inferences that the unarticulated preferences of the stronger state are inimical to it and take measures to blunt or damage the more powerful state's interests. Whether the weaker state's overt initiatives operate in one direction or another, it is obvious that both positive and negative effects of primacy can occur without the deliberate intention of the stronger state.

Another counter effect is the anomalous situation of the weaker state accumulating certain bargaining advantages out of its weakness--as Thomas Schelling and others have explained.

#### Power and War

A great deal of study and analytical effort have been devoted to interrelationships between power and war in different societies. Henry Barbera, as already noted, is one of the few who has explored whether meaningful relationships exist between national development (not national power) and the incidence of war, and we shall reconsider his explorations later. Most analysts combine power capabilities and war in some way. We cite here the work of Wayne H. Ferris, for example, who sought to differentiate between power in general and power capabilities, and to review extant findings on relationships, if any, between power capabilities and the incidence of war.

Ferris found that important theoretical differences exist. Available data from systematic inquiries are sometimes confirmatory of one theory, while others tend to confirm its opposite. For example, Quincy Wright, Hans Morgenthau, Inis Claude, and others hold that balances of power promote peace. A. F. K. Organski holds that imbalance promotes peace. Johan Galtung holds that imbalance promotes war. Lewis Richardson held that power variables are ambivalent about involvement in war. It seems certain that some relationships exist between power capabilities and war; but the nature of those relationships remains unclear.<sup>62</sup> Ferris' analyses and comparisons of relevant theories and data on wars are instructive; but we need not pursue them further here.<sup>63</sup>

We are mindful in general terms of the massive role war has played in international affairs, including significant roles in the attainment of primacy by certain nations. We realize that some nations have engaged more often in war than others, and certain questions suggest themselves. For example, is the amount of war participation related to national character? Has primacy, specifically, been a status related to amount or kind of war participation?

War has played enormous roles in international affairs and in conflicts over primacy. Current statuses of nations and relations among them have been powerfully conditioned by the military results of past wars (not to overlook the role of war in shaping national characters). No doubt all major nations are

still affected to some extent by lingering psychological effects (smugness? quest for revenge?) of the most recent wars.<sup>64</sup>

We have recourse herein to statistics on past wars compiled by the most eminent of scholars who have undertaken such analyses, including Quincy Wright, Pitirim Sorokin, Lewis Richardson, J. David Singer, and Melvin Small.

#### Participation in Wars

One of the modern pioneers in the methodical study of war, Pitirim A. Sorokin, studied the incidence of warfare in Western civilization since the dawn of recorded history. By his methods,<sup>65</sup> he identified 967 wars in all; the eleven most war-historied countries listed by him and the numbers of their wars have been these: Netherlands 23, Greece 24, Germany 24, Italy 32, Poland and Lithuania 65, Spain 75, Rome 81, Austria 131, Russia 151, England 176, and France 185.

Using other measures, Quincy Wright analyzed 2600 important battles involving European states between 1480 and 1940, and found that Spain participated in 12%, Turkey 18%, Russia 22%, Great Britain 22%, Germany (and Prussia) 25%, Austro-Hungary 34%, and France 47%. Since 1700 alone, according to Wright, France participated in 147 wars.<sup>66</sup>

Over the past three centuries, while the percentage of war participation by Germany (and Prussia) and Russia tended to increase, and that of Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark tended to decrease, that of Austria, Turkey, Great Britain, and



France remained relatively constant.<sup>67</sup> One interesting statistic is that concerning the number of citizens per 1000 of population who died in military service for France and Great Britain during the recent centuries.<sup>68</sup>

	<u>17th Century</u>	<u>18th Century</u>	<u>19th Century</u>	<u>20th Century</u>
France	11	27	30	63
Britain	15	14	6	48

Using still another approach, Richardson<sup>69</sup> measured national participation in "fatal quarrels" between 1820 and 1945, with the wars categorized according to a scale of magnitude from 3.5 up to 7.5:

	<u>7.5-6.5</u>	<u>6.5-5.5</u>	<u>5.5-4.5</u>	<u>4.5-3.5</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Britain	2	0	1	25	28
France	2	0	4	15	21
Russia	2	0	6	10	18
Germany	2	0	5	3	10
(incl Prussia)					
USA	2	1	1	4	9

Perhaps the most intensive statistical study of wars is still being conducted by Singer and Small (their data do not include the Vietnam War).<sup>70</sup> In one of their series of reports, they specifically analyzed a characteristic they identified as "war-proneness" of nations. According to their criteria, they identified "members of the international system" (1816, 23; 1870, 34; 1920, 61; 1965, 124) and 50 wars between "system members" during the 1816-1965 period, plus 43 "extra-systemic" wars (i.e., involving system members with non-members, such as in wars of conquest and revolutions). Among the full-period members of the system, the United States participated

in 6 international wars, Spain 7, Italy (and Sardinia) 11, Russia 15, Turkey 17, and France and Great Britain 19 each. Of the entire system's nation-months of international war during the 150 years, 39% were utilized by 5 nations: Spain, Turkey, Russia, Great Britain, and France. Of the 43 extra-systemic wars, 39 were fought by 7 states, including Great Britain 12, France 7, Turkey 6, and Russia 5.<sup>72</sup>

Perhaps even more indicative of "war-proneness" are identifications of the initiators of wars. Singer and Small identified the initiators (and participants on the side of the initiators) of 49 of the 50 interstate wars; initiators were Bulgaria 4, Russia 4, Austro-Hungary 4, Japan 5, Germany 5, France 6, and Italy 8. This was one category in which Great Britain and the United States were conspicuously inconspicuous.<sup>73</sup>

In 40% of the initiations, a major power attacked a minor power; of these 18 occasions, there were 17 in which the major and minor powers shared a border, and 17 in which the initiator won. It appears that initiation has had certain advantages; for, of the 49 wars in which initiators were identified, the initiators won 34, lost 14, and tied 1. Overall winnings and losings during the period were as follows: Great Britain won 16 and lost 2, France won 14 and lost 4, Russia won 13 and lost 2, Italy won 8 and lost 3, and the United States won 5 without any losses.<sup>74</sup>

### War-Alliance Participation

Another aspect of statistical analysis of relevance to this study involves the record of dyadic relationships in war as ally or adversary. Out of the 50 interstate wars between 1816 and 1965 identified by Singer and Small, 209 adversary pairs can be identified. Of these, 19% had also fought each other on a previous occasion, while 21% had been previously allied with each other. Of the 209 adversary pairs, 95 pairs had one or more other experiences as opponents, and 77 pairs fought on at least one other occasion on the same side. Among the adversary pairs, several never fought other than as adversaries: China and Japan, 4 times; Germany and France, 3; Austro-Hungary and Italy, 4; and Russia and Turkey, 5. Of allied pairs, several important combinations never fought as adversaries during the 1816-1965 period: France and Britain, allied 6 times; Greece and Yugoslavia, 4; Greece and Britain, 3; Netherlands and Britain, 3; and France, Britain, and the United States, 3.<sup>75</sup>

One inescapable conclusion is that France has a valid claim to being the modern nation with the most extensive war history; while the United States, at least up to 1965, as cited by Singer and Small, and despite the assertions of certain contemporary critics, has a valid claim to possess the history of the least war-inclined major nation in the world.

One potentially important conclusion is that, whether they initiated the wars or not, the major powers have been the nations most frequently engaged in war. Especially in the more recent



decades of the 150 years, no major power has escaped becoming involved in the major wars that occurred. As Singer and Small observed, in a comment relevant to a concern with primacy, involvement in major war may be one price a nation must pay for great-power status.<sup>76</sup>

### Alliances and Other Forms of Association

#### General Alliance Participation

It might also be instructive to consider briefly the record of alliance participation in general. Again, it is rewarding to refer to Singer and Small, who analyzed alliances, exclusive of wartime alliances, over the period 1815-1939 on two levels: among members of the total international system, and members of the European "central system." They utilized four criteria: the extent of each nation's commitment to the alliance; the effective duration; the type of alliance (defensive, neutral, or entente); and concurrent status of the principals as independent members of the international system with a population over one-half million.<sup>77</sup>

It is, incidentally, indicative of France's status among the nations of the world in previous centuries that Singer and Small accept, as certification of independent membership in the international system, de facto recognition by the two nations "that came closest to being the international community's legitimizers: . . . Britain and France."<sup>78</sup> France and Great Britain were, of course, members of both the total and central systems throughout the period; the United States, while a member of the total system throughout,

has been considered a member of the "European central system" only since 1899.

Over the period until 1939, France participated in 20 bilateral or multilateral alliances, exceeded in number only by Russia's 32; other national participations included Germany (and Prussia) 19, Italy 19, Britain 16, Turkey 16, Austria 15, Spain 6, Japan 6, Portugal 3, and the United States 2 (one with Japan in 1908, and an entente with 18 Latin American states, in 1936).<sup>79</sup>

What form does association normally take between a nation in the status of primacy and other nations? What patterns of relationships occur between a Number One nation and other friendly nations, and other hostile nations? We do not have space here to pursue the important subject of associations among states in all its myriad manifestations; but it may be profitable to pay brief attention to association in general, and its principal form, alliance, as associations are impelled by inequalities in status, power, and other attributes of nation-states. Noting that there are many forms of international association--e.g., empires, federations, alliances, and common markets--Friedman observes that all associations are pairings or collaborations with other states for limited duration regarding some mutually perceived problem: for aggregation of capabilities; for joint or parallel pursuit of common national interests; and for the probability that members will assist each other.

Alliance is one of the oldest forms of international relations. The Indian commentator, Kautilya, in a treatise entitled Arthasastra,

written in the 3d Century B. C., distinguished between alliance and other forms of political agreement.<sup>80</sup> George Simmel declared that the defense of one's existence is one of the few values so central as to permit alliance among numerous and heterogeneous actors--a theme repeated frequently among alliance theorists.<sup>81</sup>

In his book, Nations in Alliance, George Liska observed:

Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something. The sense of community may consolidate alliances; it rarely brings them about. When community feeling is sufficiently strong, it commonly seeks other institutional forms of expression. Cooperation in alliances is in large part of the consequence of conflicts with adversaries and may submerge only temporarily the conflicts among allies.<sup>82</sup>

But a number of traditional benefits of alliance are being differently perceived. In his somewhat prescient 1966 book, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age, Professor Knorr observed that the traditional balance of power considerations are now less likely to make allies attractive to a great nuclear power; lesser nations are, in nuclear equations, more likely to be drawbacks, and possibly dangerous drawbacks during nuclear confrontations, although, in limited-war terms, lesser nations may still be able to offer worthwhile benefits to big powers. A principal value of an alliance to a superpower is the clear identification of resources which one superpower intends to indicate as not being available to another superpower.<sup>83</sup>

. . . Superior power does not attract. The weaker state naturally fears that its identity will be abridged by aligning with a more powerful one; and the strong state, too, will often shun association with the weak for fear of overextending its commitments and resources . . . When another state intervenes as a threat . . .



The stronger state assumes the role of a protective ally, interested mainly in keeping the resources of the potential victim out of the adversary's control.<sup>84</sup>

Lesser powers may come to see that they can benefit from de facto nuclear protection by a major power without the necessity for the lesser power's entering an alliance, a prescription which is not without relevance to the nuclear relationship between the United States and France. In the future, Knorr argues, great nuclear powers may prefer to avoid alliances, giving instead security guarantees. Such practice, however, as Knorr recognizes, may be ambiguous--even dangerously so.

The following appraisal by Liska echoes the viewpoint of a "hard-nosed" alliance member, such as Charles deGaulle:

. . . a state can count only on itself, even within an alliance . . . it is up to the lesser allies to compel respect for their rights within the alliance. The fundamental posture must be one of firmness, principle, and self-dependence . . . This does not exclude cooperation, but it defines its terms as strict quid pro quo reciprocity and limits it by the requirement of equality and independence . . .<sup>85</sup>

However, this is only one approach. When a lesser state stands on "principle," expecting support by other states, it appears to be doing more than "counting only on itself." What "principle" does it stand on? Are "principles" different for lesser states than others? How is strict quid pro quo reciprocity to be "limited" by equality and independence? Every nation, in fact, consciously or unconsciously, relies to some extent on the support of other nations and is a party to one or more visible or invisible coalitions.<sup>86</sup>

In order to act economically within its capabilities in pursuit of its interests, even a great nation must not haphazardly collect all available allies and seek the most demanding commitments; it must weigh "the marginal utility of the last unit of commitment to a particular ally and the last unit of cost in implementing commitments."<sup>87</sup>

Some historical leaders who had extensive experience with alliances became less than enchanted with them. Napoleon ascribed his successes to the fact that he fought allies. Winston Churchill asserted that the history of any alliance is a history of mutual recrimination.<sup>88</sup>

In support of the notion that systemic needs may generate certain expectations of conforming behavior among alliance members, the "associationist" viewpoints of Churchill and Adenauer are representative:

. . . they wait out the crystallization of an identity of interests within the alliance, rather than precipitate fights over conflicting interests. Having once decided that the alliance is necessary, the associationist believes in making it work.<sup>89</sup>

Concerning internal stresses and strains, of great significance, says the eminent political scientist Arnold Wolfers, are the psychological stresses--the idiosyncracies of leaders, especially leaders of major nations; the influence of charismatic personality; preconceptions and biases; and the mixed truth-and-falsehood of, for example, such stereotypes as Indian pacifism, American moralism, Arab fanaticism, and the complacency of democratic nations.

Other sources of stress cited by Wolfers are the geo-politics, the external world and regional conditions; and the differences in status, power, and responsibilities in each of many dyadic relationships--differences magnified in these days of nuclear stockpiles. Varying perceptions of the threat by different members of the alliance may lead one or more to flirt with neutrality on certain issues (or to pretend to do so). Disputes among members may attain such pressures as to force the alliance leader to perform what Osgood called the leader's principal function: the restraint of allies--a role played by the United States on more than one occasion, such as in the crises over Suez and Cyprus. In such instances, the peacemaker is frequently blamed by both sides. In some circumstances, restraint cannot be effected by a leader except via means akin to the exercise of hegemony.

#### Equality, Hegemony, and Leadership

Even the nation that stands at the top of the international ladder of states must enter into various relationships with other nations. Various dynamics, unique in kind or degree, attend the "exercise of primacy"; a number of special nuances may characterize the relationships between the leading nation and other nations. Burton writes:

In every group interaction there are three basic processes. There is cooperation amongst members on a basis of equality . . . there is also leadership which provides means of coordination of activities without necessarily eliminating group participation in decisions. Whenever the exercise of the power of leadership extends beyond the limits of authority there is resistance, and a drive by members to regain



participation in decisionmaking, and a position of greater equality in relationships . . . at all stages all three processes continue to exist to a greater or lesser degree: one is more dominant than others at different times.<sup>90</sup>

In the 1960's, the term "hegemony" was frequently used by deGaulle to characterize the type of relationship with European states allegedly sought by both the United States and the Soviet Union. What are the characteristics of hegemony, and how do they differ from earmarks of equality and of leadership? Is there a relationship between hegemony and primacy? Is there only one type of hegemony? If there is more than one type, are all types vulnerable to objection on moral grounds? Is there a relationship between such concepts as hegemony and norms of associationist behavior?

According to deGaulle, peace can only be maintained by equilibrium among independent states--to a large extent, much as David Hume analyzed the abstract theory of equilibrium in his famous essay, "On the Balance of Power." Each state, said Hume, tries not to be at the mercy of the others--a rather vague dictum which Raymond Aron finds unexceptionable enough to have universal validity. Aron, however, distinguishes three types of peace: equilibrium, hegemony, empire.<sup>91</sup> Either the political units are in balance (equality), he says, or dominated by one of them (leadership or hegemony), or overwhelmingly outclassed (empire) by one of them--or they are not at peace. Under hegemony, says Aron, unsatisfied states may despair of modifying the incontestable superiority of one unit; the hegemon, however, should not abuse

hegemony; it should respect the external forms of state independence, and should not aspire to empire.<sup>92</sup>

These are highly negative descriptors, leaving a great deal of room for variance on a scale of "dominance" at one end and "equalitarian-dealing-despite-superior-power" at the other. Schwarzenberger narrows the spectrum more helpfully. In a provisional way, he says, "hegemony may be defined as the mildest form of imperialism, in which indirect domination is reduced to its barest minimum of control."<sup>93</sup>

In another comment on hegemony, Schwarzenberger is not much more precise than others:

It is difficult to generalise . . . in hegemonial relations . . . It is, however, possible to elaborate articulately the criteria on which any such assessment is likely to depend . . . the degree of autonomy left to the weaker state is inconclusive, for strong leadership may be in the best interest of the State asked to submit to it . . . in a number of significant ways, hegemony differs from other forms of imperialist domination. The hegemonial power exercises more self-restraint. It pays more attention to the display of good manners. Discussion, rather than orders, is the normal form of communication . . . in relations that are not between equals, for any superior to treat his inferior as if he were his equal is certainly both wise and civilised . . .<sup>94</sup>

The foregoing passage appears to include both descriptions of how hegemony is sometimes exercised and prescriptions as to how it ought to be exercised in some combination of self-interest and equity.

Schwarzenberger is one of the very few who discuss leadership as a role conceptually distinguished from the exercise of hegemony:

Leadership means giving direction by going in front or setting an example. The accent is on superiority freely

acknowledged by the followers and on shouldering responsibilities, rather than on the use of the weaker by the stronger as a means to his own selfish ends . . . there is an undertone in this notion which suggests relations on the footing of a community rather than a society.<sup>95</sup>

Burton also offers valuable insights into the role of leadership in systemic behavior of states, derived partially from his analysis of norms:

A norm of State behaviour is, in systemic terms, behaviour when authorities are fully legitimized, acting in the interest of systems, and capable of perceiving the environment accurately and responding to it appropriately . . . Simple exchange relationships are those most conducive to norm behaviour. [They] are characterized by reciprocity . . . In any relationship in which one party has "power" over others . . . the employment of power in any form . . . is subject both to expediency and to conventionalized usages. If it is employed beyond these . . . opposition occurs.<sup>96</sup>

Both Schwarzenberger's and Burton's arguments are compelling concerning the presumptions that each independent state has a role to play in the international systems that is both partially-unique and partially similar to the roles played by other states, that all roles involve exchange and reciprocity with the other actors, that leadership roles are legitimate provided the exercise of superior power is not carried to excess, and that there exist both empirical and prescriptive bases for conducting even hegemonial relationships on patterns of equality.

Neither appears to hold, however, that the norms of behavior for every member of an alliance, for example, including the leader (or hegemonial member, if any), are necessarily identical. Neither does Raymond Aron. In discussing bipolar equilibrium systems,



Aron distinguishes three classes of actors (coalition leaders, other coalition members, and states outside coalitions); all three classes, he asserts, operate according to somewhat different rules.<sup>97</sup> There are certain differences attributable to the leadership function, in perspective, responsibilities, authority, and style of operation, interacting internally and externally on association matters. (There are, of course, many other differences, rooted in other sources.) Exercise of this function need not, and in practice usually does not, affect general equality among all nation-members of a political association.

Vast experience of persons, groups, and nations supports the notion that complex activities, especially collectivities, must accept some performance of a leadership function or fail. Many egalitarians resent the performance of leadership functions at any level. Despite the claims of experience, some assert that leadership roles can be dispensed with; on the other hand, Aron, Burton, Liska, and Schwarzenberger are among those who identify the leadership function as vital in associations among nation-states in the real world.

This imperative can be illustrated by an empirical analogy from the experience of the eminent organization theorist, Douglas McGregor, who described his personal struggle in moving from the role of eminent scholarly theorist at M.I.T. into the role of president of Antioch College:

Before coming to Antioch, I had observed and worked with top executives as an adviser in a number of organizations. I thought I knew how they felt about their

responsibilities and what led them to behave as they did. I even thought that I could create a role for myself which would enable me to avoid some of the difficulties they encountered.

I was wrong! It took the direct experience of becoming a line executive and meeting personally the problems involved to teach me what no amount of observation of other people could have taught.

I believed, for example, that a leader could operate successfully as a kind of adviser to his organization. I thought I could avoid being a 'boss.' Unconsciously, I suspect, I hoped to duck the unpleasant necessity of making difficult decisions, of taking the responsibility for one course of action among many uncertain alternatives, of making mistakes and taking the consequences. I thought that maybe I could operate so that everyone would like me--that 'good human relations' would eliminate all discord and disagreement.

I couldn't have been more wrong. It took a couple of years, but I finally began to realize that a leader cannot avoid the exercise of authority any more than he can avoid responsibility for what happens to his organization.<sup>98</sup>

Granted significant differences between personal leadership of a university and leadership by a nation-state of an international association, some aspects of the analogy may not be as far-fetched as they might appear to some. One instructive point is the inadequacy of the second-hand perspective; as McGregor demonstrates, no amount of analysis of the leader's (or Number One's) situation without direct experience of it can confer adequate understanding of its imperatives. Extended experience as a fellow-member and follower in formally organized collectivities, however, conveys to most people and to most political entities some idea of why someone must fulfill the leader's role.

The rub comes sometimes from objections to any performance of a leadership role, but most often from conflict over the degree and style in which leadership is exercised. As Burton insists, when a leader exceeds the limits of authority that are reasonably conceded to the role, resistance arises; and other states struggle to reestablish their status as co-equals in fact. Successful leadership of pluralistic associations consists in performing functional responsibilities only in issue-areas which demand such a role, but in avoiding implications of seeking wider sectors of authority embracing non-functional issue-areas.

So far, we have scratched the surface of the subject of styles in which a nation in the status of primacy might deal with other political units in the world. There is one extreme form of hegemonic relationship of which a number of nations had experience in past centuries, and which a number of observers persist in alleging as characterizing United States foreign policy: Imperialism. We shall take up later more extensive discussion of the United States connection, if any, with imperialism.

Having carried our discussion of primacy into the context of leadership in a pragmatic world, we withdraw somewhat from that world to reenter the theoretical world involving concepts of power.

#### Modern Political Philosophy

Morgenthau describes the essence of the principal competing modern schools of political thought, which differ fundamentally in their conceptions of man, society, and politics.



One school assumes the goodness and malleability of all humans, and holds that there are universally valid abstract principles discernible, from which a rational and moral political order can be derived and established now. It faults the social order, social institutions, and certain individuals or groups for deficiencies that exist in social and political harmony.

The other school believes that social and political shortcomings result from contradictory forces inherent in all human nature. To improve the world, one needs to understand human forces and institutions and adapt to them, not denounce them or oppose them. Ideal results and pure moral principles can never be fully realized. This school expects to balance interests and to accept compromises and, in fact, to achieve good relationships; at times, however, it expects to realize, not the absolute good, but possibly no more than the lesser evil.<sup>99</sup>

This latter school is often called "realism," based on six fundamental principles:

1. Politics is governed by well-established laws rooted in human nature, supported by evidence, and illuminated by reason.

2. The principal realistic concept in politics is that of self-interest defined in terms of power, guarding against two popular fallacies: concern with identifying other people's motives and concern with furthering one's ideological preferences, making sharp distinction between what is desirable at all times everywhere and what is possible in concrete circumstances of specific time and place.

3. In real life, the concept of interest defined as power is universally valid in principle. George Washington observed long ago:

A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make it otherwise. No institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.<sup>100</sup>

Nevertheless, actual expression of interest is never fixed, but depends upon the political and cultural context of time and place, accepting also that modern linkages of interests with the nation-state are constantly evolving and will continue to evolve over time.

4. Political realism recognizes moral significance, but holds that universal moral principles must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place; not morality, but prudence exercised in awareness of moral considerations, is held to be the supreme virtue in politics.

5. Political realism refuses to endorse the moral opinion of one nation, even our own, as possessing universal moral validity.

6. Political realism, based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature, is aware of the existence and relevance of criteria of judgment other than political (such as legal, moral, economic), but maintains the identity and legitimacy of the political criterion.<sup>101</sup>

It seems appropriate, at this point, to confront directly the political relevance of morality, both the morality based on formal religious sources and the non-religious morality rooted in the "natural law" or secular concepts of ethical behavior.

#### Morality and International Affairs

Declared Robert Dahl: "We study politics in order to act rightly, to help guide men to the good life."<sup>102</sup>

In taking up the concept of morality in relation to international primacy, it behooves us again to be aware that we are discussing an elusive concept, one that overlaps others such as norm, mores, law, universalism, reason of state, national interest, and other concepts that exercise restraint upon the application of power.

There are those who feel that morality is irrelevant to public affairs of any kind, a viewpoint suggested by President Harry Truman's rejoinder: "I can't be moral on my country's time."<sup>103</sup>

Another extreme may be represented fairly by those who attempt to make moral considerations override all others, everywhere and all the time; it was in response to such importunities that Abraham Lincoln developed this eloquent passage:

In great contests each party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both may be, and one



must be wrong. God cannot be for, and against the same thing at the same time.

I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief and perhaps in some respects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is I will do it! These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible and learn what appears to be wise and right.<sup>104</sup>

Morgenthau speaks of morality, norms, and laws as civilization's indispensable restraints on power:

All the social instrumentalities and institutions relevant to the different competitive devices of society serve the purpose, not of eliminating the struggle for power, but of creating civilized substitutes for the brutality and crudeness of an unlimited and unregulated struggle for power.

Such is, in brief and sketchy outline, the way ethics, mores and law limit the struggle for power in the domestic societies of Western civilization. And what of international society? . . .<sup>105</sup>

Morgenthau cautions us that discussion of international morality must guard against the two extremes of either overrating the influence of ethics upon international politics, or underestimating it by denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by anything but considerations of material power.<sup>106</sup>

Surveying the long line of theoreticians participating in the unfinished controversy over morality in international affairs,

Schwarzenberger placed them in three categories: those who deny the existence of any international morality; those who equate international morality with personal morality; and those who admit the existence of international morality, but only with significant differences from personal morality. He would place Machiavelli in the first category (one also recalls Hobbes: "There is neither morality nor law outside the state"); Kant in the second, and Hegel and Treitschke in the third.<sup>107</sup> Schwarzenberger does not follow Hegel into deification of the state; he insists that the cleavage between individual and international morality to some extent conforms to the large differences between the trust-based relations in community and the relations in international society bordering on anarchy.<sup>108</sup>

It is the alleged possession by every nation-state of unlimited sovereignty that impels some observers to regard the international context as one of anarchy. From even a moderately careful survey of the international scene, is such a description accurate? Two of the most eminent analysts of international affairs--one French, one American (the latter repeatedly and incorrectly alleged to hold amoral views towards the norms of international relations)--do not agree that the international context is a jungle; instead, they endorse tempering of sovereignty according to moral considerations.

Raymond Aron holds that:

Relations between states are not . . . comparable to those of beasts in the jungle . . . Diplomatic-strategic conduct tends to justify itself by ideas; it claims to

obey norms, to submit to principles. We call cynics those who regard ideas, norms, and principles as mere disguises of the desire for power, without real effectiveness.<sup>109</sup>

. . . The first duty--political, but also moral--is to see international relations for what they are, so that each state, legitimately preoccupied with its own interests, will not be entirely blind to the interests of others.<sup>110</sup>

Hans Morgenthau has frequently explained his view of national interest in terms such as this: nations always act or should act to maximize their power over other nations. He has called the alternative orientations "sentimentalism," "utopianism," "moralism," or "the legalistic-moralistic approach." Yet he has added firm caveats:

The national interest of a nation which is conscious not only of its own interests but also of that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with the latter. In a multilateral world this is a requirement of political morality; in an age of total war it is also one of the conditions for survival . . . I have always maintained that the actions of states are subject to universal moral principles and I have been careful to differentiate my position in this respect from that of Hobbes.<sup>111</sup>

Two of the most persuasive political scholars on this subject are the late Arnold Wolfers (e.g., in his famous essay, "Statesmanship and Moral Choice") and Stanley Hoffmann. Hoffmann argues that the problem is not, as often asserted, idealism versus realism or moralism versus power; for ideals are an ineradicable part of reality--"every action has both moral and immoral aspects, every moral issue its ambiguities . . ."<sup>112</sup>

Reinhold Niebuhr did not expect much from nations: "Nations are, on the whole, not generous. A wise self-interest is



usually the limit of their moral achievements."<sup>113</sup> On the other hand, referring to Max Weber's premise that the statesman is forced by the ethic of responsibility to uphold the power of his nation as the supreme value (and, hence, to justify employment of means repugnant to Christian ethics), Hoffmann rejects that premise as excessively tragic and narrow:

Even statesmen who believe in the high moral value of the national interest feel they must justify their policies in the light of standards higher than mere reasons of state . . .<sup>114</sup>

Paul Nitze wrote that it is "unjustified to associate morality with the values of any single portion of the political world . . . the values of the individual, the values of the family, the values of the business or the labor world, or the values of the state alone . . ."<sup>115</sup> Yet, moral justifications on such limited bases are repeatedly offered.

Sometimes, coincidence clothes self-interest with moral justification--a situation illustrated perhaps by Mark Twain's definition of an ethical man: "a Christian with four aces."<sup>126</sup>

As numerous students of human motives and behavior have observed, men seek moral reasons and justifications for their acts, some more than others. The historian Dicey once noted that in Western society, "men come easily to believe that arrangements agreeable to themselves are beneficial to others." John Stuart Mill once asked, eloquently: "Was there ever any domination that did not appear natural to those who possessed it?" Even Charles de Gaulle, in a January 1963 press conference, commented: "In

politics and strategy, as in economics, monopoly naturally appears to him who enjoys it as the best system."

Kenneth Thompson cites several impressive examples of rationalization, of finding common identity between one's objectives and "Right Thinking and Behavior":

Lord Wolseley:

I have but one great object in the world, and that is to maintain the greatness of the Empire . . . I firmly believe that in doing so I work in the cause of Christianity, of peace, of civilization, and the happiness of the human race generally.

Even Arnold Toynbee said in 1935 that the security of the British Empire was "also the supreme interest of the whole world."

A prominent Nazi, in 1935: "Anything that benefits the German people is right; anything that harms the German people is wrong."

Woodrow Wilson, after the bombardment by American forces of Vera Cruz in 1914, said that the United States had gone to Mexico "to serve mankind." At the time of entering World War I, Wilson identified American principles and American policies as "the principles of mankind."

French Minister Edmond Jouve: "The construction of Europe is only desirable and only to be pursued to the extent that it lifts France to the first rank."<sup>118</sup>

One basis for "competition in morality" is the decline in authority in many fields--the erosion of certain universally agreed moral criteria.

Nations no longer oppose each other . . . within a framework of shared beliefs and common values, which imposes effective limitations upon the ends and means of

their struggle for power. They oppose each other now as the standard-bearers of ethical systems, each of them of national origin and each of them claiming and aspiring to provide a supranational framework of moral standards which all the other nations ought to accept and within which their foreign policies ought to operate . . . . Compromise, the virtue of the old diplomacy, becomes the treason of the new; for the mutual accommodation of conflicting claims, possible or legitimate within a common framework of moral standards, amounts to surrender when the moral standards themselves are the stakes of the conflict.<sup>119</sup>

Morgenthau observes that the ethic of nationalism has been on a course of world ascendancy for the past 150 years:

This fragmentation of a formerly cohesive international society into a multiplicity of morally self-sufficient national communities, which have ceased to operate within a common framework of moral precepts, is but the outward symptom of the profound change that in recent times has transformed the relations between universal moral precepts and the particular systems of national ethics.<sup>120</sup>

Most individuals today and during all of modern history have resolved this conflict between supranational and national ethics in favor of loyalty to the nation. In this respect, however, three factors distinguish the present age from previous ones.

First, there is the enormously increased ability of the nation state to exert moral compulsion upon its members. This ability is the result partly of the almost divine prestige the nation enjoys in our time, partly of the control over the instruments molding public opinion which economic and technological developments have put at the disposal of the state.

Second, there is the extent to which loyalty to the nation requires the individual to disregard universal moral rules of conduct. The modern technology of war has given the individual opportunities for mass destruction unknown to previous ages. Today a nation may ask one single individual to destroy the lives of hundreds of thousands of people by firing one missile with a nuclear warhead. The compliance with a demand of such enormous consequences demonstrates the weakness of supranational ethics more impressively than do the limited violations of universal moral standards of conduct which were committed in pre-atomic times.



Finally, there is today, in consequence of the two other factors, much less chance for the individual to be loyal to supranational ethics when they are in conflict with the moral demands of the nation. The individual, faced with the enormity of the deeds he is asked to commit in the name of the nation, and with the overwhelming weight of moral pressure which the nation exerts upon him, would require extraordinary moral strength to resist those demands.<sup>121</sup>

Any attempt to measure the acceptability of a nation's action by a criterion asserted to be more compelling than the national interest is, today, a high-risk venture. And yet, rejection of any other criterion or referent of morality in international relations may be morally untenable. Unrestrained and unadulterated self-interest on the part of a nation may be a declining concept, for which the bell may already be tolling, though in still-muffled tones.

It is of interest to compare certain strong moral positions, taken up by particular individuals in earlier times.

One account of about 1600 tells of an old acquaintance of John Napier (the creator of logarithms and inventor of numerous devices) trying to pry from him on his deathbed the secret of a new "artillery" he was believed to have invented. Napier is supposed to have replied:

For the ruin and overthrow of man, there were too many devices already framed, which if he could make to be fewer, he would with all his might endeavor to do; and that therefore seeing the malice and rancor rooted in the heart of mankind will not suffer them to be diminished, by any new conceit of his the number of them should never be increased.<sup>122</sup>

Montesquieu, one of the most open-minded figures of the Enlightenment, one who bequeathed many insights to the American

Founding Fathers, expressed a universal view which, even centuries later, we find difficult to swallow whole:

If I knew of something beneficial to me but harmful to my family, I would eject it from my mind. If I knew of something beneficial to my country but harmful to Europe--or beneficial to Europe but harmful to the human race, I would regard it as a crime.<sup>123</sup>

### Proneness to Violence

A large body of internally contradictory literature is growing, purporting to prove that man is inherently aggressive or that he is not. Apparently, there is evidence to support both sides of this argument, although support for the proposition that man harbors no instinct for even forceful defense of his family, in-group, or property remains thin. We have no intention, however, of entering this controversy with hopes of persuading anyone to one view or the other.

Here we are again at the threshold of that highly uncertain area of motivation: why do nations do what they do? Particularly, why do they go to war? We have already cited certain pacifistic sentiments; we now cite three commentators over the span of almost-a-century, each resigned to inevitable resurgence of war in relations among nations. They tend to affect me persuasively; others may not agree.

The first is John Wharton, writing shortly after World War II:

Actually, the assumption that man acts only from rational motives is an arrogant piece of vanity akin to the former belief that the earth was the center of the universe. We act in fits of anger; we pursue vengeance which avails us nothing; when tortured by frustrations or anxieties, we are constantly performing acts which

we 'know' will increase our unhappiness, and we do not understand why we are impelled to perform them.

It is no use trying to dismiss these acts as temporary aberrations. They are parts of the acts which set family against family, group against group, nation against nation. They are part of the reality with which we have to deal.<sup>124</sup>

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was blunt: ". . . when men differ in taste as to the kind of world they want, the only thing to do is to go to work killing . . ."<sup>125</sup> A later passage expresses the same thought more delicately, but it is the same thought:

I do think that man at present is a predatory animal. I think that the sacredness of human life is a purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I believe that force, mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio, and between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of worlds I see no remedy except force.<sup>126</sup>

Frederick L. Schuman, the political scientist, was unequivocal: "The great controversies are questions of power admitting of no settlement through the application of law. They can be resolved only by diplomatic bargaining and compromise or by war, and in no other way whatever."<sup>127</sup>

#### Universal Perspective

"Universalism" is the reverse of nationalism; as a rallying principle for the diminution of war, it is a muted theme in all societies, but it is hardly new. Said Bertrand Russell:

The ultimate aim of those who have power (and we all have some) should be to promote social cooperation, not in one group as against another, but in the whole human race. The chief obstacle to this end at present is the existence of feelings of unfriendliness and desire for superiority . . .<sup>128</sup>



A Cambridge Professor of International Law, John Westlake,  
wrote in 1894:

It is almost a truism to say that the mitigation of war must depend on the parties to it feeling that they belong to a larger whole than their respective tribes or states, a whole in which the enemy too is comprised, so that duties arising out of that larger citizenship are owed even to him.<sup>129</sup>

Meanwhile, insists Kenneth Thompson, in foreign affairs there is not one ethical principle, but many. Peace is one, but so are security and honor. Freedom from colonialism, yes, but also order. Support for the underprivileged, yes, but also defense of Western civilization. There is no master value, no touchstone, to be found. Our challenge is to express, not abstract morality, but morality in complex political action.

We cannot escape the temptations and liabilities of power politics by an act of will. We now perceive that we must live in a brutal world and still remain civilized. We must live in an immoral world and make the best of it . . .<sup>130</sup>

#### Reason of State

So far, we have cited a number of sources and viewpoints in relation to international morality; but may have tended to lean most heavily upon Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson, and others of the realist school (perhaps my own basic values incline that way). However, in view of the emergence of "situation ethics" and other evidences of shifting contexts of morality in modern times, I cite here a modern view somewhat different from those of the realists, closer to the views of Napier and Montesquieu, rejecting even raison d'etat as justification for questionable acts. Ronald V.

Sampson, a British psychologist, has taken the line of absolute universal morality in the Psychology of Power; and I quote from the book at unusual length because I feel that he has some things of importance to say on this subject at this time. I do not necessarily agree with all the author's insights; but moral ideas in general, and the moral arguments articulated by Dr. Sampson, appear with increasing frequency and force in modern discussions of relations among nation-states, including the relationship of primacy. It behooves us to be aware of, listen to, and weigh these arguments:

It will be the central argument and purpose of this book to deny that there is more than one plane of reality in which the moral judgment functions . . . In other words, what is morally right cannot be pragmatically wrong or politically wrong or invalidated on grounds of apparent futility. The variety of the scales of moral value accepted in the world, the number of people at any given time who are blind to the truth of the moral law, is irrelevant to the existence of that universal and unchanging moral law which binds and governs all men, whether they obey it or not. That there is a plurality of 'true' values, that moral truth is no more than the expression of a subjective appraisal relative to and valid only within the culture in question, this it is my concern to deny . . . The moral law rests on the fact that it is possible for every human being to develop in greater or lesser degree in one direction or another. He may seek to order his life and his relations with others on the basis of love or on the basis of power . . . To the extent that we develop our capacity for power we weaken our capacity for love; and conversely, to the extent that we grow in our ability to love we disqualify ourselves for success in the competition for power. To the extent that the forces of love in men triumph over the forces of power, equality among men prevails. And conversely, to the extent that the forces of power prevail over the forces of love, domination and subjection characterize human relations. The former is good and leads to human well-being; the latter is bad and leads to human suffering and strife. The struggle between these dialectical forces is always

the same. No one may contract out of it, however much he may wish to do so.<sup>131</sup>

The debate turns on the issue as to what is human nature . . . Can man by his own understanding and endeavors work out his own salvation? Or is he irredeemably a fallen creature, seeing the better but following the worse?

None struggled more devotedly to enlighten mankind than Denis Diderot . . . But even Diderot, in a mood of despondency as he considered in retrospect the malignant opposition which he had had to overcome in order to produce the great Encyclopaedia, was constrained to reflect: 'The world does not profit from its advance into old age: it does not change. It is possible that the individual perfects himself, but the race becomes neither better nor worse in the mass. The sum of evil passions remains the same, and the enemies of the good and useful remain as numerous as ever.'<sup>132</sup>

. . . If we suppose that man carries within him the seeds of his own doom . . . we are confronted by a root contradiction. On the one hand, it appears that we are so biologically constituted that the appetite for domination and power to obtain privileges for oneself or one's group at the expense of those with whom one is competing, is endemic and ineradicable in human nature. By definition, success in this struggle must be confined to a relatively small minority, since exclusiveness is a crucial element in the 'value' that is being sought. If all men alike were rich and powerful leaders possessed of power and status, there would be no followers, no one to lead. But then the psychological motivation would dry up at the source, since the object of striving would have lost its savour.<sup>133</sup>

In the greater society more than in the family the problem of power itself is thrust into the forefront of the discussion. Here we at once find ourselves faced by a curious paradox reminiscent of the paradox of human nature itself. Whereas in personal relations within the sphere of private family and social life the power nexus is generally recognized as a bad thing, in public life, in the administration of communal affairs and in relations between communities, power is regarded not as a bad thing, but as a good thing or at worst as a necessary evil . . . At the other extreme, the morally sensitive will be found trying to argue that power is unrelated to force or even that force must be distinguished from violence. But common to practically all is the belief that power itself is a factor in human affairs that is morally neutral;



that it may, in other words, be deployed for good or evil purposes, according to circumstance. Cavour it was who said something to the effect that he would be called a scoundrel by his friends and neighbors if he did in his private life those things which he frequently found himself called upon to do in his duties as a statesman on behalf of his country. Very few since appear to find anything very odd in this state of affairs . . . in private life we ought to try to practise the ethic of Christianity of selflessness, and in our public life we are told we ought with equal zeal to practise the ethic of raison d'etat or national self-interest. Power carries along with it its own rights and duties. So while we strive in one direction in the private moral sphere, we labour in an opposite direction in the public political sphere . . . My general conclusion is that the belief in the possibility of advancing human welfare through working to secure political power is itself the most important single illusion which stands in the way of advancing that welfare. It provides the individual with the most plausible and widely offered of all excuses to justify his failure to make the necessary changes to eliminate the contradictions within his own life.<sup>134</sup>

The heart of Machiavellian metaphysic is the insistence that there is a fundamental, unchanging human nature which prescribes the same limits to human behaviour at all places and in all times. Any possibility of genuine progress, of improving the general level of behaviour, is ruled out on this view . . . we find ourselves condemned by circumstances to inhabit a world moved by suspicion and fear and governed by force--an internal policy force, an external military force. And the central doctrine of raison d'etat is simply that any act whatsoever will admit of ultimate justification, if it is necessary to the safety of the community. Deception, betrayal, broken faith, torture, murder, arson, rape, axe, bullet, dungeon--no means is intrinsically excluded from justification provided salus populi can be pleaded in excuse . . . The legitimacy of raison d'etat we are assured, is strictly pragmatic. It serves as nothing else can to secure the safety of the State. For all his vaunted honesty of analysis, Machiavelli is less than candid here. The real beneficiary of Machiavelli's recipe is far from being salus populi; it is the wealth, power and security of the ruling group. His genuine touchstone is the same as that which troubled the Psalmist of old, namely, the fact that the wicked prosper in this world, whereas the valiant, the faithful, the true go down to defeat. The root of Machiavellian thought, indistinguishable in this respect from that of Marx or Trotsky on the Left, is the powerful . . . advice . . . to consult not what men say about

such things but what they do. The standards of one's time are determined by majority behaviour; and if we live as the world lives, we can scarcely be thought guilty of any grave immorality. On the contrary, to act otherwise would be to be guilty of pretension, to set ourselves up as righteous critics of the common run of mankind . . . Even Sir Thomas More did not question his allegiance to the secular sovereign.

The dilemma was resolved, but only at the cost of intense anguish. 'I die the King's good servant, but God's first' . . . Much of the spirit of modern relativism may be traced back to the radical influence of the doctrine of raison d'etat. But the time has come when we are compelled to ask whether raison d'etat has not now established itself as a new sovereign absolute in its own right, that is, to which every other human interest and value must give way.

. . . This is particularly the case, it is alleged, in the United States, where statesmen have been inhibited in the international sphere by the mistaken supposition that the politics of the national interest are antithetical to the claims of morality. The genuine and relevant antithesis, according to them, is that which obtains between a morality divorced from political reality and one that is founded upon it. It is true, they freely admit, that without being able to rely upon altruism and self-sacrifice for the common weal, the State could not continue to exist. Internally, therefore, statesmen must continue to foster such traditional morality. But he who attempts to pursue such aims in the international sphere can only do so to the detriment of the national interest. And the national interest is the only legitimate aim and standard of value in the international sphere; for outside the confines of the nation State no community exists. He who ignores this rule threatens the security, the lives and property of his fellow-citizens and is thus a great danger to them. In this way they triumphantly conclude the argument by standing morality on its head . . .<sup>135</sup>

. . . In the words of the original Pelagian heretic, 'Everything good and everything evil, in respect of which we are either worthy of praise or of blame, is done by us, not born with us. We are not born in our full development, but with a capacity for good and evil' . . .

. . . to allow our moral standards to be determined by the generally accepted level of behaviour is to put ourselves at the mercy of those of least repute. For



they too affect the general standards of behaviour. An average is made up of the worst as well as the best.

For incessant struggle is a necessary part of the moral life . . . The really serious evil starts when we begin to persuade ourselves that what was done in extenuating circumstances was on that account the right thing to do . . . the slow move towards greater equality has been steadily maintained in the modern period, and there is much greater understanding of the nature of the problem. Human nature, as we know it, is undoubtedly weak and easily misled; but it is not inherently vicious. Much of the evil that occurs is attributable to the power of the few and the weakness of the majority. And the power of the few derives from the intellectual and moral confusion of the many. The evil in men can be overcome if enough people care enough, are sufficiently energetic and clear-sighted. How otherwise would the great social reforms of the past have been brought about? . . . In every society a minority of powerful men are able to keep up a barrage of propaganda to the effect that the patriotic duty of men is to be prepared to kill their enemies. Again in virtually every society today there are men who strive to combat such falsehood, but everywhere they experience the utmost difficulty in reaching the public even where they are permitted to try. The authorities still wield great power and command deference. The most urgent task that confronts mankind is to break the authority of men and institutions whose position rests on violence or the threat of violence. It is monstrous to tell people that they must continue to prepare to slaughter each other, notwithstanding the deep repugnance to killing their fellow-men which exists in all normal human beings . . . Even though the parties to the relationship may be quite unaware of the effect of their dominance or subjection upon themselves, the moral effect is nevertheless inescapable. A relationship is always vitiated in proportion to the degree of power present. Dominance is inseparable from pride or arrogance, while deference or compliance indicates weakness, if not servility, and is accompanied by resentment, conscious or unconscious.

. . . If men reject the logic of equality, they must necessarily live by the logic of inequality and power. Therefore the question must be posed: why is equality or living without recourse to power considered so utopian? Partly, no doubt, because human beings find it difficult to imagine any change of a kind that they have not hitherto experienced. But obviously the difficulty goes much deeper. Given the existing inequalities and resultant tensions and animosities, people find it impossible to imagine life on a secure basis without recourse to



institutions providing violent sanctions. Therefore they readily acknowledge the rights of power, however much they try to soften the outlines of its face by the claim that power backed by majority consent is no longer power but democratic authority . . .

The principal obstacle to an understanding of power is the intensity of the desire to possess it. In most people this stems not so much from a positive love of power, but from the fear that they will be insecure or impotent without it. People are readily persuadable that power is evil in the hands of their opponents: in their own hands it becomes 'just' or 'necessary' or 'democratic' . . . While each denounces power as wielded by the other, each is ready to join forces with the other when the logic of power itself or the framework within which it is conducted is felt to be threatened. Within the parliamentary system, each respects the conventions, rules and ritual whereby each is allowed to rule in turn. Each will defend the system against its critics . . . Moreover, when direct-action unilateralists make a sudden incursion into the closed circuit of the upper reaches of power, the responses of the power world are significant . . . British direct-action unilateralists arouse the suspicions, not the support, of the Kremlin. Because unilateralism might by the force of its example prove contagious. And this would threaten the power of the East's ruling group no less than that of the West. While the rulers of the East have a vested interest in weakening the power of the West's ruling group, they have an even greater vested interest in securing the power of both ruling groups against action that would threaten both equally. And this is the essential reason why negotiations for multilateral disarmament between the Great Powers never succeed.

Tolstoy has put the truth of this as plainly as any man.

To suggest to governments not to have recourse to violence but to decide their differences in accord with equity, is a proposal to abolish themselves as governments, and no government can agree to that . . . it is the nature of a government not to submit to others but to exact submission from them, and a government is a government only in so far as it is able to exact submission and not itself to submit, and so it always strives to that end and will never voluntarily abandon its power . . .

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At this point, I feel impelled to respond with an early (perhaps premature) conclusion. Dr. Sampson's are strongly expressed views which denounce self-interest. These are idealistic appeals for universalism. As with most similar appeals, they fail to make distinctions that are crucial in the real world.

For power can be, and is, widely used both to promote justice and to eradicate justice; to emancipate some peoples from chains but to fasten chains on others; to destroy public order in some circumstances, but to recover, or sustain, in others, the only kinds of political order under which human progress is possible. A great many claims are made for the effectiveness of good works, but (as argued later) they are partially unpersuasive. Many wild claims about "rights" are bandied loosely about today, and some "rights" are asserted to exist which are totally fanciful, incompatible with any political order. "Rights" are feasible only in a collective context, and are obtainable not through unilateral assertion but solely upon the sufferance of the collectivity concerned.

As we shall discuss later, predators exist in the world. Some nation-states are committed (by their human leaders or prevailing domestic ideologies) to expansion, to dominance of other nation-states, to applying power in furtherance of purposes of their own (usually utopian in statement, but far less than utopian in practice) which the people of other nations do not wish either to subscribe to voluntarily or to have involuntarily imposed on them.

Thus, we may understand widespread longing for universal order on humanitarian terms, and may join in longing for it ourselves. We may admire expressions of universal goals. We may even support, to the limits of prudence, efforts toward attainment of those goals. But we will no doubt continue to retain some power of our own at hand, to be used in ways as moral as the circumstances permit. The form probably destined to be applied longest among moral but practical men is forceful resistance to, and violent defeat if necessary of, forceful overtures by predators.

#### Norm

The concept of norm in international relations is similar to most other concepts in that it represents a step forward in clarifying our understanding of the context to which it is applied, without being able to clarify it as much as we might wish or as much as to satisfy the expectations of those who overestimate its explanatory power. When overused or loosely used, the concept may confuse, rather than clarify. Also, as one would expect, the concept of norm overlaps the concept of morality.

There are two principal kinds of norms: one involving observed patterns of actual behavior, empirical patterns established by observing what people and groups actually do; the other involves prescriptions derived from several sources expressing what it is thought that people and groups should do. This dichotomy has often been expressed as the "is-ought" controversy--what does exist and what "ought" to exist; how people do behave vs how some think they should behave.



The derivative "normative" tends to be more strongly prescriptive than "norm"; nevertheless, both terms are used in various contexts to imply either (1) consensual standards of more or less conforming behavior (in a large sense, conduct that is considered "normal" in its context), or (2) articulated standards of how the parties concerned ought to behave (whether or not most actually do behave that way).

We shall try to distinguish here between these two meanings, that is, when we use "norm" to mean what parties usually do, and when we use "norm" to convey some idea of what they ought to do.

Both meanings have value, of course, in seeking to understand behavior among nation states. Neither meaning is new--this distinction identifies long-familiar prescriptive and empirical perspectives. Proponents of either side have argued eloquently in the course of arguing around each other, such as Thrasymachus and Socrates. Thrasymachus argued strongly along the lines of how the politically powerful do act, while Socrates was arguing how they should act.<sup>137</sup>

There is an element in the concept of norm that goes beyond mere statement or description and enters into the domain of evaluation, in order to provide a model or criterion or standard for measurement of relevant performance or behavior. In some respects, "norm" overlaps "custom"--for example, in interactions among national representatives at the United Nations, certain actions may be done or not done without reference to explicit UN rules, principally because that kind of action may be the norm of behavior in that context--i.e., "the way that sort of thing is done here."

The term norm has been long used in philosophical analysis, but its extensive use in the social sciences is recent.<sup>138</sup> Norms are rules for conduct in any important human activity; performance is judged by reference to norms, which are more specific and imperative than values or ideals. Modern social science places the concepts of norms centrally in its analysis of social systems.<sup>139</sup>

Most definitions emphasize that a norm represents consensus as to what the conduct of members (of a society, group) ought to be, and tend necessarily to be influenced by studies in jurisprudence, social anthropology, and sociology, especially the sociology of small groups and organizations.<sup>140</sup> Nevertheless, the conceptual evolution of "norm" is not, on the whole, satisfactory; and, while the term is increasingly used, much work is in prospect prior to its refinement adequately for some of the purposes for which it is now used.

As noted, there is some overlap between "norm" and the sphere of ethics and morality (and in some instances, with those of religion and theology). In general, however, to the extent that "norm" is prescriptive, it provides a source of judgment, a standard and basis for evaluation, that lies outside theistic, religious, and demoninational areas.

Thrasymachus' hypothesis, that men seek power for self-interest, has been echoed and restated by many political thinkers since, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bentham, and Marx. However, as has become clearer from the analyses of numerous other analysts from Plato to Freud and Lasswell, what constitutes self-interest is highly

complex and widely varied among individuals, depending upon their conscious and unconscious psychological drives, as well as their genetic capabilities, conditioned by culture and experience.<sup>141</sup> Even for power-seeking, as noted earlier, no single explanation seems satisfactory.<sup>142</sup>

A "norm" may achieve high acceptance within a group (of political scientists, policy planners, or whatever); but the reasons for high acceptance may be pluralistic, varying according to the value-system of each individual--by one individual because he thinks the norm right (ethics, morals, prescription), another because he thinks it works (effectiveness). But both may accept it. Moreover, modern studies show, as we have cited Plato, Freud, and Lasswell, that reasons for acceptance are mixed within each individual.<sup>143</sup> Thus, for example, insistence on categorizing norms as either exclusively ethics-based or exclusively effectiveness-based may be, in the light of present knowledge, ambiguous, in excess of validated underpinnings.

Both morality and self-preservation are referred to as principles or norms in this passage by Blair Campbell:

An apologist for political order must be ambivalent in his attitude toward political morality . . . Hobbes was unique among political thinkers in attempting to deny political force to morality . . . he sought to reverse the moralizing trend set by Plato . . . While Hobbes' answer to the problem of political obligation is non-moral--at least in the traditional sense--it is not merely prudential. Like morality, self-preservation provides a norm for conduct, a governing principle which serves as a guide for personal, as well as social behavior. Fear serves to mediate between conflicting desires . . . and it, too, requires that we take the needs of others into account (at least within limits), even at the expense of our own.<sup>144</sup>



In quoting the foregoing passages, my purpose is simply to cite an instance of an influential classical thinker (Hobbes) about politics, who appeared to repudiate morality in favor of self-interest in political thinking, yet whose repudiation of morality appears to be partly ambiguous; even though based preponderantly on self-preservation and self-interest, Hobbes' argument appears to accept the concept of partial obligation, of partial concern for the interest of others, as a norm for political conduct--an acceptance of the utility of the function of norm in society. Concerned primarily with theoretical considerations, we have not necessarily proved any proposition mentioned; but satisfactory support may have been adduced for a claim that association generates obligations of reciprocity in considering systemic needs and the interests of other parties.

Burton has clearly carried furthest the approach to a concept of norm of state behavior, including, for example, behavior among associates:

. . . There has not developed in the discipline of International Relations any concept of the behaviour of States equivalent to that behaviour of an individual in society which is regarded as within the range of lawful, socially conforming or acceptable behaviour . . . While we have clear concepts of social norms, there is no concept of State behaviour that is universally acceptable in international society--behaviour that is directed toward the development and advancement of the State but which is at the same time acceptable and conforming within world society.

It is important to be able to define the norm of behaviour . . . to analyse differences in human behaviour, it is necessary to have a notion of what is standard. The study of inter-State relations is directed toward, amongst other things, ascertaining what is acceptable and what is not acceptable behaviour. Whether the regulation of conduct is to be self-imposed by a supranational body, the

problem remains the same: first acceptable or unacceptable behaviour has to be defined.<sup>145</sup>

Can precedents or guidelines be found in international law?

Burton thinks not:

It is understandable that international law has not provided a concept of a norm . . . international law provides little guide to acceptable behaviour. It is mainly based upon past patterns of behaviour of states, particularly of powerful states . . . It is from the social sciences that one would expect to derive a concept of a norm of State behaviour. It is psychology and sociology that determine norms of behaviour in municipal society; it is a sociological and not a legal concept.<sup>146</sup>

It may strain the reader's tolerance to quote Professor Burton at any further length, but his discussion of political behavior may make the effort worthwhile:

. . . reference was made to 'normative' behaviour: if authorities wish to attain certain goals, then policies are required that take into account systemic needs, otherwise there will be self-defeating results or high costs in terms of other values. The concept of 'norm' is a different one: this refers to a standard pattern of behaviour by which to measure other patterns. Both may be described by reference to systemic behaviour. Neither concept has any moral or ideological connotation. The norm in this context is used very much as economists employ perfect competition as a norm for analytical purposes.<sup>147</sup>

#### A Concept Related to "Norm": Sovereignty

It is sometimes argued that there can be no such thing in international relations as a norm of state conduct (at least, not a powerful norm) associated with ethics, morality, values, obligation, prescription, or other normative criteria, since the nation-state's status as an autonomous political entity is placed beyond cavil or question by its possession of absolute sovereignty.

Whatever the merits may have been of such arguments concerning sovereigns and states in past centuries, their applications in the seventh decade of the 20th Century are subject to several practical modifications.

Sovereignty, as Professor Louis Sohn points out, is one of the most controversial concepts in political science. In the 16th Century, Jean Bodin developed the concept to bolster the power of the French king over rebellious feudal lords (thus, among several effects, hastening the end of feudalism). Several writers developed the theme--Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes, Laski; perhaps the most interesting development was Laski's treatment of pluralistic sovereignty residing in several shifting centers--pressure groups, economic power, and religious authority, as well as conventional governments. In any event, while Hobbes, for one, identified sovereignty with might, not law, others have outdone Hobbes in justifying absolutism in internal political order and irresponsible anarchy in the international context. Even Bodin, however, had emphasized that a sovereign otherwise absolute was still obligated to observe divine law, the law of reason, the law of nature, and jus gentium--"the law common to all nations."<sup>148</sup>

Pointing out that the limitations on states gradually arising in the 20th Century have been balanced by increased freedom of states from interference, Professor Sohn insists that a state cannot expect support of other states for its own interests unless it gives compliance to obligations reciprocally. Moreover, he holds that it can be demonstrated that at least in some cases states



have been considered bound by "international principles" whether or not they had accepted them voluntarily.<sup>149</sup> Other commentators seem to go at least some distance in Hobbes's direction of self-interest. Louis Goldie says that a state implicitly recognizes the obligatory nature of some provisions of international law, aware that its own best interests are served when other states comply.<sup>150</sup>

Other Concepts Related to "Norm": Custom, Social Exchange, Community

Custom is a body of more or less overt, more or less strict reciprocity-based rules expressing "ought" aspects of relationships between human beings, about ways in which people must behave if social institutions are to perform enduring tasks, and which are actually followed much of the time. Certain customs are institutionalized in justiciable terms, thus becoming part of the law of the society.<sup>151</sup> Custom and law are thus two forms of social (including, in appropriate aspects, political) norms.

The concept of "social exchange," and a few others, may also be relevant to our concern with primacy among nations. Writers since antiquity have discussed social exchange, including Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics), Adam Smith, and modern anthropologists. The basic assumption of social exchange is that man enters associations with others in order to bring rewards to himself; to be welcome in association, he must impress the others that association with him will also be rewarding to them. When he derives benefits from his association, he is under obligation to reciprocate by supplying

benefits to his associates. Benefits are not restricted to the economic category; "social exchange is ubiquitous," including politics.<sup>152</sup>

Thus, some concept exists that voluntary participation in association, and the receipt of benefits therefrom, create an obligation to supply benefits. This concept obviously has relevance for a range of political interactions among nations, such as alliance, trade agreement, tariff concession. Schwarzenberger distinguishes between the contexts of society based on rival interests and fear, and community, based on trust, self-sacrifice, and love (these are ideal types; in real life, only hybrids exist). Nations in international society tend to use any effective pressure to improve their positions, doing what they can, rather than what they ought. A community, on the other hand, finds classic expression in the Sermon on the Mount, the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, the Analects of Confucius, and Pufendorf's Elements of Law;<sup>153</sup> behavior therein is characterized by reciprocity and coordination.

As with most such concepts, at least two schools oppose each other. One school of political analysts resists the notion that, at the level of the world context, any community among the world's nations exists; at best, these scholars insist that the concept is a fiction, an illusion, or an abstract premise with limited expedient value.<sup>154</sup>

E. H. Carr cautioned thirty years ago:

It would be a dangerous illusion to suppose that this hypothetical world community possesses the unity and coherence of communities of more limited size up to and including

the state . . . the principle that the good of the whole takes precedence over the good of the part, which is a postulate of any fully integrated community, is not generally accepted in the international domain.<sup>155</sup>

Even accepting Carr's arguments, one may take literal note that Carr does not preclude two relevant and important possibilities:

(1) That international society does possess some community unity and coherence, only lesser in degree than that of smaller, more closely integrated communities, up to and including nation-states;

(2) That the good of the whole of international society is not without importance among many nations and regions, although assuredly it nowhere achieves importance comparable to "the part"--i.e., any nation-state.

Those whose emphases are on the positive aspects of world community adopt Talcott Parsons formulation of "a genuine consensus at a certain level of values."<sup>156</sup> They cite unmistakable current evidences of common endeavor in pursuit of shared goals; they refer to obvious acceptance of rules and precedents as norms in interstate relations; and they point to expanding interchange of communications and transactions.<sup>157</sup>

The foregoing discussion appears to conceive of only two levels of potential community: the entire world system, and the nation-state level. In reality, there are available a number of intermediate levels of associations, and cross-level forms of association. In sum, as one contemplates modern nation-states:

For security or aggrandizement, none is wholly self-sufficient . . . the community of nations is so structured



that no one nation is a "world unto itself" whatever its people may think but is a party to one or more visible or invisible coalitions.<sup>158</sup>

Olson and Zeckhauser interrelate a number of concepts--community, norm, social exchange--in an analysis of association in which they take up in some detail, for example, the argument that the United States and the other large members of NATO carry disproportionate shares of the burden of common defense.

It is true that the smaller members devote smaller percentages of their national income to defense (and, for that matter, to international agencies) than do the large members. However, the authors conclude that the larger nation has more to lose by withholding its contribution than a smaller nation, and that the larger nation has less to gain from hard bargaining.<sup>159</sup> On the whole, Olson and Zeckhauser conclude that it should not surprise anyone that the larger members bear the larger share of the costs of association (and, in that sense, of international agencies); for the differences are rooted in the differing national interests of the different members, and not in differences in moral attitude.<sup>160</sup>

In fact, a brief summary of some Olson-Zeckhauser findings<sup>161</sup> in specific reference to alliance appear worth citing at this point, as another input to our understanding of inter-nation dynamics:

- (1) every nation seeks furtherance of its own values;
- (2) values are different for each member;
- (3) the larger members tend to place higher value on the public good;

(4) some small nations feel that great effort on their part would not make much difference in strategic equations;

(5) exceptionally, the converse occurs, in which a smaller nation believes that its forces, though small, are the key input providing the potential margin of victory, or that its forces provide the increment that makes total risks prohibitive for a specific potential aggressor;

(6) these considerations influence calculations of appropriate contributions that are not necessarily "consistent with ordinary conceptions of ability to pay."

The concepts of social exchange and community, then, enrich the concept of norm. But we have pursued these concepts sufficiently for our purposes. At this point, we return to the unfinished contexts of power.

#### Evolution of Power Relationships

Initially, says De Jouvenel, social order rests on folkways and associated beliefs, including tradition, superstition, custom, authority from the gods, and authority from ancestors. The more sacred is custom, the less advanced is the society, and the more extensive is the conformity demanded of members, including the monarch. As religious authority declines, political authority grows; commandments given by gods are supplemented by statutes and regulations promulgated by men.<sup>162</sup> This sequence of experience is more or less universal, and communities that become states develop the same means to cope with real life tensions and conflicts with other states.

Declares political scientist K. J. Holsti: "Stripped of diplomatic verbiage, all states seek to achieve or defend their objectives through basically similar means, employing threats, rewards, and punishments."<sup>163</sup>

It is inevitable under current international dynamics that the principal actors are the nation-states. One of the most prominent modern statesmen of power dynamics among states was de Gaulle. De Gaulle's concepts, for example, were clear and firm, and anything but sentimental; one of his firmest convictions was that the nation-state is the only logical focus for human endeavor in the international sphere; only states are "valid, legitimate, and capable of achievement." The status of any state within the international community, according to deGaulle, is measured in terms of power; "logic and sentiment do not weigh heavily in comparison with the realities of power." DeGaulle sometimes quoted Nietzsche on the state as "the coldest of cold monsters."<sup>164</sup> Ideologies are of little importance. A nation needs power to survive, and then, if possible, to flourish.<sup>165</sup>

Another primary conviction of deGaulle was that human affairs lead inevitably to struggle and conflict; in turn, life cannot be conceived without a primary role for the operation of force. All nations contend for hegemony. International life, like life in general, is a struggle for power. Defense is the ultimate reason for a state's existence.<sup>166</sup> The primary goal for a state is to increase its power; therefore, foreign policy, felt de Gaulle, takes precedence in any nation's affairs. The indispensable support for foreign policy is military power.<sup>167</sup> France had long realized



these facts, said deGaulle; for fourteen centuries, military power had remained France's "second nature."<sup>168</sup>

Moreover, as deGaulle reflected upon the policy failures at Munich in 1938 and of the Maginot Line policy, he concluded that the common fatal weakness of those policies was preponderant dependence upon a defensive military posture--"the absence of offensive weapons killed diplomacy."<sup>169</sup> Thus force de frappe can be considered a consequence of deGaulle's conviction that diplomacy unsupported by offensive weapons is bound to be weak.<sup>170</sup>

Thus, deGaulle would confer primacy within their respective contexts to the nation-state, to defense of the state, to military power as an element of defense, to offensive weaponry as supports of diplomacy, and to foreign policy.

When a policy does not possess sufficient power in itself, supplementary guarantees can be found in associations with other powerful states--in alliances. Said deGaulle: "It is only in equilibrium that the world will find peace"--in a balance of offsetting powers. Associations can lead to equilibrium, but they must not be integrative.<sup>171</sup>

A modicum of deGaulle's fundamental rationale is indeed essential for survival and growth on both the personal and national level. No conscientious statesman or military leader ever forgets that his most basic responsibility is to ensure the survival and welfare of his own nation. Especially in thwarting, and if necessary, crushing, the capability of predators to wreak damage, the responsible representative must remain perpetually wary and firm--and, occasionally,

take the offensive as the best defense against the offensive-minded. Strife, indeed, continues as one of the natural ingredients of relations among men and politics.

The concept of the international context, however, as exclusively an arena of autonomous antagonists, of predators eternally striving for power and advantage over others, each unwilling to concede some proportion of autonomy in return for a comparable proportion of harmony, is primitive. Three hundred years of experience with nation-states should have demonstrated that there must be a better way to national survival and international harmony, and the world is not devoid of suggestions for better ways.

Those ways, it can be argued forcefully, must begin through some form of cooperation, of partnership, or regional community, in which the existing differences among members are accepted by all members. Some member will have to serve (even temporarily, or alternatively) as leader, leading by consensus as much as possible, without coercing other members in matters that do not concern the survival and welfare of the collectivity; and the other members, sensitive to their individuality on other matters, will have to come to acceptance of some degree and form of leadership, while maintaining equality and diversity. Otherwise, internecine warfare will continue indefinitely.

DeGaulle's concepts strongly influenced France's interactions with other nation-states, although they were not actually implemented in and by France as thoroughly as they were enunciated. Insofar

as they contributed to the rehabilitation of France and Europe, they were constructive and admirable. Insofar as they revived and encouraged obsessive, egocentric nationalism at the expense of international harmony, however, they may have retarded the interests of the community of nations in general, and of France in particular.

One can approach international relations on a number of levels, none of which exclusively covers the entire field; e.g., international organizations, power rankings, nation-states, alliances, or other. Accordingly, one may profitably perceive the entire field of international affairs as a highly complex system of bilateral and multilateral interactions among various forms and levels of international actors, including international organizations with other organizations, nations with other nations, nations with regional groupings, nations with alliances, members of international organizations with nonmembers, private transnational agencies with nation-state governments, and other combinations.

So complex is the context of international affairs, and so ambivalent are the implications of actions in this area, that Bertrand deJouvenel has suggested the following proposition: "the results of decisions in foreign affairs are invariably unpredictable." This accords with Tolstoy's conclusion that while historical forces do not control immediate events, they implacably dictate results irrespective of the will of any power holder in the situation.<sup>172</sup>

Writes Bertrand Russell of all levels of human activity:

There must be power, either that of government, or that of anarchic adventurers. There must even be naked power, so long as there are rebels against governments,



or even ordinary criminals. But if human life is to be, for the mass of mankind, anything better than a dull misery punctuated with moments of sharp horror, there must be as little naked power as possible . . . I do not pretend that this is easy.

It is useless to trust in the virtue of some individual or set of individuals. The philosopher king was dismissed long ago as an idle dream, but the philosopher party, through equally fallacious, is hailed as a great discovery. No real solution of the problem of power is to be found in irresponsible government by a minority, or in any other short cut.<sup>173</sup>

One alleged national "short cut" to achieving the national interest that has been repeatedly and relentlessly urged by commentators of a certain cast of mind is generosity and good works. The effectiveness of such an approach in harmonizing relations among states is not compelling. Machiavelli observed long ago that as much harm is likely to be done by good works as by bad. Kenneth Thompson wrote in "Ethics and National Purpose":

It is too much to expect that nations will show gratitude or lasting affection for one another. Generosity is as likely to produce envy, resentment, and contempt as to create good will, for no government based on popular support can afford to acknowledge the full scale of its dependence on others.<sup>174</sup>

Prior to the 19th Century, a collectivity of individuals such as we now call a state was not conceived of as an actor in itself, nor could identity as a "nation" be separated from the characteristics of aggregated individuals (e.g., a nation of Frenchmen, as distinguished from "France")--a whole, so to speak, inferior to its parts. It was Hegel who advanced the concept of the state as the proper repository of power. According to Hegel, although the motive power of society is the "general will," it is justifiable

for a minority made up of the "conscious" members to direct the majority, "whether or not the individuals who lack consciousness of the end are assenting parties."<sup>175</sup>

In power dynamics, says DeJouvenel, some subjective element is indispensable:

. . . the nature of man and the nature of society combine . . . without the egotistical principle, Power would lack the inner strength which alone enables it to carry out its function . . . In the order of nature everything dies which is not sustained by an intense and brutal love of self. Power, in the same way, can only maintain the ascendancy necessary to it by the intense and brutal love which the rulers have for their authority.<sup>176</sup>

DeJouvenel asks probing questions that echo our earlier discussion:

Is not the will to power rooted deep in human nature? . . . The struggle to magnify itself is of power's essence . . . In the makeup of power in the real, two natures [egoist and social] are necessarily found in association. In whatever way and whatever spirit it has been established, power is neither angel nor brute, but, like man himself, a composite creature, uniting in itself two contradictory natures.<sup>177</sup>

What is the essence of power? It all turns on . . . obedience. Who knows the reasons for . . . obedience knows the inner nature of Power.<sup>178</sup>

Restrained by concepts of "divine will," "general will," and others, the power of even a monarch of the Middle Ages was (theoretically) not absolute; he, too, was subject to the Law of God. Thus, Yves de Chartres was able to say to Henry I of England, "You are the servant of the servants of God; you are the protector and not the owner of your people."<sup>179</sup> Still, individual kings managed to rationalize practical absolutism; e.g., James I asserted that even when subjected to a king's unjust commands, "the people may do no

other than flee unresistingly from the anger of its king; its tears and sighs are the only answer to him allowed it, and it may summon none but God to its aid."<sup>180</sup>

Gradually, there evolved the doctrine of popular sovereignty, i.e., society is formed and power established by the will and consent of the people. Suarez, Hobbes, and Spinoza argued, however, that transfer of one's individual sovereignty to the sovereign was complete and unqualified; accordingly, no subject could question the way in which a sovereign exercised collective power, because the subject "had agreed in advance."<sup>181</sup> Eventually, such reservations in favor of monarchs were eroded.

#### Power Structures and Interactions

Berle recounts a provocative modern instance of the exercise of power. After 5:30 p.m. on November 9, 1965, New York City was blacked out by the failure of electric circuits. Traffic was at its peak when the traffic lights failed, and chaos loomed. What happened spontaneously at the intersection of 3d Avenue and 19th Street was replicated all over New York.

An anonymous young man, perhaps 20 years old, equipped only with a flashlight and assertiveness, appointed himself to take charge. Yet, while he had no authority, everyone obeyed him. The incident is worth some reflection. There was not much choice available for the mass of people affected: chaos or submission to some traffic director. The young "usurper" operated wholly within limits of a familiar role model so as to resolve the situation (not to accrue power to himself). Because it was recognized, his power



became legitimate.<sup>182</sup> This example may be instructive concerning indispensable elements of the exercise of authority.

The central hypothesis in many theories is that the greater one's resources, the greater one's power. In attempting to analyze power, Lasswell constructed a scheme with eight base values, in each of which recipients of power-wielding can be motivated to acknowledge influence: power, respect, rectitude or moral standing, affection, well-being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment.<sup>183</sup>

Economic power is second in scale to political power--"a bad second";<sup>184</sup> says Russell, economic power is derivative, not primary, like military power.<sup>185</sup> McFarland finds much agreement among political theorists that power is a type of causation. He distinguishes power from influence by restricting power to mean the exercise of intended social causation against resistance.<sup>186</sup>

Haas' way of expressing it is that power is the ability to exercise influence by threat of punishment.<sup>187</sup> Haas states the normal assumption

that the militarily and industrially stronger nation has more power than the weaker nation and can threaten sanctions accordingly. But the real question is: will the stronger readily use this power? . . . The capability of a nation to coerce should never be confused with the will to do so.

Berle echoes this caveat,<sup>188</sup> and this distinction is repeated by a number of students of power.

David Vital has attempted to articulate some political implications of the material inequalities between states. Relatively speaking, the weakest element of the smaller state's national

arsenal is the economic element. A state with great economic resources coupled with a large population naturally has more influence on events outside its borders, greater security from pressure and attack, more prestige, and freer, wider choices in pursuing national policies. The small state, on the other hand, is "more vulnerable to pressure, more likely to give way under stress, more limited in choice of options and subject to tighter connection between domestic and external affairs."<sup>189</sup>

The volume of human and material physical resources is an important, but not exclusively important, factor. Other factors may modify the effect of the physical element--such as level of social and economic development, the chance of living in geographical proximity to areas of conflict or areas of importance to the great powers, the nature of the environment, the degree of cohesion among the populace, the degree of support accorded to the current government, and others.<sup>190</sup> One of the ancillary but not inconsequential advantages possessed by big states involves diplomatic and informational capabilities related to other states; in general, the foreign ministries and foreign services of small states do not possess adequate resources for analyses of the whole range of foreign affairs in modern times.<sup>191</sup>

Vital discusses the difficulty of classifying "in-between" states, even in general terms. As in most activities, such analytical precision as exists tends to be applied at the top of the pyramid, or iceberg; distinctions among elements well down in the hierarchy tend to be far less precise. It is especially difficult to make distinctions in power rankings between a state with a large population

but limited development (e.g., Indonesia) and a state with advanced development but limited population (e.g., Canada, Australia). Vital, for example, sets arbitrary upper limits for the category of "small state": either 10-15 million population for economically advanced countries, or 20-30 million for underdeveloped countries.<sup>192</sup>

One refuge for the small state is subjective moral righteousness--along the lines of self-conviction that bigness itself is immoral and that smallness itself confers virtue. Vital cites a writer on Swedish foreign policy (Herbert Tingsten, 1949) who described the Swedish tendency between the World Wars to consider all great powers villains, casting states into a hierarchy in which Sweden occupied the highest level, the other Scandinavian states the next level, the formerly neutral states the next level, followed by all other small states in general.<sup>193</sup>

Vital holds that:

. . . It is not unnatural [for small states to desire] that the distasteful, sometimes humiliating hierarchy of power be replaced by a more satisfying, moral one where the great powers, with their egoism and brutality, their collective role as prime mover in the international system, are suitably compared with the weaker class of states who being weaker are supposed, by that very fact, to be more likely to have justice on their side.<sup>194</sup>

These considerations lead to resurgence of age-old debates, on such questions as the following: are the poor better people than the rich? Have leaders of enterprises reached their positions through chicanery and deception? Are members at the lowest levels of organizations certain to be more competent than those at the top? If one were able to throw out all those who are "running



things," would their replacements be likely to run things better? Where would all the "better" replacements come from? If America is considered not to perform satisfactorily in the position of primacy, what other nation is likely to do better? On what basis could such a forecast be made?

We shall return later to the subject of inverse correlation of size with virtue.

If one is trying to understand the views of disproportionate entities (a great power and a small power) towards each other, one handicaps his vision by assuming an indulgent predilection toward one or the other. If hubris may distort the great power's view of the smaller, envy may distort the view in the other direction. It is no new observation of human nature to conclude that those in a lesser status tend to regard those in a higher status, not only with envy but occasionally also with some feeling that the other party, not oneself, is responsible for one's "inferiority."

Although we are here anticipating later discussion, this may be an appropriate place to comment on that symptom of modern tension among nations, by which developing nations accuse developed nations of "unfairness," of "exploitation," of "owing" much, and similar unsavory activities which allegedly resulted in disadvantaged status for other nations. As McClelland showed in The Achieving Society, motivations within societies play significant roles in the destinies of those societies. A number of nations which express grievance at others have only to look incisively at their own histories, during which small entrenched internal elites may have

been the critical elements in retarding growth and emergence into the modern world.

In any event, we cite here Vital on what he believes to be the great power's view of the small power:

For the great power, the small state is either irrelevant to its purpose, a marginal factor of support, or an impediment (but not a barrier) to the pursuit of its interests. It may be an opponent, but not a rival . . . What this may mean in practice--contempt, disdain, disinterest, coldness, inflexibility, or simple impatience--depends upon the nature of the issue at stake and the importance attached to it. It also depends upon the nature of the great power's society and regime.<sup>195</sup>

The small power:

must cope with the fact that in its relations with the great power the preponderance of physical strength in the latter will be buttressed by inequality in the instruments of foreign policy and by a combination of indifference and deep-rooted reluctance to ascribe any practical significance to the doctrine of the legal equality of states.<sup>196</sup>

As Berle puts it,

A small or relatively weak state adjacent to a larger, powerful country finds its decisions restricted in any event. It cannot, for example, ally with an enemy of its neighbor without risking, indeed expecting, military or other reaction. Realistically, its only choice is between inoffensiveness to or alliance with the adjacent power. Its power holders know perfectly well that the neighbor cannot accept a substantial threat to its own safety; it must act whether it enjoys the process or not.<sup>197</sup>

Non-alignment becomes less tenable in modern times as a stance for a small state. A major factor of sovereignty involves a state's capacity to defend itself, primarily with military capability; but small states cannot afford to maintain a comprehensive modern military establishment. The days of sending a number of naval vessels to show the flag and thereby change the course of

other nations' foreign policies are practically over. Modern military establishments are too large, and weapons systems too expansive, for small states to bear; moreover, the essential technological base is beyond their reach. Hence, the small state, to the extent that it can afford them, must purchase weapons from another, larger nation; inevitably it becomes partially dependent upon its weapons supplier.<sup>198</sup>

### Envy

In exploring the concept of primacy, relations between the pre-eminent state and other states are usually analyzed from the perspective of the more powerful nation. In our discussion up to this point, we seem to have followed this practice, although we have taken up a limited number of facets of perspectives of lesser states.

It may contribute to enhanced understanding to proceed a bit further in analysis of such interactions, as perceived by the lesser state. As noted frequently herein, such interactions are complex: some degree of simplification is involved in the paragraphs immediately following.

Many dynamics of such relationships take their course without friction, acrimony, or animosity, in straightforward exchange. Some nations appear able to deal effectively with more powerful nations, even with superpowers, without resentment, envy, secret or open suspicion, or spleen. Others allow their perspective to be heavily seasoned by one or more of various prejudicial tendencies which we shall here oversimplify by subsuming them all under the rubric "envy."



If pride, the first of the seven deadly sins, can be assumed to be among the prominent characteristics of a Number One nation, then envy, also a deadly sin, can be assumed to characterize at least some of the others. Especially among those nations which criticize other nations pungently and gratuitously on moral premises can be found states substantially moved by envy; as Thornton Wilder says in the novel Theophilus North: ". . . envy plays a large part in censorious morality."

Nations which seek equity from others seek attainment of a condition that is not only difficult to attain but also difficult to recognize. Some are really seeking not equity but advantage for themselves and disadvantage for others. For example, nation A, with lesser resources, may assert that nation B, in possession of greater resources, has an obligation to share its resources with A, on humanitarian or moral grounds. A may assert that B lacks moral justification for projecting influence toward A on the basis of an existing power differential. A may even assert (as has been done) that B, because B is big and powerful, is therefore corrupt and immoral--and that, because one must be corrupt in order to attain bigness, B is invariably, in any contretemps with any smaller nation such as A, in an inferior and untenable moral position.

One reflects on the old maxims of common law: "he who seeks equity must do equity" and "he who seeks equity must come with clean hands." Has the critical state shared its resources with lesser states? Has it stated its conviction that it has an obligation to do so? Are its deficiencies in resources and power status at least

partly attributable to its own internal ideology, values, and practices, rather than being solely attributable to purposefully adverse influences exerted by other nations or to bad luck in the marketplace? Has it dealt with nations lesser than itself with scrupulous equity despite possession of a favorable power differential? In comparing its own moral position, for example, with the position of nation C (which may be even more inferior to A than A is to B) on any issue, does A invariably concede that C occupies the higher moral ground?

Large and powerful nations deal with each other, and with superpowers, on a basis of general equality, as well as a basis of equality, even occasional superiority, in certain specific aspects. Thus, in some respects, they may act as rivals, or near-rivals; for those entities nearest to each other in power are most likely to be the most assiduous and most frequent assessors of their relative statuses. Involved in the "power game" themselves, they are less likely, however, to invoke moral equations as accounting for significant differences in the past, present, or future. Nations to which the resources and power of a great nation loom with enormous differential may succumb to the temptation to believe, and assert, that the advantages possessed by another nation are due, not to its own shortcomings--but to chicanery, corruption, or similar forces.

We are not at all implying that power differentials between nations are always fairly or equitably established. It will not do to imply that all unfavorable commentary on American performance is

rooted in envy. Resentment by one nation towards another's power or affluence may be well justified. Then again, it may not be.

It would be a desirable state of affairs if leading nations always treated lesser nations generally as equals, with equity governing give and take. It would be equally desirable if lesser nations refrained from recourse to envy or moral recrimination to which they themselves are no less vulnerable than the nations they denounce.

#### Merit vs Chance vs Operant Conditioning

At this point, we may extract some significance for primacy from the discussion in Chapter 1 of operant conditioning, a deterministic concept. There is no intention here of contending or implying that there is a direct analogy between the laboratory-derived theories of B. F. Skinner, for example, and a nation's attainment of high status among all nations. We are necessarily confined in this section to speculation; substantial answers to the basic dilemma articulated here must await the future.

The basic dilemma is this: is a nation entitled to claim to have reached high status, even primacy, solely through its own efforts? Or, alternatively, is it possible to establish conclusively that its attainment was the result of (1) chance, or (2) other international forces beyond the control of itself or any other individual nation?

We are all familiar with the phenomenon that each of us shares a universal two-sided characteristic of human nature, in that we tend to take credit for our successes but tend to ascribe our



failures to forces outside ourselves--to "Life," "Fate," "the System," "enemies," and similar scapegoats. But are they mere scapegoats? We never really know; still, it seems unlikely that we bear no personal responsibility for our failures, especially if we claim responsibility for our successes.

Are these caveats reasonably transferable from the fate of persons to the fate of nations? To what extent does it matter? It matters in this way: a nation, a society, that preens itself obsessively on its attainment of primacy by ascribing its success exclusively to its own efforts may be tempted to go further--to claim that its efforts were not only successful, but also successful because its methods were of higher quality, of greater validity, or of superior analytical precision. The nation itself, and even observers in other nations, may conclude that preeminent results were attained not only because of the quality of the nation's efforts and methods but also because of superior merit or virtue inherent in the individuals who form that collective society. Such premises may be correct, or in partial error, or in total error. On-going efforts, or responses, keyed to such premises may be compounding error.

We recall Lincoln's statement: "I claim not to have controlled events, but frankly admit that events have controlled me." Thus, and without crossing the borders into astrology, we may conclude that the conjunction of a number of broad international forces, purposeful or indifferent, has something to do--but how much?--with the hierarchical status of each nation.

Without abandoning our faith in man's capacity to influence his own future, we may conclude that chance and luck happen even to nations (e.g., timing, weather, assassinations, natural disasters, the incidence of genius, technological breakthrough), contributing in some degree--but how much?--toward determining the international ranking of each nation.

From the work of McClelland and others, and from our experience, we may conclude that the type and quality of people's own efforts to improve their lot have more than a little influence on the establishment of the status of their nation, high or low, relative to all others. But again we ask a question impossible to answer: how much influence did their own efforts have?

#### Noncoercive Influence

In addition to actual or implied coercion, it must be noted that non-coercive influence also operates in various effective ways in relations between states.

Professor Klaus Knorr has helpfully analyzed noncoercive influence:

Military power turns on threats which can take various particular forms (e.g. an increase in the military budget). Economic power turns on the withholding of economic advantages (e.g., trade). Political penetrative power, which is less well understood, turns on a variety of overt or clandestine activities (e.g. propaganda, the fomenting of political unrest and strikes, the support of opposition parties or revolutionary groups, the bribing of officials or political leaders) . . . This has rightly been called 'psychic coercion.'

Noncoercive influence affords interaction which is fruitful and enriches rather than restricts choices for the actors concerned. Like power, it turns on a large range of values important to these actors. In fact, any value which is a power base may also provide a base for noncoercive influence. The play of noncoercive influence and cooperation are facilitated when the value preferences of actors converge rather than diverge--for instance when they share an interest in freer trade or economic integration, or in some sort of ideological utopia. But a similar structure of value preferences proves integrative rather than divisive only if it is marked by priorities that are susceptible to cooperative solution, rather than conflict and competition. Against this background, benevolent influence also thrives on the mutual respect and esteem



of elites and communities--feelings which, in the modern age, are rooted in the domestic as well as international performance of countries and often also in dedication to the same ideology. Still more favorable, of course, are special relationships of friendship and trust established as a result of a satisfactory shared past experience. Such relationships impede the exercise of coercion and encourage noncoercive influence, whereas settled relations of animosity have the opposite effect. Trust refers to expectations of benevolent behavior in contrast to suspicion, which feeds on the expectation of malevolence. Although attitudes of respect and friendship may be unrelated to the immediate issues confronting governments, they create an ambiance facilitating cooperation.

All these factors may play a role when international leadership is not hegemony or domination and hence is not derived from compulsion or from a forcible change or maintenance of the status quo, either of which, in turn, may be based on military or economic superiority or superiority in some other value. In international interaction, a state may lead by proposing, initiating, and organizing cooperative arrangements redounding to the benefit of all voluntary participants. Thus, the leader may provide and/or organize military security against aggression or, more generally, the preservation of the established order. Or the leading nation may prove innovating in designing new solutions to pressing problems, for instance by proposing regional federation or other modifications of the status quo. The point is that, in the absence of any compulsion, these capacities for organizing cooperation and multinational problem-solving and for increasing the supply of protection and other values furnish the bases for benevolent leadership. This leader does not command, control, and manipulate. He serves his function by information, persuasion, advice, and example. And once a state has displayed these qualities over some time, it enjoys a corresponding prestige that tends to facilitate the future exercise of noncoercive leadership. To conclude, whether leadership is based on military or economic superiority (or superiority in some other value base), it can be coercive or noncoercive (or, in practice, of course, both at once).<sup>199</sup>

We turn from the dynamics of power to the international contexts in which power dynamics among nations boil and mull.

### World and International Order

Broad theory, or grand theory, concerning international systems, coalitions, and alliances, although appreciably more sophisticated than theories of norms of behavior, has not yet reached a definitive stage, as the theorists involved are the first to concede.<sup>200</sup> Nevertheless, many formulations already familiar, and others in the process of emergence, possess varying degrees of explanatory power sufficient to throw into sharp relief important aspects of nation-state performance.

Of initial importance are theories attempting to explain the world system; next, those concerned with subsystems; and finally, those concerned with interactions between individual states. Necessarily, these theories sometimes overlap, for nation-states exist as primary actors simultaneously in world, multilateral, and bilateral relationships. In analyzing the conduct of one nation towards another, one is inevitably, at the same time, analyzing many aspects of its conduct toward all other individual nations, groups of nations, and the whole external array of nations. It is, in fact, out of the accumulated perceptions of the comprehensively observed international behavior of individual nations that regularities can be observed, leading via the inductive process to generalizations, or theoretical propositions, about the interactions of the whole collectivity of nations.

One useful introduction to theories concerning patterns of relationships would include eight major systemic concepts:

community of nations, international order, international system, collective security, international organization, international law, diplomacy, and balance of power.

Next to diplomacy, the balance of power is the most enduring concept in relations among nations. Liska finds in the balance of power the fundamental basis of international alignment.<sup>201</sup> G. H. Snyder calls it "the central theoretical concept in international relations."<sup>202</sup> Most scholars of international relations<sup>203</sup> link associative behavior of nations to the balance of power concept. Yet, familiar as this concept has become over decades, even centuries, it remains imprecise. As Ferris described the problem:

The problem stems not only from the fact that power has many faces but also from the relatively frequent failure of investigators to specify verbally which aspect or aspects they have in mind in the context of their discourse. A well-known case in point is the literature on the concept of 'balance of power.' Some of the many meanings that have been attached to this concept include: distribution of power in the international system, whether balanced or unbalanced; equilibrium, or a situation in which the power relationship between states or groups of states is one of more or less approximate equality; disequilibrium, or a favorable balance or superiority in power for one state or group of states in the international system; a policy pursued by states aimed at securing a position of either equality or superiority; a system of international politics; a theoretical principle acting as a guide to foreign policy-makers in any and all international situations so that the preponderance of any one state can be avoided; power politics generally; stability and peace; and instability and war.<sup>204</sup>

Thus, all of the major systemic concepts cited above have something to recommend them; they all express some perspective which is partially valid as an explanation of the international



scene on either a partial, normative, or empirical basis. All are relevant in some degree to the behavior of any nation. Obviously, there exists an international system of some sort, but it does not yet lend itself to a completely satisfactory formula, especially for purposes of prediction. Obviously, some partial world community, as noted earlier, exists, as do partial frameworks of international law, international order, international organization, and normative diplomatic networks and procedures. Collective security awaits a broader consensus, leading to a merging of the concepts of international law, order, community, and organization. The most nearly satisfactory concept is still the balance of power concept--substantially ambiguous and precarious in application--enduring as a relatively simple but powerful explanation of the conduct of nations.

Organski feels that the theory of the balance of power, however, applied to the period before 1950, when there were many nations of approximately equal power, free to switch sides, able to increase their power by clever diplomacy, alliances, and military conquests. Today, observes Organski, there does not exist a condition of roughly equal power characterizing many nations; it is no longer possible to balance power by shifting alliances. "The great century of Pax Britannica from 1815 to 1914 amply illustrates that peace comes with preponderant power, not with a balance of power."<sup>205</sup> Thus, Organski represents the "preponderant power" school in explaining world order.

Professor Hedley Bull of Australia discusses what is meant by "order" in the world. International order is a pattern of activity

fulfilling the goals of sovereign states, while world order is a pattern of activity so drawn as to promote primary goals in human society as a whole. Bull says that even though it is international order that engages most of our attention, world order is far more important in the long run.<sup>206</sup>

And in any case, says Bull, we must avoid the practice of assuming that order is the sole, overriding goal, or the only or chief test, of international institutions and activities. Order is only one of a number of contending values; others are change, justice, prosperity, and perhaps peace. Each can be of transcendent importance, depending upon the circumstances.<sup>207</sup>

What is connoted by the term "great power" in current contexts? Ranke once said that a great power is one that can maintain itself against any other power without allies. Today, says Bull,

a country which is a great power is one that is recognised by other states to have a certain status in the international hierarchy. Such a state is entitled to have a voice in the resolution of issues that are not its immediate concern; it is expected to take a leading part in the affairs of the international system as a whole; it is, in other words, not merely the depository of a certain degree of armed strength, but the bearer of certain special rights and duties. To speak of great powers (or, in present day terms, of super powers) is already to presuppose the existence of an international society in which these states are 'great' responsables.<sup>208</sup>

. . . There are many who believe that if the power wielded by the United States and the Soviet Union were available to Sweden, or Switzerland, or the non-aligned states of Asia and Africa we could expect to look forward to a more orderly or at least to a more just world system . . . The notion that if power had been exercised by others, this disorder and injustice might have been avoided appeals to our progressive instincts, our will to believe that things might have been and might be 'better' than they are.

To take this view, however, would be to overlook the possibility that things might have been 'worse' than they have been; that while the history of modern international society conforms to a pattern of war, insecurity, and confusion, there are woven into this pattern elements of peace, security and stability; that this part of history has also been made by the great powers, and that but for the role they have been able to play it might not have been present . . . Moreover . . . in order to establish that Sweden or Switzerland or India or Abyssinia was more virtuous than America or Russia we should need to consider not merely what their record has been as states whose opportunities for managing the world's affairs are in any case minimal, but how they would be likely to have acted if the temptations of great power had actually been placed in their way. Many small states are in fact troublemakers on the small stages on which they play a role; and while there are others which, like Switzerland, enjoy a reputation for keeping out of trouble or, like Sweden, one for espousing innocuous causes and promoting good works, theirs is a virtue deriving essentially from innocence of high politics, not one tested by experience of it . . . If states were equal in power as they are in law, and every state could assert its claims with the same degree of force as every other, then it is difficult to see how, apart from resort to alliances that may introduce a contrived element of inequality, international conflicts could ever be settled and laid to rest, or the claims of any one state definitely granted or denied.

Because states are grossly unequal in power certain international issues are as a consequence settled<sup>209</sup> . . .

The super powers may be said to shape their policies so as to contribute to world order in two main ways: by managing the balance of power between them, and by exploiting their joint predominance in relation to the rest of the world.

The Soviet-American or central balance of power vitally affects the prospects of order in international society as a whole . . .

One way in which great powers act so as to promote international order is by maintaining dominance, hegemony, or primacy over particular areas of the globe or among particular groups of states. The preponderance of a great power in relation to a given area or group of states comprehends a great variety of relationships. There are some . . . where it is proper to speak of dominance. There are others . . . where it is more



appropriate to speak of hegemony. There are other relationships, like that of the United States to its NATO allies, where the special position of the great power does not appear to rest on explicit coercion but on acceptance of the fact that a more powerful ally makes a disproportionately large contribution to the common cause and is entitled to special rights and privileges in return, where it may seem best to speak of primacy.<sup>210</sup>

Professor Bull also observes that it is likely that no form of world order will exist that is not the form preferred and supported by some specific nation states:

The question the lesser states have to ask themselves is not whether they would prefer a world order in which no states had special privileges and responsibilities, but whether they would prefer that these privileges and responsibilities were exercised by a different or a wider group of states . . . In the long march of history the Soviet-American world order is bound to be swept aside. But it may last for some years yet if the United States and the Soviet Union are able to make the adjustments . . . necessary to retain the consent they have so far enjoyed.<sup>211</sup>

#### International Organizations

One of the modern devices that plays an increasingly important role in regularizing international order is the international organization. Since all but a handful of nations in the world belong to the United Nations, certain significant interactions take place within that organization, affecting the exercise of primacy, or any other hierarchical status, among most or all world nations. Throughout this study, we discuss various dynamics among nations; in this section, we focus upon the particular kinds of interactions that take place within international organizations.

Morgenthau points<sup>212</sup> sharply to two critical differences between decisionmaking inside and outside of international organizations:

1. The most fundamental issues between nations, as Professor Schuman has been quoted earlier, are still settled on the battlefield or in diplomatic negotiation; voting in international chambers such as the UN General Assembly may, on bedrock issues, be misleading and ineffective, and sometimes irrelevant.

2. Parliamentary procedures transferred to the international organization at best have limited or no effect on issues; at worst, they aggravate conflicts that carry the seeds of war. Morgenthau explains why disaster can be invited by attempts to decide controversial issues by majority vote among nations in international organizations, by comparing the nature of domestic and international majority voting procedures.

When the Congress of the United States votes down an internal minority, its vote actually settles the issue for the time being because of four pressures of reality:

1. The parliamentary majority vote takes place within a highly complex, balanced, internally-corrective, responsive structure with carefully developed devices to achieve peaceful change, supported by the entire national community;

2. The domestic structure provides numerous protections for minorities on single issues; minorities may overlap majorities on other issues, and in time may evolve into majorities on any issue;

3. The numerical relation between majority and minority at least approximates the actual distribution of power and interests within the whole polity;

4. Although even in Congress not all votes are weighted equally, the most powerful single vote represents a small fraction of the total power of the American population.

In contrast, in the United Nations General Assembly, the vote, for example, of the Maldive Islands, with 119,000 people, is equal to the vote of the United States, with almost 2000 times that population, and of China, with over 7000 times that population. Thus, on matters under vote in the UN General Assembly, a citizen of the Maldive Islands exercises 2000 times the voting power of a citizen of the United States, and 7000 times that of a Chinese.

Thus, Morgenthau lists some objections to transferring domestic majority voting systems to an international arena:

- The majority vote is the sole device for compulsory peaceful change within the UN framework; but there is no constitution, no balanced structure, no protection of minority rights, no systems of restraint and review, no community expression enjoying a moral consensus. Hence, a majority consisting of minor nations frequently and meaninglessly outvotes a minority comprising major nations and the preponderance of power; in turn, this powerful "minority" protects itself with the veto.

- The current "minority" (meaning fewer states, but the most powerful states) in the United Nations is likely to become a permanent one.

- The numerical significance of a two-thirds "majority" vote in the United Nations frequently reflects the reverse of actual power realities in the world.



As the result, "the powerful minority cannot accept the decision of the majority, and the majority cannot enforce its decision short of war."<sup>213</sup> One cannot predict how long this "stalemate" will endure, or what its outcome will be. It appears destined to last for some time, clearly affecting the exercise of primacy by the United States or any other powerful nation. Later, we shall consult American views on the subject.

Even in international organizations, there is no single, standard approach to participation. Even indifferent subelements of the same organization, or different representatives of the same nation, may proceed with different methods and styles. For illustrative purposes, we turn to eight subordinate agencies of the United Nations--all are international organizations with similarities and differences. Compared to each other, involving variant dynamics in the exercise of power and influence by each nation within the confines of each international agency. Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, political scientists at Columbia University and the University of Michigan, with others, devoted years to the study of how influence entered into the making of decisions in each of these eight international agencies (subelements of the United Nations) between 1945 and 1970:

International Telecommunications Union (ITU)

International Labor Organization (ILO)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural  
Organization (UNESCO)

World Health Organization (WHO)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
(UNCTAD)<sup>214</sup>

For purposes of gaining perspective on influence from several angles, Cox and Jacobson constructed two sets of rankings, one of general international power rankings among nations, and one of influence standings within the functional area of each agency's specialty.<sup>215</sup> For general world power rankings, they analyzed five factors as components of power: GNP (despite misgivings about the accuracy of certain aspects of GNP in distinguishing power among nations)<sup>216</sup>; per capita GNP; population; nuclear capability; and prestige. This last factor was assessed judgmentally according to perceived autonomy or independence of a state's foreign policy, both as psychic resource and willingness to exert influence.<sup>217</sup> In order to assess this factor, nations were classified according to internal politics as competitive (democratic), mobilizing (revolutionary), or authoritarian.<sup>218</sup>

Lest this latter attribute be considered impossible to measure, the authors agree that it is a difficult and uncertain measure, but that the attempt is not unprecedented. Among others, the Feierabends attempted in 1966 to produce indices on the coerciveness of political regimes, degree of political stability, degree of frustration of "wants" of the population, extent of external aggression, and other aspects. Their data indicated, as one might expect, significant association between coerciveness of regime and

amount of socioeconomic frustration within a country; e.g., in 22 countries with a high rate of satisfaction of the wants of the people, 16 had permissive regimes. Of 17 countries with low rates of satisfaction, none had a permissive government. In addition, of 16 nations with both high satisfaction and permissive government, 15 were evaluated as highly stable.<sup>219</sup>

In any event, the actual international rankings arrived at by Cox and Jacobson will be presented, along with others, in the next chapter. Meanwhile, we shall explore in greater detail the dynamics of the eight international agencies selected by Cox and Jacobson (note that their data cover UN and agency members only through 1970; hence the PRC is not included).

The following observations<sup>220</sup> concerning the eight agencies (initials are used to save space) indicate that some share certain features with others. Some common aspects evaluated include institutional structures; breadth, essentiality, and technicality of their functions; and saliency of the issues dealt with to the political authorities of member states:

- ITU, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, and UNCTAD come much closer to being universal organizations than IAEA, IMF, and GATT (IMF and GATT do not include the USSR or certain other eastern Europe states).

- Several have unique institutional features; e.g., ILO has a tripartite system of delegates designated by governments, employers, and labor. UNESCO uses a system of National Commissions. WHO uses elaborate regional structures. IMF uses a system of



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weighted voting. UNCTAD has developed a formal, prescribed mechanism for conciliation.

- ILO, UNESCO, and UNCTAD have broad mandates in economic and social policy, whereas the mandates of the others are much more restricted.

- The most indispensable membership is that of ITU; no state hoping to communicate with others can ignore it.

- The work of ILO, UNESCO, and UNCTAD does not require much technical expertise; but the work of ITU, WHO, IAEA, IMF, and GATT does.

- ITU, IAEA, IMF, and GATT deal with fields that can involve the sovereignty of states; hence, their activities receive constant central monitorship from each home state's political authorities.

- Only the IMF has its own resources. The rich countries create outside separate shadow organizations from time to time to handle specific aspects of problems involved in these organizations. Thus, critical financial problems are now handled largely in the Group of Ten, not IMF, and certain decisions on incomes and wages and manpower are discussed in OECD rather than ILO.<sup>221</sup>

Cox and Jacobson interpret "power" to mean capability, whether material or not, whether exercised or not. They interpret "influence" to mean specific modification by one actor of another actor's behavior in a specific activity, and "elites" to mean those with most influence. Thus, some typical patterns of influence arise. For example, government representatives will

generally be most influential in representational, symbolic, and rule-creating situations. Agency executive heads will be most influential in programmatic and boundary decisions, and international bureaucracies in operational decisions. Although international organizations recruit internationally, their bureaucracies operate politically much like national bureaucracies, except that the participants in conference structures tend to be restricted to more or less rigid instructions from their home states, and except that only in rare instances do international organizations have authoritative control over substantial resources.

Incumbents of certain posts will exert influence because of whom they represent rather than who they are; however, some supplementary influence is variably available for such personal attributes as charisma, expertise, long association, negotiating ability, and scientific achievements. In addition, "There is every reason to suspect that personal goals play as great a part in international as in national or local politics."

Functionalism stresses cooperation among states in socially-essenti , specific fields (e.g., postal, communications, transportation), as a means of gradually eroding the authority of nation-states while beefing up the authority of international functional agencies and, its supporters hope, eventually of international political institutions.<sup>222</sup> Functionalism emerged from World War I and the 1930's as the doctrine of an enthusiastic minority of "one-world-ers"; while a minority, they were influential in drawing the early blueprints for international organizations. Functionalism



appeared to project democratic theory internationally and to stress specialist functions over state interests. It has declined in popularity since World War II. For one thing, functionalism has always implied some erosion of sovereignty, and hence has never been particularly attractive to the United States government; for United States doctrine has historically emphasized the uniqueness of America, its independence, its lack of need for extensive collaboration with other states.

Nor has functionalism proved welcome to the USSR, in view of messianic Soviet ideology to the effect that certain critical problems are to be solved not via gradualism but only through conflict and revolution. Nor have the majority of the new states demonstrated interest in functionalism; quite the reverse, as they seek to enhance their own nationalism and sovereignty.<sup>223</sup>

According to Cox and Jacobson, "the ideology that has supplanted functionalism for general purposes is developmentalism." In all international agencies, frequently large numbers have made a commitment, not to transforming the international system, but to improving the lot of the poorer parts of mankind--a tangible goal. Developmentalism stresses economic coordination at both national and international level, and places higher value upon collectivity than upon individuals and separate associations.

It should not be supposed that such orientations are necessarily benign, or even genuinely constructive. Professor P. T. Bauer, of the London School of Economics, has written in early 1976, after

labeling the arguments untrue that the West bears the responsibility for Third World poverty:

Since World War II the people who work in one way or another for international organizations have come increasingly to consider themselves as agents and representatives of the Third World, a stance which has often suited their political, professional, and personal interests. . . . The ideologies of the Third World and its associated agencies have become largely interchangeable.<sup>223a</sup>

We shall return in Chapters 6 and 7 to the United Nations as an arena of conflict concerning Third World interests.

Meanwhile, for purposes of categorization, states can be divided and aggregated in numerous ways, such as haves and have-nots or status quo and self-aggrandizing states; yet one should realize that the differences within each of the resulting groups are sometimes greater than the differences between groups.

In analyzing major forces at work between 1945 and 1970, Cox and Jacobson discerned a number of significant issue-patterns, such as that between the communist states and Western states, the struggle to end colonialism, the struggle between the rich and poor nations, and the issue of regional integration, particularly in Western Europe. Assessing a number of schemes for categorizing the world's nations, Cox and Jacobson arrived at the unoriginal conclusion that the system with the most satisfactory general applicability is division of nations into three categories: Western states, from Australia to the United States; Socialist states, from Albania to Yugoslavia; and all others.

Cox and Jacobson explored the various international agencies according to four characteristics: technical (e.g., physical and biological expertise), functionally specific (e.g., health, or labor), essential (e.g., delivery of mail between countries), and salient (importance as perceived by member states). They identified four distinct roles played by member states: initiator, vetoer, broker, and controller.<sup>224</sup>

Since World War II, the US, UK, and France have ranked among the top states both in the general environment and in each of the organizations. This relatively high influence of Britain and France has been generally due to their actual status, but also partially to carryover from earlier days, such as the period between the World Wars, when the British and French were the dominant powers in international organizations.



Since the end of World War II (and undoubtedly before that), the United States has been the most powerful state in the general environment. The United States has also been a primary moving force in the creation and sustenance of international organizations--not, however, to the degree of willingness to cede any significant degree of sovereignty. The United States remains the largest contributor of budgets of all agencies, and the largest supplier of extra-budgetary funds. American influence in various international organizations and agencies has been a significant factor to whatever extent that America desired to exercise influence.

American interest has varied in the different agencies, and influence has varied accordingly. In all UN agencies with substantial budgets, for example, Americans either occupied one of the two top positions or the post in charge of finances. In general, the United States has seen its own interests to be at stake in ITU, IAEA, IMF, and GATT; whereas UNESCO and WHO, though expensive, have been viewed as unable to do much damage to American interests. Perhaps the greatest decline in American influence has occurred in GATT, in which EEC nations eventually came to act as a unit and came to the unusual status of, in terms of international trade, exceeding the United States in importance.

The Soviet Union in 1950 was a desultory member of ITU but withdrew from WHO, and was not a member of others. It has since grown in influence in these agencies more than any other state. It still does not belong to GATT or IMF; but in five of the other

six agencies (not UNCTAD), the USSR is now among the most influential states.<sup>225</sup>

Thus, the general rule, expressed in numerous ways already in this study, is that influence follows power, and international influence follows international power. So long as the United States has been recognized as the nation occupying the topmost position in the hierarchy of world power, American influence in international association with other nations has been of comparable potency whenever the United States chose to exert influence. It appears important at this point to anticipate later discussions in this study by giving explicit statement to a major observation: on the whole, the American style in international organizations is characteristically reasonable and cooperative. On occasion, the United States may bargain vigorously, as do all other states on occasion; but the United States does not "throw its weight around."

Nevertheless, despite overall preponderance in many attributes (as the next chapter will show), ups and downs occur in American relationships, as they have done in those of every other nation. It is in the nature of human affairs that American primacy will end some day, and the nature of American exercise of primacy will have affected the way America will be regarded and dealt with after its period of primacy ends.

It would be interesting to examine, even briefly, the "aftermath of primacy" related to one of the great nations which preceded the United States in the position of primacy among the world's nations.

### France: From Primacy to "Deviance"

This section provides a mini-case-study of transience in primacy, and of partial maladjustment in post-primacy, that may help illuminate a number of the dynamics of primacy in the modern world. France provides a highly illustrative example of the real-world complexity of devising effective international relations in the nuclear age, for several reasons:

- France was probably the first nation state; France consequently possesses a very long and varied experience as a nation-state, including dominance, empire, rivalry, cooperation, crises of legitimacy, and other dynamics.

- France was the world's Number One nation for a century or more, even certifying other aspirant nations as members of the international community; but France lost its status of primacy while retaining great power status.

- Compared to the other nations of the world, France retains its traditional sense of cultural superiority, matched probably only by China in this respect, manifesting tension rooted in differences between the status available to it and the status it feels entitled to.

- The Franco-American relationship has its own uniqueness, a mixture of cooperation and tension. France under DeGaulle provided an example of a formerly-preeminent major nation exhibiting ambiguous and contradictory policies in modern times (for example, DeGaulle sought unwarranted hegemony over others, while denouncing even mild leadership in relation to France as intolerable "hegemony").



- The Franco-American alliance relationship powerfully illustrates the category of difficult relationship, particularly between current and former preeminent nations; for many Frenchmen, especially de Gaulle, resented American primacy. In surveys of foreign opinion, at least in Europe, French opinion has been almost without exception less favorable to the United States than any other non-Communist nation.

- Appraisal of the performance of France as one of the world's longtime leading nations may provide some basis for comparison of the performance of the United States in the position of primacy.

- This study will demonstrate that if there is hubris in America's sense of "being No. 1," America is hardly No. 1 in self-regard.

- An account is provided of one of the realities of current international life: ambivalent anti-Americanism.

- This case study from real life may add vitality to the rather abstract and bloodless discussion we have conducted so far among principles, theories, and concepts.

A nation which has been a preeminent world power but which has lost certain earmarks of preeminence develops a unique set of adjusted perspectives. Similarly, a nation which has been a small power with a predilection for detachment but which subsequently expands to become the preeminent world power develops a different unique set of adjusted perspectives. France and the United States share a heritage of common and compatible interests and values;

simultaneously, their different national experiences and situations have produced some national values and interests which are conflicting or antithetical. France has, of course, a long history and a highly developed sense of identity. During most of French history, the United States has not been of primary importance to France; in 1800, for example, the population of France was 28 million, while the population of the United States was 5 million.<sup>226</sup> From 1650-1740, France was the most powerful country in Europe and probably on the globe.

It is not necessary to cite evidence for the Anglo-American as the longest and closest relationship of the United States with any foreign country. However, the Franco-American relationship is second in importance in American history. Nevertheless, except for infrequent opposition to each other, the United States and France have maintained a relatively harmonious and substantial--if at times somewhat distant--relationship.

It is frequently cited in modern times that since the mid-19th Century, France has three times been invaded by Germany; and profound analyses have been offered as to the aggressive paranoia allegedly resident in the German ethos. It is curious that rarely or never is such an analysis extended back to certain prior periods when the nation that terrorized the whole of Europe, including the German states, was France. By the end of his life, Louis XIV wreaked damage enough to make France universally hated. Later, Napoleon not only introduced conscripted mass armies, but also revived widespread destruction and fear of France throughout Europe.

The traditional strategy of France was largely formulated by Francis I in the 16th Century; feeling obliged to rely on more than France's military power in order to stave off the menace of the Habsburgs, he sought French security in European equilibrium, by forming alliances with distant powers beyond Habsburg lands, such as Turkey, and with weaker princes. Except for the expansionist periods under Louis XIV and Napoleon, France pursued this traditionally defensive search for security. Henry IV, Sully, Richelieu, Mazarin, Vergennes, Tallyrand, and the ministers of the Third Republic all sought to achieve French security through alliances with the smaller states of Europe against other states that tried to achieve hegemony in Europe.<sup>227</sup>

Seeking the physical integrity of its territory and the maintenance of its status as a great power, France relied on both its own military power and alliances against powers threatening the status quo in Europe. However, after the Napoleonic wars, a long gradual period of decline set in. Like Spain, France declined little by little.<sup>228</sup>

In any event, after World War I, many French diplomats and politicians, convinced that France had triumphed in the war only because of her alliances, put overwhelming importance on postwar alliances--above all, with Great Britain. As the Versailles guarantees related to Germany were successively eroded, France clung more and more to British protection--practically abandoning, in the opinion of some observers, its great-power status.<sup>229</sup> In 1939, both those Frenchmen who were willing to surrender to Germany



and those who preferred to resist were agreed that France was not able to play an independent role as a great power.<sup>230</sup> After World War II, this traditional French policy of seeking security in alliance was repeated. In February 1945, de Gaulle said, understating French dependency, ". . . we do not have the temerity to believe that we can alone assure the security of Europe. We need alliances."<sup>231</sup>

"In 1945, France was prostrate. Politically and emotionally unable to assert herself effectively in the world arena, she was a nation in eclipse, a declining power, and remained so until 1958."<sup>232</sup> A study in depth of national perspectives, undertaken for UNESCO in nine countries in 1948, <sup>233</sup> arrived at the following national indexes of each nation's confidence in its own security:

<u>Australia</u>	<u>Mexico</u>	<u>Norway</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>
42	39	39	39	35	33	32	26	20

Thus, in 1948 Frenchmen had less confidence in their own security than even Germans had in theirs. (It is also of incidental interest that Mexicans, in a state contiguous to the "Colossus" frequently alleged to intimidate Latin America, had relatively great confidence in their security). The authors of the survey report commented: "The figures above suggest that France . . . in 1948 was the closest of the nine nations to a condition of pathological tension."<sup>234</sup>

A major event in France's decline was the sudden collapse of France's military forces in 1940; in a sense, Americans, as well as Frenchmen, never got over the shock until the end of the War.

The shock resulted in early American disparagement of the unknown de Gaulle, deafness towards his plea for arms for Free French forces, and early Allied aloofness from the French resistance movement. As late as July 1945 the French were not invited to participate in the Potsdam conference. Added to French resentment of certain Allied actions and reactions, considered by the French to be slights of commission and omission, was Stalin's lack of interest or approval of French participation in postwar arrangements. If the Americans and the British desired that France be included, Stalin was agreeable, so long as French portions of anything came out of the British and American portions, and so long as such reallocations had no effect on the Soviet portions.

It is important to realize also how the losses of World War II compounded France's heavy losses of World War I. The early, swift defeat, the humiliation of the Occupation, the heavy Occupation costs paid to the Germans, the "smallness" of the French share in liberating France and winning the war--all these weighed depressingly upon Frenchmen in 1945, who referred to the whole 1939-1945 period as "Le Catastrophe."<sup>235</sup> French war losses were estimated at almost five trillion francs, bringing France to the brink of economic ruin.<sup>236</sup> One and one-half million homes, three-quarters of a million farms, and 10,000 industrial concerns had been damaged or destroyed in World War II. Extensive or total damage had been done to Le Havre, Caen, Brest, Saint-Nazaire, Boulogne, and Marseilles. After World War II, the franc continued to decline; by 1960, the franc had lost 99.5 percent of its 1914 value.<sup>237</sup>

In addition, France, like the other colonial powers, saw its extensive empire collapsing, reducing France in territory, population, military units, military manpower, strategic facilities, wealth, power, and prestige.

Among the end-of-war factors compounding internal turmoil in the breasts of Frenchmen was the reckoning exacted according to patriotic or subversive acts committed by Frenchmen during World War II. After the war, there grew up a great myth, fostered by the Communists, that attempted to divide all Frenchmen as having been, during World War II, in one of only two camps: supporters of Vichy, or members of the Resistance. In reality, the majority of Frenchmen had belonged to neither.<sup>238</sup> The Communists had (belatedly) contributed dynamically to the Resistance; however, they tried to draw on themselves alone the entire heroic mantle of the Resistance. They reportedly hammered the figure "75,000 shot Communist patriots" into the public mind, but the figure was never anywhere near substantiation. At the Nuremburg trials, the French Government said 29,660 of all affiliations had been shot under the German occupation. More than eight years after the Liberation, the Communists could produce only 176 actual names of Communists alleged to have been executed in the Resistance.<sup>239</sup>

De Gaulle had spoken of "twelve dozens of traitors, twelve hundreds of cowards, and twelve thousands of idiots,"<sup>240</sup> but the reckoning far exceeded those figures. Over 150,000 treason trials were opened; of those, 35,000 cases were dismissed, 27,000 persons were acquitted, and 88,000 were condemned as traitors--7,000 to the death penalty.<sup>241</sup>



Not all of French history, even since World War II, is of one piece and design; it is a mixed history, as is the experience of any long-historied nation. Moreover, not only has France accumulated a complex of perspectives towards other nations and towards association with them; but also other nations have developed various complexes of perspective toward alliance with France, based not only on their own alliance histories, but on their perceptions of France's alliance history. Some of the national interests pursued by modern France are, of course, of long standing. The martial content of the French ethos, for example, including recurrent emphasis upon la gloire, upon French singularity and superiority, and upon France's missionary mission in the world, has not gone entirely unremarked.

France, in evaluations by other nations, has always been accorded great credit for playing a major role in the evolution of modern Western civilization. French spokesmen, however, have intermittently and egocentrically accorded to France the highest role in "rayonnement"--the radiation to the rest of the world of the best in culture, civilization, art of living, liberty, human dignity, human rights, fraternity, and spiritual and material standards. De Gaulle was by no means the first Frenchman to bespeak, or attempt to personify, the uniquely pure and mystically transcendent role of France.<sup>242</sup> Marianne, the embodying symbol of France, is portrayed in some of the bas-reliefs around the Arc de Triomphe as radiating this civilizing mission.

Other reliefs on the same monument present Marianne in the other role of France--in the martial pursuit of la gloire. The term

"chauvinism" is derived from the name of Chauvin, an officer in Napoleon's army distinguished for fanatical nationalistic and martial fervor.<sup>243</sup> "Throughout French chauvinism is the threat that the world cries out for qualities and benefits that only France can give it. No other country has spoken so much about its supposed mission."<sup>244</sup>

Burnaud wrote "The French are not military minded, but they are warriors. The French army is the best in the world. . . ."<sup>245</sup> De Toqueville remarked that the French nation was "apt in everything but excelling only in war." Rudorff wrote:

The 1st Republic began France's civilizing mission by armed forces; for a long time France became the most military-minded country in the Western world. Prussian militarism, especially in the latter years of the 19th Century, was a pale shadow of the French product.<sup>246</sup>

These evaluations, mostly by Frenchmen, of the martial and egocentric themes which run through French history are not cited to disparage France. They echo activities that speak for themselves, that have occurred. Certainly they do not summarize the total ethos of France, for several other themes would also have to be explicated to summarize France--a truly distinguished nation. But both sides of France cited above have exerted influence upon the world scene, have affected the French performance with allies, and have been influential during the past several decades among nations dealing with France.

Pressures exaggerating the status and capability of France have been repeatedly exerted. Albert Legault, a strong defender of de Gaulle, said five years ago: "The consequences of the War have

given France a preponderant role in European affairs."<sup>247</sup> One wonders what consequences of what recent war gave a preponderant role to France. "France proposes to play a preponderant role within the continent of Europe."<sup>248</sup> Legault insisted that:

The anxiety to preserve European political integrity (of which France is unquestionably the protector) is linked, at least in the mind of General de Gaulle, with the legitimate desire to play a greater role in the affairs of the Europe to be. Whatever may be the motives attributed to Europe, it remains true that the fear of an external federating force lies at the very heart of French policies and that France has no intention of renouncing the mission destined for it by history. In this sense France is, if not a 'world power' 'a power with a world-wide vocation.'<sup>249</sup>

Legault articulated de Gaulle's intention to be the "bridge" between East and West: ". . . French policies . . . strive to restore to Europe its sense of unity, lost since 1914, through the normalization of Soviet-American relations."<sup>250</sup> Yet, what was one to make of the following evaluation?

The principal criticism that could be directed against France is that she has neither the resources nor the power to change the course of events--how could France be equal to the task of guaranteeing European security, confronted with the Soviet potential? The validity of the argument cannot be contested. France prefers to keep guessing those who question her, and is careful to refrain from replying, except in a very guarded manner.<sup>251</sup>

Without engaging here in analytical assessment of these statements (was this France, or de Gaulle, or Legault speaking? Probably something of all three), one may observe that there would have to exist an appreciable differential of political, economic, military and psychological power in France's favor in order for the other nations in Europe to accord to France a "preponderant" role. But such differentials did not exist. What were France's potential



partners in the "construction of Europe" to say of cabinet minister Edmond Jouve's comment: "The construction of Europe is only desirable and only to be pursued to the extent that it lifts France to the first rank"?<sup>252</sup> How were other nations to know that France's unilaterally-discerned "mission" has been "destined by history"? Did the legitimacy of France's desire to play a greater role in European affairs also certify to the legitimacy of French "world-wide vocation"?

Some have felt that de Gaulle overestimated the dimensions of American power and influence. Members of his entourage heard him frequently appraise the United States as the only world power.<sup>253</sup> Nursing his aims for France, he felt impelled to intervene against American policy in every part of the world, on the principle that no matter which nation is at the top, friend or foe, all others should provide opposition, lest the leader become too strong. In view of France's record in Indochina, his frequent scathing strictures against subsequent American policy in Vietnam were very difficult for Washington to swallow with imperturbability. One of his favorite terms for United States (as well as USSR) policy was "hegemonic."

De Gaulle's view of France--its value and its virtues--was extreme, a constant irritant to its allies and other nations, even to those with great respect and affection for France, willing to listen to reasonably lengthy expressions of French chauvinism. Much of de Gaulle's hyperbole was couched in mystic terms. His declaration--"France cannot be France without greatness!"--has been

widely repeated. But what could this mean in a pragmatic age? With greatness or without greatness France is what it is, and can be only what it can be. "France comes from the depths of the ages. She lives. The centuries beckon her. But she remains herself through time."<sup>254</sup> Other nations have come from the depths of the ages, held great sway, and subsided without demanding the same level of deference as they had received in the past--Rome, the Ottoman Empire, the Mongols, Spain Portugal, Poland, Sweden, Holland, Denmark, Germany.

Critical to France's behavior was de Gaulle's attitude toward the United States. Observers around the world and in France differed on whether or not de Gaulle was anti-American, and the evidence is conflicting. Roy Macridis insisted that de Gaulle's "anti-Americanism" was not a matter of personal antipathy, but a matter of increasing France's independence of both Soviet and American "hegemonies."<sup>255</sup> One unidentified but highly placed French official who knew de Gaulle well is said to have remarked grimly that what de Gaulle really resented about the United States was that he was not privileged to rule it.<sup>256</sup>

A response essential to understanding the international and personal conditioning that produced the de Gaulle of the Fifth Republic, and one which illustrates the imperatives that sometimes produce intransigence in weak nations, was given to Churchill in the dire early days of the war. Churchill had chided de Gaulle for his inflexibility, suggesting he conduct himself as flexibly as he, Churchill. De Gaulle's retort was instructive concerning relations

between stronger and weaker parties; he conceded that Churchill, in control of a nation still in possession of its facilities and its homeland, could afford to be flexible. "But I! . . . I am too poor to be able to bend."<sup>257</sup>

De Gaulle commented himself on his "bargaining style," his own rigidity and singleness of purpose, especially during the tribulations of early collaboration with allies:

It is by acting as the inflexible champion of the nation and the state that it would be possible for me to gain the consent and even the enthusiasm of the French and the respect and consideration of foreigners. The people who throughout the drama were shocked by this intransigence did not want to see that, for me, strained to resist innumerable contrary pressures, the least bending might have led to collapse. In short, circumscribed and alone as I was, and exactly because I was, I had to reach the summits and never more descend.<sup>258</sup>

De Gaulle borrowed from Maurras the distinction between the pays reel, the people, and the pays legal, the institutions of the state; and on this distinction he exploited his charismatic appeal to the French people.<sup>259</sup>

The principles of de Gaulle related to international interaction were recognizable behind the conduct of France during the Fourth and Fifth Republics. They are strong contenders for recognition as realistic appraisals of life and politics, as numerous philosophical and artistic masterpieces produced over the entire life span of mankind will attest. Insofar as they are logical, pessimistic, and cynical, they also have a claim to being very French.



They are also Hobbesian and negative. When carried to extremes, they can be used to rationalize egocentricity, pathological sensitivity concerning oneself, and brutal insensitivity to others. No history of de Gaulle fails to emphasize the slights which he suffered from Roosevelt, Churchill, and others in the early days of World War II. But slights of some sort under the circumstances might well have been expected; both Churchill and Roosevelt were world figures, engaged in a global war, with some responsibility for the continuity of Western civilization in endurable form. Who France was was well known and appreciated, also; but in those days and circumstances, who was de Gaulle?

Moreover, like many people who are highly sensitive to slights to themselves, de Gaulle seemed insensitive to the slights he bluntly inflicted on others, as in his brutal statements to Chancellor Erhard in Paris in 1963, his barring of Walter Hallstein from even attending the tenth anniversary celebration of the Treaty of Rome in 1967, and his not infrequent denigration of others, including French officials and, on occasion, even the French people.<sup>260</sup>

The French voice was not timid. "During the 4th Republic, France behaved, broadly speaking, as a declining power . . . it sought to compensate for military inferiority by reiterating demands for respect for its dignity."<sup>261</sup> France repeatedly used its veto power in the Allied Control Commission; coming on top of French arguments over military strategy during the war, French demands gradually turned Anglo-Saxon understanding into impatience, and then to hostility.<sup>262</sup>

Meanwhile, the United States contributed enormous aid of all kinds; by the last year of the Indo-China War, 1954, the United States was paying 75% of the costs of the French side.<sup>264</sup> Other aspects of Franco-American collaboration were less harmonious. One aspect of American alliance non-cooperation rankled the French since World War II: the refusal of the United States to pass advanced nuclear technology information to France<sup>265</sup> (as well as to any other country, except through the United Kingdom).

In view of the enormous support given by the United States to France, it is interesting to note an analysis of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in 1964, which attempted to set up a balance sheet on the Cold War. Using 14 principal (and 14 other) indicators, the project sought to identify every nation's degree of alignment with the United States or the Soviet Union.<sup>266</sup> The project identified the 20 countries most closely aligned with the United States or the USSR. Of the 20 nations most closely aligned with the United States, West Germany was closest, and the United Kingdom second. France was not even among the 20 nations closest to the United States<sup>267</sup>--a remarkable differential between any member of an alliance such as NATO and the leader of the alliance.

There has always been considerable variation in interest among the members of NATO, but the need to make distinctions among them was muted when American participation was desperately desired--when "American leadership was accepted . . . there was no challenge of the prevailing strategic doctrine . . . or of America's predominance in the Alliance. The benefits of Alliance were real for all."<sup>268</sup>

Considerable ground appears to exist to contest de Gaulle's repeatedly-voiced resentments of alleged alliance integration, American hegemony, and supranational dictation; but these resentments were not confined to de Gaulle:

There is a certain dose of Americanophobia in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic . . . yet, anti-Americanism . . . goes far beyond de Gaulle himself. It was born in the early days of the Fourth Republic as a resentment of dependence. . . .<sup>269</sup>

"We must say it, we must write it," declared Maurice Duverger, "there is only one intimate threat for Europe, and that is American civilization."<sup>270</sup>

On the one hand, a Fifth Republic Cabinet minister could declare in 1960 that "there can be no question that political and military capabilities (of the United States) confer upon it certain rights."<sup>271</sup> On the other hand, the nation which de Gaulle had called in 1963 "a good ally," had become by 1964 a "foreign protector wholly uncertain."<sup>272</sup>

The postwar survey of Buchanan and Cantril in 1948 revealed some interesting French conclusions about themselves and others. Frenchmen thought "things were worst" then in (in order) Greece, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Britain, Indo-China, and Palestine; they thought "things were best" in Switzerland, the United States, the USSR, Belgium, and Sweden.<sup>273</sup> A revealing question was asked of citizens of nine countries: "Which country in the world gives you the best chance of leading the kind of life you would like to lead?" These were the percentage responses selecting each nation by its own citizens:



<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Norway</u>	<u>Mexico</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>	<u>Germany</u>
96	83	51	50	45	43	36	31	30

To some extent, in the most recent five years, French foreign policy has come closer to home, and is less concerned with distant situations (e.g., Quebec). Some modification of strategic views has occurred--e.g., repudiation of the "tous azimuts" (all around the compass) strategy began while de Gaulle was still in office--both because of the costs involved and because the rest of NATO, after French departure, adopted the concept of "flexible response." At the North Atlantic Council meeting of December 1970, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman even acknowledged Europe's military dependence upon the United States in "terms rarely heard since France ended her military integration with the alliance in 1966."<sup>274</sup> If United States forces were to depart, he said, Europe would be almost defenseless; "there can be no European security without the participation of the United States."<sup>275</sup>

Still, Foreign Minister Michel Debré, a heavily committed Gaullist, used these terms,<sup>276</sup> containing a number of veiled references to the United States, in describing France's defense principles in June of 1970. After describing the master-servile relationships between Hitler and his satellites and Stalin and his, Debre said:

-The same phenomenon is apparent on the side of liberty, quite different in reality but analogous in principle . . . after the establishment of NATO, . . . a strange conspiracy of ideology and foreign interests sought, through the European Defence Community, to enforce disbandment of our army and the total subordination of our national interest. . . .

-It is fashionable, in some quarters, to criticize French nationalism. In fact, French nationalism no longer exists. . . .

- . . . it is now unrealistic to think in terms of a common organization unless one accepts that there will be the integrated, who follow, and the integrator, who commands.

- . . . its consequences . . . are not always evil . . . but (it creates) a hierarchy of interests to the profit of the strongest, who is, in the final analysis, the sole master of the security or insecurity of the group.

- . . . there is a great difference between constructing reciprocal obligations and abandoning the fate of the nation to the authority of a foreign power!

-It is only normal to give a special place to Franco-American relations.

The nation in the world which received the greatest amount of American material aid was France; only through the political efforts of America and Britain was France given a part in the occupation of Germany and among the Big Four, a position which France immediately abused through non-cooperation. The point is that France was politically, economically, and militarily dependent upon allies, until recovery reached advanced stages.

Even at an advanced stage of recovery, France was, among NATO nations, on a par with Britain, Germany, and perhaps Italy. France's rank would be determined like everyone else's--not by pretensions, but by hard-eyed assessment of actual capabilities. The NATO nations not only accepted American leadership but for many reasons preferred it; they did not want to confer leadership upon France. Yet, France sought preponderance among Continental members, and a share in a limited leadership, to which no capability of France

(even the force de frappe) or NATO endorsement entitled it. France's pursuit of status and power caused it to lend itself to Soviet designs to emasculate NATO and to get the United States out of Europe.

On numerous occasions, de Gaulle denounced American leadership of NATO, as "American command," "subjection imposed from abroad," and "hegemony." He frequently paired "The two hegemonies"--as though the leadership roles in NATO and the Warsaw Pact were more alike than different. Yet, other NATO members whose problems were no different from France's, did not express such denigration; none felt subjection imposed from abroad, or that they were "under American command." With limited exceptions for limited periods, all were reasonably satisfied with American leadership of their Alliance.

This excursion into French national behavior since World War II may shed some illumination upon several dynamics of international interaction that are still volatile on the world scene and that will not depart for some time. Can a drive toward primacy render a modern nation paranoid, or is paranoia produced by the prospect of losing a status of primacy? Can world order be maintained without some exercise of coercive power, including pressure on Allies? Is foreign assistance appreciated? Does foreign assistance produce harmony and cooperation?

There are disturbing aspects in this account of the partly eccentric behavior of one of the most advanced and sophisticated nations on earth, attempting to stave off the consequences of lost



preeminence. If America were to suffer substantial decline in primacy, in its power and affluence relative to other nations, should the rest of the world assume that subsequent American behavior will be immune from eccentricity?

Having explored a wide and uneven range of concepts and aspects related to primacy, it remains to summarize what appears most significant.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, p. xiv.
2. Ibid., p. xxiv.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Singer, Human Behavior, pp. 1-2, 6.
6. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
7. Dahl, op. cit., p. 406.
8. Berle, op. cit., p. 419.
9. US Department of State, Status of the World's Nations, 1974.
10. Ibid.
11. Everett S. Lee, "Population and Scarcity of Food," Papers prepared for 79th annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, April 11, 1975, pp. 6, 8.
12. Henry Barbera, Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War, p. .
13. Vital, Inequality of States, p. 123.
14. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate," p. 32.
15. Singer, Human Behavior, p. 104. There are a number of critics of the concept, such as Farber, Leites, Klineberg, and Bendix.
16. Ibid., p. 105.
17. Quoted by Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 129.
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19. Ibid., p. 133.
20. David McClelland, The Achieving Society, pp. 391-392.
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22. Cited by Charles A. Beard, "The Idea of National Interest," in M. Berkowitz and P. G. Bock, eds. American National Security, New York: Free Press 1965, p. 3 (*italics in original*).

23. Ibid.
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25. Berkowitz and Bock, op. cit., p. x.
26. Ibid., p. 1.
- 26a. George F. Kennan, "Lectures on Foreign Policy," Illinois Law Review, XLV (1951), pp. 718-742. Cited by Grayson L. Kirk, "In Search of the National Interest," World Politics, October 1952, p. 112.
27. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': the National Interest of the United States," in Ibid., pp. 31-32.
28. J. David Singer and Paul Winston, "Individual Values, National Interests, and Political Development in the International System," p. 3.
29. Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth, pp. 37-38.
30. Singer and Winston, op. cit., pp. 6-9.
31. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate'," op. cit., p. 32.
32. Quoted by George L. Peabody, "Power, Alinsky, and Other Thoughts," in Horrnstein, Social Intervention, p. 522.
33. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 74, (referred to hereafter as "PAM").
34. Ibid., p. 30.
35. Ibid., p. 75.
36. Quoted in Peabody, op. cit., p. 523.
37. K. E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," Conflict Resolution, Vol. III, June 1959, p. 120 (referred to hereafter as Boulding, "Images").
38. Ibid., p. 122.
39. Ibid., p. 124.
40. Morgenthau, PAM, p. 84.
41. Ibid., p. 87.
42. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. .
43. Letter to Dr. A. L. Wermuth, from Mr. W. V. Morrow, Jr., Oct. 25, 1974.
44. Barbera, op. cit., pp. 118-119.



45. David McLellan, The Theory and Practice of International Politics, p. 3. Quoted in C. L. Clarke, Jr. "What Does It Mean to Win in the Cold War?", p. 36.
46. Quoted in Ibid., p. 68.
47. Quoted in Ibid., p. 29.
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49. Ibid., p. 46.
50. Morgenthau, PAM, Chapter 9.
51. Anton W. DePorte, DeGaulle's Foreign Policy 1944-1946, p. 1.
52. Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Basis of French Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, January 1930. Quoted in Ibid.
53. Barbera, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
54. Ibid., p. 3. Barbera also considers and rejects other theories concerning responsibility for differences in development, such as the theory suggesting climate as the principal differentiator.
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56. Ibid., pp. 119-121.
57. Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth, pp. 12-13.
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59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
61. Ibid., p. 15.
62. Wayne H. Ferris, The Power Capabilities of Nation States, p. 111.
63. Ibid., particularly pp. 7-19, 112-119, and 123.
64. The analysis of national traits and their relationships to the understanding (or the prediction) of national behavior is still in inconclusive stages. Terhune's illuminating review of the state of current thought supports the value of continuing study, but this complex aspect is not pursued extensively in this paper. Hence, the points made touching on this aspect are tentative, subject to confirmation or rebuttal. See Kenneth W. Terhune,

"From National Character to National Behavior: A Reformulation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIV, 2 (June 1970), pp. 203-264.

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83. Klaus Knorr. On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age, pp. 152, 163.
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143. One might cite here the work of George W. England, University of Minnesota, in investigating the value systems of organizational groups, among a number interested in this kind of analysis.

In some studies, two scales are used; in one, the respondent evaluates each of 86 value-concepts as of high importance, average importance, or low importance. In the other scale, he evaluates the concepts as "successful," "right," or "traditional." Those who rate concepts as both high in importance and successful are classified as pragmatic in outlook; those who emphasize "right" concepts as high in importance are classified as moralistic in tendency. Both orientations are found in all groups, even though all group members work on the same problems. See "Personal Values and Military Administration," Industrial Relations Center, U. of Minnesota (for Office of Naval Research) Aug. 1970.

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162. Bertrand deJouvenel, Power, pp. 195-197, 202-208.
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167. Alfred Grosser, op. cit. pp. 15, 21.
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181. Ibid., pp. 32-34.
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184. Berle, op. cit., p. 46.
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187. Haas, Web, p. 5.

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190. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
191. Ibid., p. 21.
192. Ibid., p. 8.
193. Ibid., footnote, p. 34.
194. Ibid., p. 33.
195. Ibid., p. 36.
196. Ibid., p. 38.
197. Berle, op. cit., p. 483.
198. Vital, op. cit., pp. 63, 119.
199. Knorr, Power and Wealth, pp. 6-9.
200. For example, Raymond Aron writes: "There is no general theory of international relations comparable to the general theory of economy," op. cit., p. 93.
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202. Glenn H. Snyder, "Balance of Powers in the Missile Age," Journal of International Affairs, 14 (1960), p. 21.
203. A number of approaches are available purporting to explain not only how the world system is, but also how it was, or will be, or could be, or should be. Among valuable contributions are the following:
- Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York, Knopf, 1948), p. 182; J. W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1965), Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares (New York, Random House, 1967), and Power and International Relations (New York, Random House, 1967); Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York, Wiley, 1957); R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution, X, 3 (September 1966); Wolfram E. Hanreider, "The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, IX, 3 (September 1965).
204. Ferris, op. cit., p. 1.
205. Organski, op. cit., p. 417.

206. Bull, "World Order and the Super Powers," p. 141.
207. Ibid., p. 142.
208. Ibid. p. 143.
209. Ibid., pp. 143-144.
210. Ibid., pp. 146-148.
211. Bull, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
212. Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 535-536.
213. Ibid. p. 537.
214. Cox and Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence, p. 1.
215. Ibid., pp. 437-438.
216. Cox and Jacobson compare their methods of measuring power with those of Organski and F. Clifford German. Their misgivings about the GNP measure are expressed on p. 441. Knorr's misgivings on the same issues can also be compared in Power and Wealth, p. 47.
217. Cox and Jacobson, op. cit., p. 438.
218. Ibid., p. 29.
219. I. K. and R. L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior Within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 10 (1966), pp. 249-271. Quoted by Morton Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 79 ff.
220. Cox and Jacobson, op. cit., chapters 2 and 11.
221. Ibid., p. 424.
222. Ibid., pp. 15-22.
223. Ibid., pp. 402-404.
- 223a. P. T. Bauer, "Western Guilt to Third World Poverty," Commentary, January 1976, p. 38.
224. Cox and Jacobson, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
225. Ibid., pp. 411-413.
226. Official Associated Press Almanac 1975, p. 220.
227. De Porte, op. cit., p. 2.



228. Aron, War and Peace, p. 312.
229. DePorte, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
230. Ibid., p. 13.
231. Serfaty, op. cit., p. 6.
232. Ibid., quoted on book jacket.
233. William Buchanan, Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other, p. 27.
234. Ibid., p. 28.
235. Brogan, op. cit., pp. 66-69.
236. Serfaty, op. cit., p. 27.
237. Brogan, op. cit., pp. 66-69.
238. Herbert Leuthy, France Against Herself, p. 97.
239. Ibid.
240. Serfaty, op. cit., p. 27.
241. Kelly, op. cit., p. 4. Serfaty cites (p. 27) the "official" figures given by P. H. Teitzer to the National Assembly on August 6, 1946: 4783 death sentences, 11,000 sentences to life imprisonment; 19,000 to lesser periods of confinement. Serfaty also cites the somewhat different figures given by Jacques Fauvet (La IV<sup>e</sup>me Republique, Paris 1960), pp. 34-35): 2071 death sentences; twice as many death sentences in absentia; 40,000 detentions (2777 for life); and 48,273 "condemnations for national indignities."
242. Raymond Rudorff, The Myth of France (New York, Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970), pp. 6-13. Every library in France, says Rudorff is "cluttered" with books with titles such as L'esprit de la France, L'ame francaise, La civilization francaise, etc. Rudorff quotes both older and modern spokesmen; e.g., Pierre Alix, 1939: "Civilization at its purest, its most disinterested; civilization seen as the ultimate achievement of Occidental experience--civilization in this sense is France . . . French thought has not lost its primacy . . . Paris confers consecration . . . Anybody who has not received our baptism can scarcely pretend to universality. Even more than at the time of Voltaire, Paris is the capital of thought." Andrew Malraux: France can only be herself when she is part of other's hopes "and in charge of man's destiny." Leon Blum,

1930's. "What you call our internationalism is the hope, is the certainty, that the whole world will one day be peacefully conquered by those ideas which France represents in history." Rudorff finds this theme repeated relentlessly by de Gaulle, such as in speeches in 1958 and 1959--the theme that the eyes of the world are always fixed on France " . . . the world . . . wishes, even if she sometimes pretends the contrary, to see us playing a role which suits us, since it feels that it will be to the advantage of all mankind, since France's power and grandeur aiding her genius, are directed toward the good and the fraternity of mankind"; "France is made to live, to raise herself, and to radiate . . . we are a single people . . . we are the great, the only, and unique French people . . . "

243. Ibid., p. 7.

244. Ibid.

245. Robert Burnand, Je Sui Francais, 1927, Quoted in Ibid., p. 13

246. Rudorff, op. cit., p. 15.

247. Albert Legault, Deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance, p. 94.

248. Ibid., p. 26.

249. Ibid., p. 76.

250. Ibid., p. 90.

251. Ibid., p. 92.

252. Buchan, op. cit., p. 56.

253. Beck, op. cit., p. 46.

254. Quoted from de Gaulle's memoir, The Renewal, published in October 1970. Quoted by Henry Giniger, "Memoirs by deGaulle Cite Appeal to US on Vietnam," New York Times, October 8, 1970, p. 3.

255. Roy Macridis, ed., DeGaulle--Implacable Ally (New York, Harper, 1966) p. 96. See also Edward A. Kolodziej, "French Strategic Policy: A Systemic Perspective," a paper for the 65th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-6, 1969.

256. Cited by Harold Deutsch in Beck, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

257. dePorte op. cit., p. 24.

258. Quoted by dePorte, op. cit., p. 23.

259. Serfaty, op. cit., p. 114.

260. Twenty years after the Normandy landings, for example, de Gaulle refused to attend commemorative ceremonies, saying that he had never forgiven the allies for not informing him about the invasion until the day it occurred (J. R. Tournaux, La Tragedie du General (Paris, Plon, 1967) p. 575, cited in Bech, et al., op. cit., p. 46).

To Pierre Abelin, de Gaulle said in 1962: "The French will always be the same. After I am gone they'll go back to what they used to be. Disunited, divided, victims of their internecine bickerings." In the same year he said to Pierre Sudreau: "Without me this country will amount to nothing. Without me all this will collapse." Quoted by Harold Deutsch, in Ibid., pp. 53-54.

261. Serfaty, op. cit., p. 161.

262. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

263. Ibid., p. 78.

264. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 100.

265. The French particularly resented British nuclear collaboration with the United States on an exclusive basis. Atomic physics had begun in France in 1896 at the laboratories of Henri Becquerel and the Curies. The French government held the original patents on atomic energy, which they had shared with the British. Robert Gilpin, France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 11, 164, 170.

266. Henri Teune; Sig Synnestvedt. "Measuring International Alignment." Orbis, IX, I (Spring, 1965), pp. 171-189. Indicators included military commitments, voting behavior in the UN, diplomatic recognition patterns, and diplomatic exchange visits of important political figures.

267. Ibid., p. 179.

268. Stanley Hoffman, op. cit., p. 391.

269. Serfaty, op. cit., pp. 120-121.

270. Quoted by Kulski, op. cit., p. 168.

271. M. Debré, Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats de l'Assemblée Nationale, October 13, 1960, p. 2512.

272. Address of April 16, 1964, quoted by Serfaty, op. cit., p. 123.



273. Buchanan and Cantril, op. cit., p. 28.

274. Drew Middleton, "Nixon Gives NATO Pledge on Troops," New York Times, December 4, 1970, p. 1.

275. Robert Schuman, quoted in Ibid.

276. See text of the comprehensive June 25 address by Michel Debré to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, "The Principles of Our Defense Policy," in Survival, November 1970, pp. 376-383. See also Eric Pace, "Debré Says France is Planning Thermonuclear Arsenal by 1980," New York Times, July 31, 1970, p. 2.